Killer Robots and More

From Der Spiegal, an interesting report on all the new "killer robots" that the US military and the military industrial complex is looking to deploy in the near future:

Robot warriors have already seen action in Iraq, and the US Army plans to replace one-third of its armored vehicles and weapons with robots by 2015. These killing machines may one day come equipped with an artificial conscience -- even to the extent of disobeying immoral orders[ed...as opposed to humans who don't?].

It should come as no surprise as the military moves forward with unmanned jet fighters that are much larger than the latest predator drones and can carry nearly twice the amount of ammunition and fuel that a conventional, manned fighter can carry. Once you get past some of the "I.Robot" hysterics, there are other fascinating developments:

The US Army's latest recruits are 1 meter (about 3 feet) tall, wear desert camouflage and are armed with black M249 machine guns. They also move on caterpillar tracks and -- thanks to five camera eyes -- can even see in the dark.

The fearless fighters are three robot soldiers who, unnoticed by the general public, were deployed in Iraq in mid-June, charged with hunting down insurgents.[snip]

Because the three robots, dubbed "Swords," are being used in a secret mission, their creators have no idea whether the devices have already killed enemy fighters in combat.

The military is probably not going to release that information for a long time. Right now there is speculation on it and future uses that are already sparking discussions about humanity, morality and the use of robots to harm humans straight out of Isaac Asimov's book. When or if that is announced, a much bigger and broader discussion will ensue. Obviously, unmanned drones have already used hellfire missiles to take out buildings and known enemies. Because it is an aerial platform that many have been used to thinking of as a "spy plane" or other model planes that are relatively frequent in our society and likely because people have always associated aerial bombings as somewhat "surgical" and "cold", unlike shooting a human with a gun up close and personal, there has been much less concern. With ground robots who may or may not act autonomously, it is like a machine looking into the face of its victim.

A more important issue is noted here:

From a military standpoint, there are many reasons to support the growing use of steel soldiers. For one, fear and fatigue are non-issues. Robots kill without hesitating and, unlike flesh-and-blood soldiers, losing them is merely a financial loss. A new Swords goes for about $150,000. Besides, politicians and generals no longer need to worry about a public outcry over excessive fatalities: Who mourns a fallen tin soldier?

Yet, one issue that is not addressed here is what happens when a large portion of our forces are inanimate robots? What happens if you pay little cost for war? How important does it become to win? Will we actually see war as a defense and necessary for our survival? And, will the population be even less inclined to support that war or fight to win it when they have little, if anything, to lose? Further, if we have nothing to lose besides money, how much more inviting is it to use force?

Beyond the development of robots that may or may not have a "conscience", what about our "conscience"?

Other robots coming up quickly:

An even more impressive device on display at Webster Field was a seven-meter (23-foot) helicopter called Fire Scout. Instead of a cockpit, the unmanned helicopter has a windowless face that covers a Cyclops-like eye: a laser device that enables Fire Scout to land on its own, even on the tight deck space available on smaller warships.[snip]

Northrop Grumman is also developing an unarmed stealth fighter, the X-47, which the company expects to perform its first fully automated landing on a moving aircraft carrier in 2011. "By removing the pilots, we enable the device to remain airborne for an additional 10 hours or more," says Tighe Parmenter of Northrop Grumman. "To program an enemy mission, all you need is a keyboard and a mouse."

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20 Kilowatt laser blows up mortar(video)

It's been one of the big mysteries of the ray gun world: How exactly did Raytheon manage to blow up a set of mortars -- while using a laser that's only a fraction of what's considered battlefield strength? A company executive revealed the surprising answer in an interview with DANGER ROOM.

Pentagon Paid $999,798 to Ship Two 19-Cent Washers to Texas

Aug. 16 (Bloomberg) -- A small South Carolina parts supplier collected about $20.5 million over six years from the Pentagon for fraudulent shipping costs, including $998,798 for sending two 19-cent washers to a Texas base, U.S. officials said.

The company also billed and was paid $455,009 to ship three machine screws costing $1.31 each to Marines in Habbaniyah, Iraq, and $293,451 to ship an 89-cent split washer to Patrick Air Force Base in Cape Canaveral, Florida, Pentagon records show.

The owners of C&D Distributors in Lexington, South Carolina -- twin sisters -- exploited a flaw in an automated Defense Department purchasing system: bills for shipping to combat areas or U.S. bases that were labeled ``priority'' were usually paid automatically, said Cynthia Stroot, a Pentagon investigator.

Summary only...

Casualties of War

Wounded in War - One soldier relates how, after being severely wounded by an RPG, his buddies ran through a hail of fire to rescue him.

Army suicides highest in 26 years

Some interesting facts:

The 99 suicides included 28 soldiers deployed to the two wars and 71 who weren't. About twice as many women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan committed suicide as did women not sent to war, the report said.

Preliminary numbers for the first half of this year indicate the number of suicides could decline across the service in 2007 but increase among troops serving in the wars, officials said.[snip]

Failed personal relationships, legal and financial problems and the stress of their jobs were factors motivating the soldiers to commit suicide, according to the report.

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Military Inventions

Weapons Makers Unveil New Era of Counter-Terror Equipment- Most of the previewed items here are not "new", but "improved". Bullet proof glass and a robot that can "patrol" for days without coming back in, modeled after a Mars robot. Another interesting item was the vehicle bound x-ray machine that apparently can x-ray vehicles passively and will allow troops to identify vehicles with explosives or other contraband in them.

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Women in Combat: Where I Part Company with Conservatives

Reading this piece, Rubber-Stamp RAND Report Excuses Women in Land Combat, (h/t Mudville) I knew immediately I was going to disagree with it.

There are issues in here about appropriate congressional oversight of mandated laws which requires at least 30 days notice that women will be assigned to front line units or roles in theater. I understand those concerns based on our still rather conservative society. Yet, I believe that it is likely most of the MOSs these women are serving in are designated as roles women can serve in without congressional oversight.

But, where I really doubt this interpretation of the RAND report is this section:

The document condones practices that blatantly disregard congressional-oversight requirements mandated in law, and puts female soldiers at the mercy of commanders making up their own rules. What’s worse, the RAND Report disregards the military consequences of forcing women into or near direct-ground-combat units, which attack the enemy with deliberate offensive action. Nor does it mention that such a change ultimately will expose civilian women to future Selective Service registration and combat duty on the same basis as men. The authors seem unconcerned that all of this could happen without Congress or the American people having a say.

As far as I know, based on anecdotal evidence only, but including conversations with many women who have served as combat medics and as leaders of CMOCs, etc, I have not heard one woman complain about being "forced" into these roles. In fact, from my experience, most of the women who have served in these positions have trained for and volunteered for these positions. Some have even demanded it. Most of them are not overtly concerned with women as future Selective Services candidates. They are largely concerned about two things: 1) giving as much service as their male counterparts; and 2) having as much career opportunity and advancement as their male counterparts.

Can Donnelly provide any reports, official or anecdotal, that women are being "forced" into any combat or near combat related role?

It's bunk.

Then we get this time worn and bogus issue:

Our female soldiers are indisputably brave, but the military cannot disregard differences in physical strength and social complications that would detract from the strength, discipline, and readiness of direct-ground-combat units.

Collocated forward support companies, called “FSCs,” also are required to be all male for many good reasons. No one’s infantryman son should have to die because the FSC soldier nearest him cannot lift and single-handedly carry him from the battlefield if he is severely wounded under fire. Male soldiers have that capability. Female soldiers, no matter how brave, do not.

Gees...I am hard pressed at even where to begin, but let me talk about "social complications". Women are serving in great numbers on bases all over Iraq and Afghanistan. Bases that are large and small. Let us say, for simplicity, that Al Faw Palace in the Green Zone, arguably the largest base and well protected, is most closely associated with the "rear". It is in the middle of Baghdad. It is mortared still pretty frequently and "front line" offensive forces come and go from there every day to patrol Baghdad. Women are on this base. It IS the front line. Exactly where would Donnelly like these women to be based? Kuwait? How about Balad? It is routinely mortared, has infantry troops stationed there that go "outside" the wire and so is a major medical unit, personnel, paymasters and various other support groups.

Exactly, how would she like these forces allocated? And the nurses who volunteer to take medical flights that are shot at? What different social connotations are supposed to exist on a small base where front line forces are compared to a big base? And, how often does it really happen that women are on absolutely remote bases with small forces?

