Egypt, Syria, Israel and Palestine: Revolutionaries Selling Their Freedom Cheap and Their Top Bidder is Syria, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood/Hamas

It is becoming very clear that the revolutionary youth in Egypt are determined to throw away everything they earned to act as proxies for the Muslim Brotherhood and their subsidiaries, Hamas, in the Gaza Strip.  The second runners up for the bid for cheap revolution are Hezbollah and Syria.

Read More >>

Summary only...

Egypt and Democracy: Why the Muslim Brotherhood Is Supporting El Baradei for President

While there is yet to be an official report on the matter, according to the rumor mill on twitter, it is believed that the Muslim Brotherhood will throw it's support behind El Baradei in the upcoming presidential elections.  


Viewers in the west won't be surprised.  From the outset, El Baradei has appeared to be the Muslim Brotherhood's front man.  The smiling, nonthreatening face of liberality and psuedo-western attitude and political knowledge that the Brotherhood wanted to use to belay the idea that the revolution and the MB were a threat to the west.   

In Egypt, El Baradei had two more roles.  For the "revolutionary youth" he served as a rally point.  Someone who said all the right things about democracy, freedom and Egypt's future as a free state.  El Baradei is intelligent and capable, a "deep thinker" that appeals to Egypt's middle class, educated youth.  Others have viewed him as a "Johnny Come Lately", an opportunist who had spent the last ten years in and out of Egypt, like a tourist, while they were the ones who suffered under Mubarek's regime.


It is difficult to assess El Baradei's true position.  He continues to speak "above the noise" talking about democracy in Egypt, even as some supporters express concerns that he is still to detached from the Egyptians on the street.  In an odd split from the MB's support of El Baradei, the MB went on the record as supporting the amendments to the Constitution in the March 19 referendum even as El Baradei rejected the amendments and the rush to elections.  

He stated that the political parties in Egypt needed time to organize and present candidates.  Many of the "revolutionary youth" supported this approach, fearful that the only parties organized and funded well enough to contest the upcoming elections successfully were the remains of the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood.  Regardless of their objections, the referendum was passed by an overwhelming 77% 'yes'.  


Now the Muslim Brotherhood is apparently considering El Baradei as their candidate of choice for President.  Some of El Baradei's liberal secular supporters wonder if the MB is trying to sabotage El Baradei's chances by peeling off liberal secular supporters.  That is probably not the MB's calculation.  


The Muslim Brotherhood has been playing very smart politics throughout the revolution and post Mubarek regime, even as it has seen some internal struggles to define and move the party forward.  It remained in the background as a whole organization even as the MB Youth went into the streets with the revolutionaries.  To some this appeared that the MB was hedging it's bets against the possibility that the revolution would fail.  The loss of some of it's young members would have been hailed as the participation of martyrs in the eternal struggle even as the MB attempted to negotiate with the ailing Mubarek regime.  


In the end, the revolution prevailed and the MB was able to denounce these conferences as individuals taking their own initiative.  The MB as a whole did not even appear in the streets until the revolution had been assured ascendency.  


It is this ability to play to more than one side while finding their own path to power that puts them behind El Baradei.  The only other viable candidate at this time is Amr Moussa, previously Egypt's ambassador to the Arab League.  When he re-appeared in Egypt, there were many reports that his posting to the League had been a move by Mubarek to distance a potential trouble maker and reformist from the NDP and presidency.  Others disagree, insisting that Amr Moussa is still a stalwart NDP man and connected to the Mubarek Regime.  The MB would be hung out to dry by it's opposition in the revolution if they showed any real attachment to Moussa.  


Moussa's support seems to come from the part of Egypt that is wary of the radical shift in politics and the instability caused by the revolution.  They seem to be looking for a familiar face who has some idea what it means to work with other countries in the region and garner support.


Aym Nour is far too liberal and has the taint of a conviction against him, even as he wears it as a badge of honor, insisting that he was a victim of political jury rigging.  Batawasy, a judge and a known reformist who was mildly persecuted by the previous regime, seems to be the choice of the intelligentsia.  He is a high minded individual who speaks in very broad terms.  His focus in general has been the reformation of the judiciary as an independent body.  A noble and necessary step on a subject that has concerned many Egyptians that saw the judiciary as nothing but a puppet of the regime. 