In reference to what women or men can or cannot do, there have been plenty of instances where combat medics have pulled men to safety. Raven 42 comes to mind. There are also stories of men single handedly carrying another to safety. But, many famous images, including that of Sgt Brad Kassal, show a common action is multiple men working together to pull carry the wounded to a safe location. This is not about lack of body strength or heroics, this is about economic use of strength and quickly resolving the situation. It is how they train in the first place to work as a team to protect and secure their battle buddies. It is not about whether an individual is effective or not at a single person removal.

She continues with the "no matter how brave" meme. I believe that is referred to as "damned by feint praise".

I don't know what is going to happen for selective services registration. That is its own separate issue that has a particular law guiding it that was enacted at the beginning of our creation as a nation. Congress would definitely have to enact a revision or a new law to replace one that calls for every able bodied man between 18 and 40 to be called in a time of necessity.

What I do know is that women have been serving, not just with distinction or "bravely", but voluntarily and with purpose. They are 15% of in theater forces and 30% of over all forces. Trying to turn back the clock to some 1980's version of the military and society is not going to happen.

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"Flexible Battery": Military Use?

Recently, the DoD announced a contest to design a portable, lighter battery pack for soldiers' equipment in the field.

The Department of Defense is asking a person or team to come up with a way to lessen the weight of the 20-40 pounds of batteries a solider carries on a typical four-day mission. The batteries power everything from soldiers' GPS systems to their night-vision goggles.

"In many missions the batteries are heavier than the ammunition they are carrying," said Dr. William S. Rees Jr., Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences -- whose office, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering, is sponsoring the prize competition. "We'd like to reverse that ratio."

There was a million dollar prize for the design.

There is no indication that this group was working towards the prize, but I found this announced invention interesting and began thinking about how it could be integrated and adapted for military use:

Researchers develop bendable battery

WASHINGTON - It's a battery that looks like a piece of paper and can be bent or twisted, trimmed with scissors or molded into any shape needed. While the battery is only a prototype a few inches square right now, the researchers at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute who developed it have high hopes for it in electronics and other fields that need smaller, lighter power sources.[snip]

Unlike other batteries, Linhardt explained, it is an integrated device, not a combination of pieces.

The battery uses paper infused with an electrolyte and carbon nanotubes that are embedded in the paper. The carbon nanotubes form the electrodes, the paper is the separator and the electrolyte allows the current to flow.[snip]

And over about 18 months, the groups developed the projects, into a battery, a capacitor, which stores electricity and a combination of the two.

Ajayan sees potential uses in combination with solar cells, perhaps layers of the paper batteries that could store the electricity generated until it is needed, he said in a telephone interview.

Perhaps it could be scaled up and shaped into something like a car door, offering moving electrical storage and power when needed.

It's thin. It's light. It can bend. The applications would be endless. The adaptability would be as well. One way that it could be shaped or developed for carrying could be to line already existing equipment or carrying devices with the material such as Body Armor vests, back packs, helmets, lining the cases of the equipment itself, etc, etc, etc,
In fact, if it could be integrated into the equipment itself, the equipment could be redesigned to be less bulky, creating a slimmer silhouette that would facilitate maneuverability.

Inside additional equipment or even clothing, the batteries could provide endless back up supply that was equally light. It could be carried by every member of the unit in those configurations. It could also be rolled into tubes and simply carried in a pack.

There are a few draw backs. The first is cost. Carbon nanotubes are not inexpensive to make. The technology and manufacturing capabilities could be an expensive undertaking. Although, if it is underwritten by government grants as well as has confirmed contracts, the set up costs could be offset considerably.

The second issue will be its capability to support the amount of energy required for some of the technology. The inventors believe that the battery is comparable to others already in use:

"So from the commercial standpoint, this would be very expensive if you want to make a large sheet out of this material," he said via e-mail. In addition, he said, "It does not look like it performs better than currently available batteries and supercapacitors in the market."

Actually, it could be a cost saver if the overall design of equipment, like radios, could be adapted to require less space and, thus, less material to cover, for the battery. This cost savings could translate into making the cost of the "paper" battery more inviting as well as the possibility that it would take less space to carry extras, for shipping, etc. There is a built in cost savings there. Finally, the most important savings, weight, translates into saving transport space and maneuverability for soldiers. That can translate into a more effective force and that equals winning more quickly and saving more soldiers' lives.

So, cost maybe less of a factor.

One other question that cannot be answered by this article: what sort of electrolytes are being used? If this flexible battery were integrated into equipment and armor and it was struck by a round, would it be harmful to the soldier?

If not, I think the million dollar prize can go to this group.

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV: Damned If You Do

Having watched the 37 minute, Pentagon Briefing 31 July 2007 on Gen. William Wallace's findings regarding the death of Cpl Pat Tillman, I was interested in finding out how exactly could the famous football star's potential death as a fratricide could be, as Deputy Secretary of State Geren called it, "close hold". In other words, how would Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld and the President not know several days later that this was a possibility when the entire platoon knew and so did their officers? More so because the AAR had occured on April 23 and an AR 15-6 investigation was opened on the same day?

Mind you, it is not that I don't understand Afghanistan is 12,000 miles away from the United States. But, Pat Tillman? The heroic, patriotic man who had given up millions to defend his country? Wouldn't somebody want to know what happened?

And how could a command believe the right thing to do was NOT tell the family or pass that information on, up the chain of command?

Was Gen. Kensinger solely responsible or was he left holding the bag?

That is the question that is being sought in congress today even though Gen. Wallace's completed report ends at Gen. Kensinger. Of course, Wallace is a general in the United States Army and has no power over the civilian authority of the Secretary of Defense so his investigation rightfully ends there.

Without passing judgment on Rumsfeld and since I only have documents pertaining to the Army's investigation, there are some very good reasons that Kensinger and several general officers are being held responsible for the failure of providing the Tillman's with appropriate information.

From the AR 15-6 2005, conducted by Brig. Gen. Jones, on page 1977, the name is redacted, but this officer explains clearly that they chose not to provide the Tillman's with information for the very thing that they were accused of - namely "cover up". I believe this is Lt. Gen. Kensinger, though I cannot be certain due to the redacted name. It could be someone directly below him in the chain of command. It is certain it is someone who had direct responsibility for notifying the Tillman family.

-Feb 17, 2005 -I was the [redacted] on 22 Apr 04. As stated in my earlier statement in this investigation, I do not recall the specific date on which I learned Spc Tillman's death may have resulted from friendly fire; however, it was a few days following the incident but prior to 29 Apr 04 when the [redacted] sent a message to the Commanders, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and USASOC advising the death was potentially a fratricide.

In general discussions relating to the friendly fire determination as the cause of death for Spc Tillman, I advised since an AR 15-6 investigation was ongoing and subject to approval by CDR CENTCOM, no one should state definitively that friendly fire caused the death of Spc Tillman.

I am aware the provisions of AR-600-8-1 and 600-34 regarding providing information to the family of suspected friendly fire and status of the pending investigation. In my opinion, neither of these regulations clearly requires the command to inform the family of possible friendly fire as cause of death when there is an investigation pending. Although 600-8-1 provides language to inform the family of a suspected friendly fire, AR 600-34 notes the importance of waiting until the investigation is complete before releasing information prior to findings of the investigation. Further, under AR 15-6, the approving authority can change or substitute findings or recommendations of the investigating officer.

In my opinion, the commander makes the decision on what information to provide the family at notification or thereafter, except that he cannot pre-empt the pending investigation which would go to CDR CENTCOM for approval. I saw no regulatory requirements for the [redacted] to inform the family that we suspected friendly fire prior to completion of the investigation.

I was sensitive to the issue of information to the family and pending investigation since we handled a similar situation June 03 OIF. In that case, preliminary information to the family indicated the service member's death likely resulted from friendly fire. The CDR CENTCOM approved the AR 15-6 investigation into the incident as the approving authority, he added a finding to note there was enemy fire during the fight. Although the additional finding did not change the finding that friendly fire caused the death under investigation, it did create additional challenges for the command in dealing with the family of the deceased, including allegations of cover up by the military.

Ultimately, in considering any information provided to the Tillman next of kin, I advised caution in providing information relating to friendly fire pending completion of the investigation.

I believe my original assumption is correct and this is LT Gen. Kensinger. I don't know if anything else needs to be said after reading this though there are reams of statements I've reviewed and some that are equally pertinent to the question of casualty notice, office of personnel and various other people who were and were not directly responsible for this failing to properly notify the family.

It seems clear that some sort of strange risk aversion overcame this officer and deluded him/her into believing that the command's reputation or even some overweening desire to defend the rights of the possible shooters (though it doesn't read that way) stood above the honest and deserved care for a fallen soldiers' family. This officer blatantly states that he re-interpreted the regulations requiring information to be given to the family regarding pending investigations into friendly fire incidents.

The worst of this is, the AAR and preliminary statements from those involved clearly stated that they understood it to be fratricide on more than one occasion long before the end of the investigation. Further, to hold it long enough that Cpl Tillman's friends and fellow platoon members could tell them without the proper respect and support that should have been provided by the military is nearly criminal.

And, as noted by Geren, a serious disgrace to the uniform, the Army and it's values. This officer put themselves above their men and their families. That is a stain of shame.

Stay tuned for additional comments on the other officers involved as well as how the press releases were coordinated to end up with the giant gap in this story.

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - The Beginning

Part II: Conspiracy and Death-Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best

Pat Tillman: death and conspiracy - Olbermann is an Idiot


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

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Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors

Conspiracies always start with a kernel truth. The situation that begins the "cover up" conspiracy, beyond the "murdered" conspiracy, is the flow of information after the immediate incident. Soldiers in the field describe war as moments of sheer adrenaline followed by long periods of extreme boredom. The firefight that precipitated Tillman's death was intense and over in minutes. This was followed by hours of pulling security, reconnaissance of the area, waiting for the medevac, and planning for the continuing mission. A mission that turns out to be more than "clearing" a village.

According to interviews with the Platoon Leader, the mission was sensitive. They had received information that 100 Taliban were planning on crossing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to attack BCPs (Border Crossing Points) manned by the AMF (Afghan Military). 2nd Platoon of the 2/75th, Tillman's platoon, was tasked with visiting several BCPs and moving to Tit, Afghanistan where the suspected fighters and/or leaders were coordinating.

After the fight was over, 3rd Platoon moved up to provide security. While the story moves along, between the end of the firefight, the arrival of 3rd Platoon and the subsequent Medevac of the casualties, it was four hours.

A member of serial 2 arrived on the scene, discovering that Tillman was dead and conferred with the remaining member of Serial 1, both indicating that they felt this was probably fratricide.

PLT leader with Serial 1 retrieved the radio and called in the situation to TOC. He called in a nine line requesting medevac for himself and his radio man. He was told that there were two friendlies KIA by the squad leader. He called back to TOC and requested a second medevac for the KIA.

TOC informs 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon of the situation and they move out to make contact with 2nd Platoon.

Two body bags were brought up and Tillman and the AMF were placed inside along with whatever gear and personal effects could be found in the immediate vicinity.

During this time, the last elements of serial 2 from 2nd Platoon had cleared the canyon. Kevin Tillman was in the last GMV. The Platoon Sergeant from serial 1 instructed Kevin Tillman to pull security on serial 2's vehicles. In his statement (pages 612-614) he said he was not informed there were casualties. He was not informed that his brother was KIA. Nor was he informed that it was possible fratricide. While the Platoon Sergeant and several others discussed the probability, they were not prepared to state it emphatically. His first priority was to secure their area, clear the adjacent village and set up a landing zone. He was not prepared to discuss Pat Tillman's death with his brother.

They were also down to seventeen men. Three of which were the shooters and one had witnessed Tillman's death. The entire platoon was shaken by the incident. He was doing what good leaders do: get the men performing their duties and don't give them time to dwell. They were in hostile territory with several hours before relief could arrive. They needed to be aware in case the enemy returned to follow up on the ambush.

As the Platoon Sergeant organized the SKEDCOs for removal of the casualties, he directed another member of serial 1 to join Kevin Tillman to provide security. Kevin Tillman asks him if he has seen Pat. When he doesn't reply, Kevin Tillman asks again and is told that Pat is KIA (according to this witness, Kevin Tillman became hysterical; a second platoon member indicates that Kevin is screaming) . When the casualties are med-evaced to FOB Salerno, Kevin Tillman accompanies the body. This is the correct decision. The Platoon Sergeant is insuring that the appropriate procedures are followed and the chain of command will provide any additional information to Kevin and the Tillman family.

3rd Platoon arrived and took control of the security. Several members of 2PLT indicate they believe this was a friendly fire incident. Because it is dark, 3PLT leader decides to secure the area and wait for morning. Everyone beds down for the night.

Back at base, those at the TOC who heard the nine line medevac knew there were casualties. One of the officers listened to the codes that indicated which members of the platoon were wounded and KIA. He looked them up on the roster and determined that one of the KIA was Pat Tillman. There were four other officers in the room with him. This is what they know:

2 WIA/Wounded (Platoon Leader and Radioman)
2 KIA (Pat Tillman and AMF soldier Thani/Thanos)
The unit was ambushed by enemy fighters in a canyon outside the village of Magareh, Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was killed in the firefight.

When the casualties arrived they were sent to the FST (Field Surgical Team). The surgeon in charge declared Pat Tillman and the AMF dead on arrival. The two WIA are treated and kept at the FST. Guards are placed on the WIA. The word is quickly spreading across the base that Pat Tillman was killed in an enemy attack. Members of the press are on the base and searching for information. The clock is ticking quickly for the command. Tillman's fame, the spread of information and the presence of the press has placed severe time constraints on how long they have to notify the family and provide the first press release. Normal time for notification to the family and definitive press release with confirmation of casualties and events is 24 to 72 hours.

This presents a problem for Command. Particularly as the next of kin is Kevin Tillman who is on base. Once that notification is completed, the POA can release the casualty information to the press.

One of the first reports to circulate is that Tillman is killed "charging up a hill" to engage the enemy. This incorrect information likely has one source: the Platoon Leader. During the firefight when Pat Tillman was killed:

The PLT leader and the man with him take fire and attempt to move to the other side of the house. The second man has a radio and is trying to contact TOC to alert them to their position. The PLT leader is hit in the face by a piece of shrapnel from a round that strikes the house and the radio man is also struck. Neither of them can see what is happening after that.

When he arrives at the base, he has no idea that Tillman has died by friendly fire. The last interaction he had with Tillman was a brief discussion on the hill about who Tillman will take for his fire team (which includes the AMF) and what position. Tillman asks his Platoon Sergeant if his squad can drop their body armor and assault the ridge. The body armor is heavy and not conducive to climbing the steep, rocky hillside. He is told "no", not to drop his armor and that the RTO (radio operator) is attempting to coordinate close air support. The Platoon Sergeant directs Tillman to the rocky spur (where he is eventually killed), telling him to not go any further forward. This is to protect Tillman and his fire team from the potential blast.

This is the most likely source for Tillman's "charge up the hill". At this point, it is uncertain whether this information is officially released by the military or if it is rumor picked up by the press.

At the base, Tillman's body is released to the company mortuary affairs by the surgeon in charge. He did not know who he treated until the next morning. 1st Sgt HHC (headquarters and headquarters company) was tasked with identifying Pat Tillman's remains. When he arrived at mortuary affairs, he assisted in removing Tillman's body armor, MOLLE and Nomex gloves placing them in a bag. When he removed Tillman's body armor, he noted that the top right hand corner of the front plate was smashed (correlating with the "thermal marks" that the ME noted during autopsy). He handed them to a supply Sgt.

It is the late hours of April 22 (the day Tillman was killed) or the very early hours of April 23. The Platoon Leader of 3rd Platoon who relieved 2nd Platoon (Tillman's Platoon) has not yet performed a preliminary review of the site nor called in a request for a friendly fire incident investigation (via an AR 15-6). Which he does, following procedures, on the morning of April 23. No one on base is aware that this is a potential fratricide.

The supply Sgt says he took the RBA (Ranger Body Armor not to be confused with the basic interceptor) to a burn site. He states that the right, top front corner of the plate was "crushed", but he didn't know whether it was from being dropped or from a round. He didn't recall any other rounds or holes in the armor or gear. The supply Sgt removed the plates and noted a small, green notebook inside the RBA. In his words, "the kind we use to make notes in the field". He said that there appeared to be an objective name written on the front. He said he did not look inside. Since it contained possible sensitive information about an operation, he burned it along with the gear.