However, this is not the stuff a presidential bid.  In fact, his focus and position as a judge who has made a career of the law may make him a danger to the MB as much as or more so than Moussa.  It would be likely that Batawasy would attempt to insure the presidency remained within the letter of any law of the constitution proscribing the president's powers and those of the Assembly when signing any law into being or using the presidential powers to enforce any law.  


El Baradei is much less dangerous to the MB.  First, the main coalition supporting him is disorganized and politically weak.  Their ability to capture any significant numbers of seats in the parliament is questionable by the MB's standards as well as analysts in the west.  For any presidency to be strong enough to resist potentially popular, but detrimental laws, he would need a good base of support in the Assembly and Shura counsel.  Enough support that they would be able to soften or modify any laws presented by the MB before they came to his desk and forced him to either make an unpopular decision to veto it or forced him to fall in line with the populists to the detriment of Egypt.  

The MB's assessment of El Baradei's political weakness is not only a matter of his disorganized support, but the outcome of the referendum.  El Baradei called not only for a 'no' vote, but was asking for an entirely different procedure to be in place for the interim government and writing of the constitution.  A process that would have given the liberal/secular groups at least an equal power to formulate the document and the future law of the land.  El Baradei's voice was practically drowned out in the cacophony of joyous rush to the polls.  To the Brotherhood, this would be a sign that El Baradei does not enjoy popular support.  At least, not without them behind him.  Without support in the assembly nor popular support in the greater body politic of Egypt, El Baradei's term as president would be incredibly weak.

Second, without strong, liberal allies in the assembly, El Baradei would be much more open to persuasion.  Due to the nature of the previous regime and the power of the presidency, a power that remains intact until the constitution is written, El Baradei would be much more likely to limit his use of presidential powers.  There would be no decrees that would thwart the MB's plans.  The presidency under El Baradei in the interim period would be considerably weaker than the power of the Assembly.  Especially, if El Baradei was reluctant to use even the balancing power of the veto.

Worse, El Baradei has no real connections to the military.  The military, for better or worse, are playing the role of the broker in Egypt's nascent democracy.  For now, possibly for the future, the military represents the real power structure in Egypt.  Without allies in the military, El Baradei would find himself caught between a rock and a hard place.   A position that would likely find him leaning towards the Brotherhood for support, strengthening their position.  

Third, the interim period of governing and creating a workable constitution will be messy and dangerous.  The person that sets on top of this process is not likely to be viewed as a savior by anybody at the end.  The process is going to require compromise and caution, neither of which any part of the Egyptian polity is very willing to accept if the 'yes' vote on the referendum is any measure to go by.  That will make even the most adroit politician practically unelectable for the next presidential election.  

El Baradei may be the candidate most likely to help push the constitution along and achieve "unity" for the Egyptian people.  The issue here is that, in the end, he will likely be seen as an obstructionist by the Islamist/MB camp and a sell out by those who supported him because he compromised on an issue near and dear to their hearts.


The Muslim Brotherhood is playing politics like the very old hands that they are.  They know that the election to win today is the upcoming vote for assembly representatives.  The next assembly will write the constitution.  All of Egypt's future laws will flow from this document.  It will set the tone for Egypt's political future for decades to come.  It will also be the document that lays out the powers of the various branches and offices of government. 

In the future, the role of the president may be greatly inhibited by this document.  That reduction in power would be likely supported by the people who are justifiably leery of a single person having too much power.  If Iraq and other parliamentary governments emerging from dictatorship are anything to go by, most of the power granted by the constitution is likely to fall into the hands of the assembly and the Prime Minister. 

The Prime Minister is not elected separately, but is chosen by whatever party or coalition of parties is able to constitute a governing majority out of the elected assembly members.  If the MB is calculating right, they likely believe that they will either have this majority in hand or will have enough of a presence to form a coalition with several weaker parties, even Salafists or leftists, who will be in no position to field a candidate for approval from the assembly nor be able to thwart the MB's selection. 

Once the writing for the constitution is achieved, the presidency will likely be a non-issue.  A position that the MB might not even attempt to obtain as it will get much of the country's umbrage and very few perks.  They will then be secure in their positions in the Assembly, always forming at least part of the governing coalition, close to the seat of prime minister and filling numerous cabinets with the power to control the apparatus of government along with making the laws.  