This is the "diary" that is "missing" that plays some central role in certain conspiracy theories. In fact, Tillman has two "diaries". One is actually a personal journal that he keeps at the rear. This journal is given to Kevin Tillman along with Pat Tillman's dog tags and ruck sack (see pages 612-614) after he returned to the base with Pat Tillman's body and the casualty notification officer first tells Kevin that Pat Tillman has three wounds to the head (not stated as yet but suspect that there was discussion about Kevin viewing his brother's body).

The small, green, "flap" notebook is waterproof. This is what the special agents through out investigation continue questioning Tillman's platoon mates regarding this "diary". The concept of a "diary" and "mission notebook" does not appear in these questions. Possibly because Kevin Tillman himself has asked for this "diary". Several indicate they know he keeps a "journal", but haven't seen him with it. Two know he writes in a journal, but believe it is at base. Three, including the Platoon Leader, notes that Tillman wrote in the "green, flap notebook" during the mission. One notes that Tillman wrote in it at the village they were broken down in before the firing incident.

It is unclear whose description of this "diary" is appropriate. Kevin Tillman believes it is a second personal diary based on his statement. The sergeant who said he burned it believes it was simply an operational note book to jot down mission notes.

On the burning of clothing and gear, the supply Sgt indicates that, while it is common to burn contaminated clothing that might present a bio-hazard (app directives provided on page 628), it is not common to burn equipment like the RBA or the MOLLE if it can be cleaned and redistributed for use in the company. However, he indicates when he opens the bag that the RBA was saturated with blood and "matter" as well as the NOMEX gloves. Following procedures, he decides to burn it due to its condition. He says that he is not directed by anyone above him to do so, but believed he was following proper procedures.

This action also lends to the conspiracy theory that someone was trying to cover up the incident. However, no one at the base knows that this is a fratricide at this time. No one has reason to believe that an AR 15-6 (informal investigation) into a friendly fire incident or criminal investigation will be opened and that anything needs to be retained as evidence. They are simply following basic procedures to dispose of potentially bio-hazardous materials.

However, there are contravening orders regarding the clothing and body armor of deceased soldiers. If they are deceased "in the field" and no medical aid can be rendered, the body armor and clothing are to remain with the deceased. The MEs at Dover explain that, even without a formal criminal investigation, they collect raw data on the damage to the equipment in order to improve the body armor at future dates. The ME does indicate that less than %50 of all casualties arrive with their clothes and equipment. Largely because many of the deceased do receive some sort of medical treatment before expiration and the clothes are removed during treatment. Sometimes because the mortuary affairs need to use other identifying marks and sometimes because mortuary affairs at the front do not know that they need to send this equipment (this is based on the MEs estimation).

To add to the confusion, another sergeant reports that he stored the body armor, had it packed and returned to Ft. Lewis Washington along with other gear. Both sergeants indicate that they completed an inventory sheet regarding the disposition of the armor. [update:this turns out to be the body armor of another ranger, identification unknown, who was also struck by friendly fire. His body armor had impact points to a magazine in the right front, lower pocket; some may be "ricochets" off another object per the crime lab report and detailed analysis page]

All of these events lend to the "perfect storm" that Deputy Secretary of the Army Geren refers to in causing confusion and complications in resolving the matter. All of the actors at this level are simply performing their functions as they believe are appropriate. (see Geren -37 mins long, to be reviewed in next installment Pentagon Briefing 31 July 2007)

On the morning of April 23, Tillman is flown to Bagram, Afghanistan accompanied by his brother Kevin. 3rd Platoon Leader requests and investigation be opened into the friendly fire incident. The rest of 2nd Platoon returns to FOB Salerno. 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon continue the mission to Tit, Afghanistan after some investigation into the ambush in adjacent village of Magareh. Five days later, they capture five individuals believed to be responsible for the ambush based on information from the local population.

April 23 or 24 (date unclear) 2nd Platoon conducts an AAR (after action review/report) where the platoon members discuss the event and conclude that it was, in fact, fratricide. Several squad members from the GMV1, serial 2 indicate that they believe they shot into Pat Tillman's position. A chaplain is made available for those of the platoon who request assistance. The Company Commander appoints a presiding officer to conduct the AR 15-6 investigation.

All those involved are told that their mission was sensitive and that, due to the ongoing investigation, OPSEC (operational security) should be followed. Most of them believe this means that they cannot discuss any part of the incident with anyone outside of the command or the investigating body. The platoon members remain open and forthcoming about the incident with their command and the investigating officer. No one believes they are contributing to a "cover up". Most of the field officers believe that they are also following procedures regarding not releasing information on an on-going investigation.

The problem is compounded here: Lt Gen. Kisinger and among several officers.



Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins (including original links to Army CID investigation materials)

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part II - Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - Olbermann is an Idiot

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - Keith Olbermann is an Idiot

And so is John Stoltz from VoteVets. Keith floats the worst conspiracies to date:



Hat Tip: Hot Air and Ace of Spades

Links to original CID report released by the United States Army under the FOIA and a brief outline of the incident can be found here: Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy

An in depth review of the trajectory of rounds, location photos and diagrams along with an outline of further interviews can be found here: Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - Trajectory

During the above Olbermann crap shoot, he emphatically states that an M16 made the rounds. This is a total fabrication based on somebody at the APs limited knowledge of military firearms and interviews with the two MEs who performed the autopsy. At no time does anyone state what type of weapon was used. In fact, the MEs go out of their way to explain in the investigation that they can't know that. They can only know that the wounds are consistent with a 5.56mm or 7.62mm round. There are no fragments or complete bullets to perform ballistic tests on since the rounds exited Tillman's head and removed part of his skull in the process.

The Rangers were carrying a multitude of weapons. The base weapon for this Ranger platoon was an M4 firing a 5.56mm round (in fact, during the reading of investigation, I did not see one notation of an M16; unless Olbermann can claim to know that the M4 is a modified version of the M16, made shorter and lighter by stock and barrel configurations; but I doubt that since he called it an M16). The squad leader in the first HMMVW to exit the wadi or canyon said he fired six (6) rounds (two 3 round bursts) definitely striking and killing the AMF (Afghan Military Forces) that was just in front of and to the right of Tillman's position. He knows this because he was looking through his scope when he did it and positively identified the uniform the AMF was wearing when he was killed. (see trajectory)

A gunner on that same HMMVW was firing an M240b (SAW) using a 7.62mm round. He said he oriented off of his squad leader and the muzzle flashes from Tillman's position, thinking it was the enemy, and fired two (2) bursts of ten(10) rounds into that position. A second gunner on that same vehicle was firing a M249 using a 5.56mm round. He said he also oriented to where the others were firing and placed at least three (3) bursts of five (5) rounds into that position. The diagram on "Trajectory" indicates that at least twenty two (22) rounds impacted the rock directly to the right of Tillman; the rock that O'Neal was behind praying (see diagram Trajectory). This rock shows twenty two (22) impact points in extremely close groupings. Up to ten rounds struck Tillman, including three to the forehead, at least one struck a flash bang in a pouch at the front of his vest (causing a fragmentation wound in his right arm), multiple strikes to the magazines he was carrying, his armor plate was "shattered" and one strike to his flashlight.

The problem with the conspiracy of murder based on only three wounds in Tillman's head is that Tillman was shot multiple times, not just three. All of this is available if anyone simply read the reports instead of going off of sensationalist half reporting by the AP.

Olbermann and Stoltz float the idea that it was murder or negligent murder by someone shooting Tillman from 30 feet or less or even an "accidental discharge" at close range (an idea floated by Uncle J at Blackfive and quickly retracted). Both MEs refute the "accidental discharge at close range" through their testimony (see "Trajectory" and original CID investigation page 119):

Q: During the conduct of this investigation, there are some questions as to the distance in which Cpl Tillman was struck. Can you determine the approximate distance the shooter had to be from Cpl Tillman for him to sustain such injuries?
A: No. But it was not within a few feet. It was not a contact wound or associated with close range discharge of a weapon. When I say "close range" I am referring to withing four to five feet.
Q: Based on your observations, can you eliminate the injuries sustained by Cpl Tillman as close range?
A: Yes.
Q: What about an intermediate wound...5 - 10ft?
A: We don't use such terms in this office. If there was stippling or soot, it may have been within 5ft, but I cannot be sure of distance in this case. These are indeterminate distance gun shot wounds, however, they are not close or contact wounds.

Another problem is the assumption that all three rounds struck Tillman at or very near the same time. The ME makes an elementary mistake, in my opinion. He notes that one of the wounds has a contusion around it. He believes this is from Tillman falling and striking his head at the time of death. The other two wounds do not have a hematoma. The hematoma surrounding the first wound may have been from the natural reaction of the body to direct blood to the affected area. This is a medical fact that wounds received prior to or peri-mortem (at the time of death) form such markings. Wounds received after death do not because the brain is no longer functioning to make such a direction. Based on Tillman's position after he was shot, it is possible that he received the other two wounds post mortem. O'Neal, who was with Tillman at the time of the shooting as well as those at the scene directly after, indicate that Tillman's body was originally lying flat on his back on an incline of about 45 degrees based on the diagrams. This would have kept his body in a position to continue receiving rounds.

There are many other issues with this conspiracy theory, particularly any idea that the President or anyone else conspired to kill Tillman for his political beliefs or any other bogus claims. The biggest issue here is that the nineteen remaining men of Tillman's platoon, including Tillman's brother Kevin who was in section 2 in the canyon being attacked by the enemy, would have to consistently lie over three years about the circumstances that led to his death. All while simultaneously admitting to the shooting. It would have been much easier to claim that he was killed by enemy action and left it at that.

Not to mention the twenty men from 3rd Platoon, the twenty men from 1st Platoon, unknown numbers involved in the search, capture and interrogation of captured ambushers from that day, command, numerous people from the Combat Hospital that received Tillman's body and on and on and on. It defies logic.

In short, Keith Olbermann is an Idiot with a capital "I". This is not journalism. This is Tabloid TV. There is definitely no integrity or credibility left at MSNBC after this fiasco. John Stoltz may be a veteran of the Iraq war, but he is no forensic scientist, pathologist or criminologist. I admit, neither am I, but I can at least claim to have read the reports.

Don't look for either of these two to do that. It would mean they would have to confront reality and I simply don't believe that is in the works.


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press At It's Best

Reviewing the PDF file of the CID investigation March 2006, I came across a statement that I am sure no one in the media is going to tell people regarding how they operate. Page 424:

About 1330, 24, May 2006, SA [redacted] interviewed [redacted] HQ 2/75th Ranger Regiment, Ft Lewis, WA 98433, [redacted] indicated he would not provide another statement, as he had already provided a total of four, to include two sworn statements detailing his knowledge of the events that lead to the death of Cpl Tillman and conduct of his initial 15-6 investigation pertaining to the matter. [Redacted] further stated that he and his wife are constantly being harassed by reporters affiliated with the San Francisco Chronicle, the Washington Post and ESPN media agencies. [Redacted] related that he and his wife have been threatened by the aforementioned agencies, in which they stated that they would print his name and attempt to tie him to some type of DOD cover up as it pertains to this investigation.

This is the part where the media begins to interfere with an investigation. By threatening those involved in the case, they effectively ended any cooperation of this individual. Further, they were manufacturing parties to a conspiracy that may or may not have existed.

I haven't googled yet to see if they did as they threatened. Of course, had they done so, it would have been libel. Obviously, somebody has some idea of the exact limits though they obviously don't mind threatening people with exposure to get their story.

Imagine if a government agency or police had made such a threat. The media would be grilling them over some hot coals.


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Part II: Conspiracy and Death-Trajectory [Update on this post: additional information on position of O'Neal and Tillman; better explanation of trajectory and wounds]

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part II - Trajectory

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Looking around the internet, one of the main questions continues to circle around the three wounds that Pat Tillman received to his "forehead" as indicated by the ME. His report and interview also indicates that the three wounds were within a 2" to 3" grouping.

Most of the internet questions seem to be generated from the idea that there was one shooter. Also, from the perceived wisdom that a fully automatic weapon could not place three rounds in a limited area. Finally, that the movement of a body, either from already being in motion (ie, walking, running, standing up or sitting down) or put in motion from a GSW is looked at as effectively canceling the ability of a shooter from placing rounds into the same location. One commenter said that, if he could know the number of shots fired in a general location, the probability of more than one round striking the same target could increase.

The first question cannot be full answered as the rounds that actually killed Tillman are not available for ballistic testing nor can be evaluated to see if they are even different calibers. Keeping in mind that this was a battle scene in hostile territory, that forensic scientists for such battle field analysis are not immediately available to secure a location and search (as one would expect in a civilian setting) and that the wounds were such that the bullets nor fragments were contained within the cranial cavity, it should not be surprising that the question remains unanswered except for the inconclusive testimony of those involved. Although, the CID did review the death site and was able to evaluate the trajectory of the incoming rounds based on the impact to the surrounding area.

The remaining questions are also best answered by the examination of the "kill zone" that was conducted by several groups including the final CID in March 2006. The following images are low grade black and white images from the PDF files provided by the FOIA. These are found here, pages 193 and 194. I have enhanced one of the photographs by simply adding color indicators where the black and white indicators were on the originals (which can be viewed at the above link; click images to enlarge).



In this photo, the "D" marks where "Thanos", the AMF attached to Tillman's fire team, was located at his death, head pointing down hill. The red pin points indicate small arms impact points on the rock just to the right and in front of Tillman's final position indicated by the "A". Note the tight grouping of rounds that impacted the rock. This would indicate that the shooter or shooters had the position "dialed in" and had excellent weapons control. There are twenty two (22) impact points on the rock, not including the wounds on both "Thanos" and Tillman. Tillman received between four and 10 rounds directly. The final number is unknown due to the unavailability of his body armor and MOLLE for examination. This number is based on the fragment wounds he received in his upper extremities from the damaged flash bang and the eyewitness that had examined Tillman's MOLLE and body armor at the base before it was destroyed as well as the three known wounds to his head. Besides at least one round in the flash bang and three in the forehead, the eyewitness believes he saw up to seven (7) rounds in Tillman's body armor. The front plate was "shattered" (pages 147-152).

Of particular interest should be the ground around this rock and the rock to left (right in the photo) with the black cross. This ground is raised behind the rock indicating that it gave minimal cover. O'Neal was lying prone behind the rock. Tillman was found in a "sitting" position, his legs straight out in front of him, torso leaning against the rock with the "X" and head slumped forward.

Based on the limited cover and Tillman's position, it is unlikely he was kneeling or standing at the time he was killed. He was most likely lying prone between the two rocks and then sat up to throw the smoke grenade when he was shot. Again, review of injuries and known equipment indicates that he received multiple rounds, possibly "walked" into his final position. Other rounds impacted a flash bang he was carrying on his MOLLE, the MOLLE itself (worn on the upper body over the "vest" or body armor) and his "forehead". The rock behind him most likely maintained his upright position as he was struck. [update: according to O'Neal's interview(page 428), they received fire for under a minute in sparse cover; Tillman decided to "puff smoke"; firing ceased for a few moments; both determined the danger was over and stood up; they waved their hands trying to indicate they were "friendlies"; firing resumed; both dropped prone on the ground, O'Neal behind the rock and Tillman beside him (possibly laying on his back on the incline beside the rock making more sense of the diagram)[update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; O'Neal and Tillman exchanged a few words, O'Neal said he was praying, O'Neal believes Tillman was injured at that time; then Tillman allegedly yelled, "What are firing at?! I am Pat *expletive* Tillman!" and then O'Neal heard nothing; he thought he heard running water and asked Tillman if he had "urinated" on himself; he received no response; the firing had ceased; he looked over and saw blood running from under Tillman's head; he grabbed Tillman by his armor and pulled him up (probably why the sergeant found him in a half sitting position with his head slumped over)] Eyewitness indicate that there was circular blood splatter on that rock behind Tillman's head which would support the proposition that he was sitting in an upright position in front of the rock when he was killed. [update: this is probably still true; very likely Tillman raised his torso up off the ground in a slight reclining position while he was yelling [update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; possibility that he was only struck with one round in the head in that position and additional rounds as he lay dead accounting for close grouping of wounds; the proposition that he was a "stationary" target still holds; looking at the diagram and trajectory lines, this makes even more sense].



These images are not to scale. In other words, you cannot tell how far away the shooter was, nor how high or low in comparison to the position. This image shows Tillman, "Thanos" and O'Neals position looking out to the shooters' position(s). "A" indicates Tillman's final position. "D" indicates "Thanos" position. "C" indicates O'Neal's position. "B" indicates the approximate location of the "small arms fire". The blue lines are the approximate trajectory and the orange outlines are the approximate outlines of the two rocks bracketing Tillman's team's position.

According to the SAW operator, he was scanning the 9 O'clock position when one of his team members yelled, "contact" at 3' O'clock. One or more of his team members performing dismounted security, began firing towards a position on the hill where he believes he saw an Afghani male "Paralleling" the GMV. The SAW operator said that he spun his weapon around and shot two "ten round" bursts into the area to provide "suppressive fire". He believes he was between 200 and 300 meters from his target. CID and previous investigations indicate the position was approximately 200 meters from Tillman's position.

Specifications of the M240B (Squad Automatic Weapon)



According to Field Mannual 3-22-68, the M240B can provide "suppressive" fire up to 1,800 meters; has an effective range of 1,100 meters while mounted on a tripod, 800 meters on a bipod; and "point" (aim/directly on target) 800 meters Tripod, 600 meters bipod. It can fire "sustained" 100 rounds per minute with 6-9 round bursts, 4 to 5 seconds between bursts.

Update: The squad leader in the first HMMVW to exit the wadi or canyon said he fired six (6) rounds (two 3 round bursts) definitely striking and killing the AMF (Afghan Military Forces) that was just in front of and to the right of Tillman's position. He knows this because he was looking through his scope when he did it and positively identified the uniform the AMF was wearing when he was killed. (see trajectory)

A gunner on that same HMMVW was firing an M240b (SAW) using a 7.62mm round. He said he oriented off of his squad leader and the muzzle flashes from Tillman's position, thinking it was the enemy, and fired two (2) bursts of ten(10) rounds into that position. A second gunner on that same vehicle was firing a M249 using a 5.56mm round. He said he also oriented to where the others were firing and placed at least three (3) bursts of five (5) rounds into that position.

In other words, there were so many shooters and rounds going into that position, it would be impossible to know which of the three shooters or weapons actually made the wounds. However, the number of rounds certainly indicates

Conspiracy From Supposition

According to the ME who examined Tillman's remains, he could not verify the distance from which Tillman was shot based on the wounds. He did state that there was no stippling or gun powder residue that would indicate that Tillman was shot from less than 5ft.

It was this statement that was inaccurately reported by most news organizations, including FOX news, working from an AP report.

In the same testimony, medical examiners said the bullet holes in Tillman's head were so close together that it appeared the Army Ranger was cut down by an M-16 fired from a mere 10 yards or so away.

Not only did they extrapolate the number of yards, but the type of weapon possibly used. Two medical examiners interviewed indicated that they could not tell the weapon used, only approximate the round because there were no fragments or other materials to examine to determine the actual size of the round or the weapon.

Page 118, Questions to Medical Examiner 2:

Q: Do you believe all entrance wounds were from the front of Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes
Q: In your opinion, could small caliber rounds such as the .223/5.56 or 7.62 have caused the defect in Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes. The size, characteristics, beveling of the skull, the impact points are more rounded instead of slit like as is on the rear of his head, all of the characteristics were consistent with what I saw during the autopsy of Cpl Tillman.

At no time does the ME indicate what type of weapon used. He only indicates that a small range of calibers could have made the wounds. The M240B fires a 7.62mm round.

The questioning continues regarding distance (Page 119):

Q: During the conduct of this investigation, there are some questions as to the distance in which Cpl Tillman was struck. Can you determine the approximate distance the shooter had to be from Cpl Tillman for him to sustain such injuries?
A: No. But it was not within a few feet. It was not a contact wound or associated with close range discharge of a weapon. When I say "close range" I am referring to withing four to five feet.
Q: Based on your observations, can you eliminate the injuries sustained by Cpl Tillman as close range?
A: Yes.
Q: What about an intermediate wound...5 - 10ft?
A: We don't use such terms in this office. If there was stippling or soot, it may have been within 5ft, but I cannot be sure of distance in this case. These are indeterminate distance gun shot wounds, however, they are not close or contact wounds.

Similarly, on page 27, the investigator asks the same questions, the physician replies that there is no way to tell the exact distance. He believes it was from more than 5ft away because there is no stippling or residue. He does make this statement:

"I cannot give you an exact distance, but I have heard several theories such as .50 weapon was used, or Cpl Tillman was shot from a moving vehicle, or he was shot from 85 meters or further. In my opinion, none of these theories were the case. In my opinion, Cpl Tillman was have been shot from much closer range than 85 meters"

It is the investigator that suggests the range to be 5-10ft away, not the medical examiner. Both Examiners said that they could only say that it was not less than 5ft. There was no evidence or any known way to extrapolate the distance based on the available information and Tillman's condition. At no time do either ME posit a theory on the type of weapon, only the caliber. The AP extrapolates the "M16" based on the purported caliber and their limited knowledge of army weapons.

That report is completely inaccurate and has added to the conspiracy theories already abounding.

The ME does question the grouping and distance provided by eye witnesses because he has never seen three such wounds in such a tight grouping from such as the distance indicated by the shooters and physical report of their location (200 meters). However, he does not present any factual information on which to base this opinion beyond the close grouping. This also seems to work on the theory that there was only one shooter putting rounds into Tillman's position.

The images indicating the number of rounds placed in Tillman's position (between 25 and 40), Tillman's body being held upright and stationary as he was struck, the expertise and ability of the shooter coupled with the M240B's "point range" indicates that it is possible. Update: Not to mention the the squad leader's M4 or the other gunners M249.

The Multitude of Conspiracies

There are a multitude of conspiracies, supposition and misleading stories out there. all of which contribute to the general feeling of the public that somebody is not telling the truth. In today's culture, no proof need to be attached to that "feeling" to make it a lasting damage to people and our society.

I will continue to address known conspiracy theories and inaccurate reports as I find them. The next issue: How facts and bizarre coincidence collides to make a conspiracy.


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Barrage of Fire (one of the few media reports that gets it right - printed in 2004 after initial investigation)

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors

A commenter at Blackfive left a link to the last investigation into Pat Tillman's death by the United States Army. Once can only speculate as to why the media has yet to read this entire document and put a more definitive story out, at least regarding the testimony, instead of dropping little pieces of the interviews and investigation like stinking cow patties in the barnyard. Apparently, no one can be bothered to read the entire investigation documents and watch the videos which can be found here: US Army Criminal Investigation Command Report of Investigation Regarding
Cpl Patrick Tillman huge PDF File, 2nd huge PDF File and Video. All names are redacted, though some of the information is probably available by simple googling.

You will not learn the shooters name. The video is not explosive. It is simply long views of the same location from different directions with similar lighting as experienced on the evening of April 22, 2004 when Cpl Pat Tillman was killed in a friendly fire accident. I say that very confidently even though I have only read approximately 100 pages (six interviews of those involved in the shooting, various maps and diagrams). The reader, of course, should always be willing to draw their own conclusions. So far, the complete story appears like this:

On the morning of April 22, 2004 2/75th Ranger (2nd Platoon of the 75th Rangers) was tasked to go to Tit[update: not Manah; manah is where they stop for the broken GMV], Afghanistan near the Pakistan Border to clear the village. So far in the interviews, including an officer at the TOC (Tactical Command), no one knows exactly what they were looking for at the village besides clearing it. No one knows of any specific intelligence that indicates a High Value Target or targets. It may have, in fact, been a simple clearing mission [update: intelligence indicated possible 100 fighters crossing the Pakistan border to attack BCPs - border crossing points- manned by AMF; the town of Tit, AF either had a leader, coordinating persons or possible rest stop for fighters].

The platoon was being led by a ranger who had been previously deployed in Iraq for the invasion. He believes that he was well trained, but admits that his actual combat experience was limited. He says that it amounts to having a few rounds fired in his direction and a grenade land nearby.

On or about 10 AM, one of the HMMVWW broke down. The PLT (Platoon) proceeded together for a few more hours towing the broken vehicle. However, the vehicle was in such bad shape that the steering mechanism no longer worked. Unable to steer the very heavy vehicle made the vehicle towing it dangerous to maneuver as well. The Platoon stopped in another village and called the TOC advising them that they could not continue towing the vehicle. The PLT leader asks to have a "sling load" (helicopter with a lifting device) or tow truck come in to remove the vehicle. TOC informs him that it would take 2 days to get the sling load up to them and that a tow vehicle could not leave the "flat top" (nearby hardened road) to retrieve the vehicle. TOC tells the PLT leader that he will have to bring the vehicle to the flat top and the tow will take it from there.

The PLT leader gives the TOC three options on how he can accomplish that mission:

1) He can split the platoon in two, sending half with the vehicle and half to the objective
2) The entire platoon can accompany the vehicle to the flat top and then continue to the objective
3) The entire platoon and towed vehicle will continue to the objective.

At sometime during this discussion, a local Afghan man approaches and says that he has a "jingha" truck (highly decorated cargo Afghan cargo trucks) that he will use to tow the vehicle for a price. [if any of this is starting to sound like a bad movie, you aren't alone; Custer comes to mind sans overwhelming force of Indians] It is unclear why the PLT leader suggests option one since he and many in his platoon indicate that option 1, splitting the platoon, is a rare action. Yet, the officer from the TOC reminds everyone that much smaller elements, down to squad size, have performed many missions. The officer at the TOC confers with the Bn Cdr (Battalion Commander) who gives the go ahead to split the platoon with half of the platoon accompanying the broken down vehicle (from here forward refered to as "serial 2"). The PLT leader verifies twice this is the action that they are to take both verbally and electronic mail.

Multiple failures as well as simple bad luck begins to effect the platoon as soon as this decision is made. No one checks the "comms" or communications. Serial 1 (the section that Cpl Pat Tillman is with), the half of the PLT that is moving to the objective, has the PLT Leader and a Sattelite Radio. Serial 2, accompanying the towed vehicle, may or may not have such a radio. Upon discussion with the TOC regarding this condition, the TOC tells the PLT leader that, yes, in fact, Serial 2 does have such a radio because they have the commander's HMMVW. Based on the interviews, no one actually checked to see if that was so and if the radios communicated. In other words, no "comm check" before the elements split up.

The leaders of the two groups confer over a map discussing the route to the "hard top" where they will meet with the unit that will tow the broken vehicle back to base. The decide what route that serial 1 will take to the objective. The discuss what route the serial 2 will use to join up with the serial 1 after dropping the vehicle. They depart with the jingha truck driver towing the vehicle.

During this adventure, both serial 1 and serial 2 change routes in progress. The jingha truck driver tells the leader of serial 2 that the path they chose was too steep and his truck would not be able to make it towing the HMMVW. Serial 2 contacts the TOC and tells them they are changing route. No one contacts Serial 1. During the movement to the objective, the PLT leader with serial 1 makes a navigational mistake and turns his group heading back towards the route that Serial 2 is now on.

Serial 2's route has set them up for a classic ambush. The wadi or canyon is approximately 10 meters or 30 feet wide (approximately the width of the average ranch style family home). The walls are steep and the direction of the setting sun prevents easy identification of enemy positions above them on the ridgeline. Several RPGs [update: further review indicates mortars] are fired at their position. None make contact with the vehicles in the convoy. Men tumble out of the vehicles and seek cover, looking for the enemy, but the steep walls and lighting prevent positive identification.

IN the meantime, the element Pat Tillman was with, serial 1, hears the explosions from the RPGs and turns to find out what is happening. They dismount and move to positions. The PLT leader can hear serial 2 but can't communicate. The communications he does hear are confusing. He directs his section towards the estimated position of Serial 2.

Leader of Serial 2 realizes they are in a bad position and orders his men to "drive out" of the ambush. This includes some men driving vehicles and others dismounted going through the canyon. No one in Serial 2 can see the ambushers. They only see the explosions and hear the gun fire.


[This graphic has been updated to show the correct orientation of the death scene with serial 2 traveling east and Tillman's position to the north pg 1210]

Serial 1 sees enemy forces silhouettes up on the ridge line above the wadi and sets up firing positions along a second escarpment opposite of the wadi and near the mouth where the road serial 2 is on turns in front of serial 1's position. Three members of Serial 1 take positions part way up the hill behind a berm. Pat Tillman, O'neal and an Afghani military force (AMF) take a position on a small spur on the rise behind some large rocks. The PLT leader and another unnamed member take position at the corner of a house on the rise. Other members are equally spread out. They begin firing at the enemy on the ridge.

Serial 2 begins driving out of the wadi. The first HMMVW sees what they believe is enemy forces now on the other side of them and begin firing into those positions. The PLT leader and the man with him take fire and attempt to move to the other side of the house. The second man has a radio and is trying to contact TOC to alert them to their position. The PLT leader is hit in the face by a piece of shrapnel from a round that strikes the house and the radio man is also struck. Neither of them can see what is happening after that.

The M240B (which fires a 5.52 round; important fact to the investigation [uptade: per Capt. JM Heinrichs, the M240B fires 7.62mm round. The ME reports either 5.52mm or 7.62 at high velocity made the wounds]) operator on the back of the first HMMVW in serial 2 exiting the wadi sees an Afghan man with an AK-47, camouflage pants, a purple jacket and a beard on the opposite rise and begins firing. This is the AMF that is in Pat Tillman's position. The AMF is firing into enemy positions on the opposite ridge above serial 2's exit. The M240B gunner affirms later that he is the one that fired at the AMF [update: squad leader in GMV says he uses optics and fires at least six shots at the same man]. O'neal, who was with Tillman, states that they were receiving fire from serial 2. At the same time, the men behind the berm and down from Tillman's position are receiving "walking" fire and one of them gets out a pen gun flare to signal serial 2 that they are "friendlies". Tillman and O'neal have a brief discussion which may or may not have included profanities. Tillman decides to puff smoke to alert serial 2 that they are friendlies.

[This section updated with O'neal's testimony from Page 428] Tillman rises out of his position to throw the smoke grenade, firing pauses for a moment (this is because GMV1 has reoriented fire on the house). Tillman and O'Neal stand up and exchange a few words thinking the danger has passed. They begin receiving fire again. The AMF is killed. O'Neal drops prone on the ground after receiving ricochet fragments and rounds into his RBA (Ranger Body Armor) and striking a magazine on his vest. Tillman also drops to the ground in a prone position on his back. (O'Neal says he believes Tillman was wounded at this time; Tillman had a wound in his left forearm; fragments retrieved were later found consistent with a damaged flashbang in his vest). Tillman is laying on an incline of approximately 45 degrees (see Trajectory). Tillman raises his http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.bold.gif
insert bold tagsTorso from the ground and yells, "What are you shooting at?! I'm Pat F***ing Tillman. Several rounds strike the rock to his front right sending pieces of rock into his clothes, face and arms. One round pierces his flashlight on his M4 exiting and smashing the top, right corner of his SAPI. Three rounds penetrate his head in a close grouping. O'Neal thought he heard running water and asked Tillman if he had "p*****d" himself. He received no response. The firing had ceased. He looked over and saw blood running from under Tillman's head. He grabbed Tillman by his armor and pulled him up (probably why the sergeant found him in a half sitting position with his head slumped over).

A member of serial 2 states that he saw the smoke and believed that one of his unit was trying to lay down cover for maneuvering so he also threw smoke. At that time, someone from serial 1 (Tillman's section) was yelling, "Cease fire!" The squad leader from serial 2 also began to yell, "Cease fire!"

All fire ceases. The entire fire fight has lasted less than 5 minutes [update: this is an estimation based on the details. no one offers up a time line yet]. A member of serial 2 begins checking the situation. He hears someone yelling that they have casualties. When he reaches Tillman's position, he finds the AMF laying with his head pointed down hill. Tillman is in a sitting position with his legs in front of him. He is slumped forward with his torso leaning against a rock that was partially to the rear and left of his position. According to this member statements, he found O'neal holding on to Tillman's arm and possibly trying to talk to him. He states he could see that Tillman's "head was missing". [based on later statements and the ME report, a large portion of the back of Tillman's skull was missing when his body arrived at Dover]. He states that O'neal said, "Your guys shot him. One of your guys shot him!" He told O'neal to get his weapon and secure the position.

A member of serial 2 arrived on the scene, discovering that Tillman was dead and conferred with the remaining member of Serial 1, both indicating that they felt this was probably fratricide.

PLT leader with Serial 1 retrieved the radio and called in the situation to TOC. He called in a nine line requesting medevac for himself and his radio man. He was told that there were two friendlies KIA by the squad leader. He called back to TOC and requested a second medevac for the KIA.

TOC informs 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon of the situation and they move out to make contact with 2nd Platoon.

Two body bags were brought up and Tillman and the AMF were placed inside along with whatever gear and personal effects could be found in the immediate vicinity. The wounded and the KIA were medevac'd separately to the FOB.

3rd Platoon arrived and took control of the security. Several members of 2PLT indicate they believe this was a friendly fire incident. Because it is dark, 3PLT leader decides to secure the area and wait for morning. Everyone beds down for the night. The next morning, 3PLT leader called together the remaining members of 2 PLT to discuss what had happened. They concurred that it was a friendly fire incident. 3PLT leader walked to the different locations indicated by 2PLT and took pictures of the area and looking out towards the positions involved. He sends a squad to the ridge line above the wadi where Serial 2 believes they were being fired on from the enemy and where serial 1 says they saw silhouettes and muzzle flashes. No one can find any trace of the enemy.

After arriving at Tillman's position and taking pictures, he finds part of Tillman's missing skull and places it in an Ammo can to be sent back to the FOB and eventually catch up with Tillman's remains. [this is not just a gruesome detail; but central to the investigation and concerns of conspiracy to cover up]. 3PLT leader calls TOC and notifies them that he believes this was a case of fratricide and requests an investigation be opened.

It is the morning of April 23, 2004.

Part II: Is there a conspiracy?

There are several problems that arise during the fire fight and after that seem contradictory or abnormal. Most of which have explanations that simply do not fit expectations of a criminal investigation, though, that alone does not implicate them in a conspiracy.

The story of Pat Tillman's death resulting from enemy fire was not due to an original conspiracy to cover it up, but appears to be the result of time, space and communications. As far as the TOC knew the night of April 22, 2004, 2nd Platoon had come into contact with the enemy and it had resulted in two wounded and two KIA. 2PLT leader was injured and medevaced but had no idea that his platoon members or 3PLT believed that there was fratricide.

It was this first report that began to filter up and out. It's continuation for several days appears to be simply the result of time and distance.

In the next piece, I'll discuss the other issues that have been contrived into a conspiracy to cover up Pat Tillman's cause of death. It should be remembered, as we go forward, that Tillman's family was told by his best friend that Tillman was killed in a friendly fire incident while the command indicated that they were still investigating the incident.

However, based on the first part of the investigation and subsequent testimony regarding that evening, it seems safe to declare that there was no known conspiracy to kill Cpl Pat Tillman. His death was a matter of existential circumstances and possible inexperienced leaders and members of his platoon.

One thing is certain, the media and many others could have taken a little time to read the investigation and providing better information than throwing out pieces and statements to sensationalize what is already a fairly sensational story.

Stay tuned for the rest of the story...

Part II: Conspiracy and Death-Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Cross posted at the Castle

Summary only...

Mythology, Ideology and the TNR Debacle

Ace reports that Foer has allegedly confirmed there was "a woman". There are questions about this confirmation and whether it is still true.

Actually, I do think that it is telling that Foer said he confirmed the woman. While many see this as Beauchamp's worst show of depravity in some people's eyes (dogs rating lower and who cares about mass graves we know exist or that some Iraqi's private property was intentionally damaged), the potentially punishable offenses, like desecrating bodies, recklessly driving government equipment and purposefully destroying private property (that the military then has to pay for via civilian claims), are not going to have people running to the fore to verify since it would mean they either participated, were complicit or conspired to cover it up.

That would require some false or incomplete reports by squad or platoon leaders as well. That would mean many people's careers are damaged or over

Foer could grant them "anonymity", but that would hardly matter since that would mean it was someone in their unit and the boot would simply come down on them.

Mocking a burned woman? Cruel and possibly punishable under some part of the UCMJ, but a good defense attorney would get that thrown out or knocked down to nothing and, as noted, it mostly implicates Beauchamp and the rest of his friends would get little more than a lecture on behavior, particularly if they were otherwise "good soldiers".

I'll be surprised if the others incidents are corroborated outside of the military's investigation.

I will bet that this is not playing out at FOB Falcon exactly as some would believe. There is probably animosity towards Beauchamp. But, there is probably a lot of wondering about how this became such a big deal, why they are being hammered and finally, confirming their opinion that people back home just don't understand anything about being a soldier in a war zone. In other words, I doubt we're being applauded for our efforts by those we believe we may be defending.

On the other hand, the question of why someone would put this incredibly bad writer on their payroll and print his "musings" is still an important question. There are literally thousands of "diarists" in the war zone who, arguably, write better than this fellow. Not all of their stuff is exciting. Most of it is in true diarist form: the mundane broken by the occasional excitement. Which also defines life in a war zone. Why was Beauchamp's contrived writing chosen?

Did it fit some pre-conceived ideological or political narrative? Or, was it simply that it was "edgy" and TNR's revenue was so bad they needed SOMETHING to get them readership (thus, revenue). Edgy=subscriptions=revenue. That it fit some narrative about what people think being a soldier and living in a war zone is like? Simply a plus towards readership.

At the end of the day, TNR is a business. While we are looking for some political or philosophical ideology that decided the choice, it may be the simplest motive was the money and Beauchamp's "musings" were the new content they thought would bring it in. Add to that he was "easy" to find since he was married to a staffer and you have most of the story already. The final issue, that they are ideologically compatible may, by Occam's Razor, simply be that they are married because they ran in the same circles and held the same ideals. The same reason Reeves was chosen for her job at TNR. Again, it may simply be about association rather than trying consciously or even subconsciously forward an agenda. People of the same ideology do tend to associate more than with those that don't.

That it re-enforces the mythological history of the military since Vietnam? Very few will even notice it because that is the accepted wisdom, even among those who may today believe that our Viet Nam vets were maligned or treated badly. They experienced John Kerry and Lt. Calley after all, not to mention the Pulitzer Prize winning photograph of the young Vietnamese girl, badly burned, running down the road. They have seen "Platoon", "Full Metal Jacket" and "Rambo". While many understand that these are fictional pieces, they can't help but believe that there is at least a "kernel of truth" in these tellings. Worse, when there are very few movies or books that actually contradict those images, or, at least, very few that are popular or well known, the mythology, not the facts, becomes the story.

Beauchamp's current writings begin that accepted story. The dehumanized man who will one day come back changed, always ready to question his own actions and those around him having experienced the worst that man has to offer. As noted, not only is his writing contrived, but he rushed, what may be, the only narrative anyone was trying to consciously adhere to. He'd barely seen any action, if any at all. He was a nobody and his experiences hardly seemed to fit the accepted wisdom that war changes people. He had not really experienced war. He simply seemed to show socio-pathic tendencies and painted those around him as such.

That is not a good story, nor the accepted narrative in the general populace. That contrivance may be why many jumped on Beauchamp's story beyond any questionable or possibly implausible scenarios that some would like "fact checked". The story that The New Republic was trying to sell, the story that they believed best matched their subscribers' pre-conceived notions of man and war. They couldn't even get that right. That may be the most damning aspect of this entire fiasco. This single event explains why the New Republic is still lingering at the bottom of the ranks of its peers.

It is the failure of The New Republic to effectively utilize the new media of citizen journalist coupled with the inability to properly identify the accepted wisdom or myth that defines modern man's beliefs on war.

Modern man no longer sees "glorious war", but that "war is hell". Man no longer survives horrifying events to emerge triumphant. Instead, he constantly questions his reasoning, his character and his actions, trying to make the best of the worst while maintaining his own personal integrity (something Beauchamp's stories were decidedly lacking), to emerge alive, but deeply scarred. He no longer experiences greatness through adversity, but remains a damaged mediocrity. That is the accepted wisdom. That is what people want to read, see and believe.

While that may match the common man's experience, it has destroyed the concept that man can rise above himself and the events around him to greatness. It has destroyed hope.

In the end, that may be what we're fighting for.

Summary only...