In the end, if the Muslim Brotherhood announces their full support of El Baradei for the presidency, it won't be because they see him as an "honest broker", but because he is the least dangerous to their aspirations. 

In the end, the liberal/secular focus on the presidency instead of the assembly elections will be their down fall.  The presidency will mean nothing without adequate support in the assembly and definition by the new constitution.  This will not be an all powerful presidency ruling over the assembly, but a presidency that is either subservient to the will of the assembly or, if the position has a stroke of luck, an equal partner, depending on how the constitution is written. 

Any hopes of a truly free and equitable Egypt with a limited Islamic bent will depend not on the presidency, but on the first parliamentary elections for the People's Assembly.  The first parliament writes the constitution.  After that, it will be a matter of Egyptians trying to live under those rules for a very long time.

Summary only...

Egypt and Democracy: Rose Colored Liberation Glasses

Update at bottom ie Wael Ghonim on Qaradawi...

As I have been trying to say to my liberal Egyptian friends, I think their rose colored liberation glasses are getting in the way of seeing their political reality clearly.

The liberals keep telling the west that it is their fears (with a healthy dose of Mubarek/NDP propaganda) that makes us see the Muslim Brotherhood as a powerful political entity in Egypt. When a massive "celebration march" is led in prayer by Yusuf Qaradawi, the Egyptian liberals better believe that the MB has got plenty of mojo left in them.

Oh...and the Egyptian military is allowing Iranian warships through the Suez Canal.

Um...pardon me, but who is pushing that button?

Yes, I support my liberal friends in Egypt getting freedom and democracy with the full knowledge that the MB is going to be part of this deal, but sometimes I feel like they are so busy patting themselves on the back and cheering on the other region wide revolutions that they are losing sight of their own situation. I don't mean that the military is still in control, I mean who is positioning themselves for leadership in the New Egypt.

I hope that I am wrong, but acting like the problem doesn't exist is the worse than having a healthy dose of worry. It is seriously close to acting like that hairy growth on your chin is just a beauty mark.

Update:
And Wael Ghonim tweeted about 1:10pm CST 9pm Egypt

I loved Sheikh Qaradawi Khutbah today. Was truly inspired when he said: Today I'm going to address both Muslims and Christians. Respect!

This is what Wael Ghonim got out of Qaradawi's presence in Tahrir square and his speech. I can't decide who they are trying to propagandize: us or themselves. They are just so excited about "Egyptian Unity" that they forget that not everyone has the same idea about what "freedom" means.

I keep seeing these posts about the Muslim Brotherhood said they are not going to (insert your worst fears here - last report says they are not going to pressure govt to change stance towards Israeli treaty while at the same time they are letting Iranian warships through the Suez to go to Syria. Hellllooooo?). Um...no, they aren't because the MB already said they aren't going to establish themselves as a political party known as the MB. They are going to create a separate political entity without religion as its main charter, but whose candidates are going to work towards MB agenda none the less. Those candidates will simply explain they are doing as their constituents want, not the MB.

Oh...and too my liberal Egyptian friends who keep saying the MB is not a major political force, please read your own news papers, allegedly all free now from government control:

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's best-organized political force,

What was that? The sound of crickets from the Liberal Egyptian blogosphere.

Summary only...

Muslim Brotherhood v. Al Qaeda and an Interview With MB Leader

An extremely interesting report contrasting the Brotherhood and Al Qaeda including outlining on the Brotherhood and Al Qaeda's break, Hamas in the Gaza v. Islamist offshoots of Al Qaeda.

Pointing this out is not in the interest of showing either of these groups as "secular" or not dangerous to the United States, Israel and the region. It is rather to put some light on divisions that should be and could be exploited. Particularly in the light of the new reality in Egypt. If our primary goal is the elimination of Al Qaeda and the diminishing of extremist ideology.

See my previous post on "The One Good Thing About the Muslim Brotherhood"

An important aspect to remember is that, in Egypt, when the Brotherhood gets a piece of the pie, they will have several counters (though, it seems the Brotherhood is lying low per some insiders). One, the Egyptian army who has lots of interests they won't easily surrender to Islamic rule. Two, they will have share power with numerous "leftist" parties who are largely socialist and have a big chunk of support through labor unions. Three, when they own a piece of the pie (as they have been working towards) they will have something to lose.

Another interesting video interview with the head of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He side steps lots of questions about establishing an Islamic state in Egypt. Says they are for a civil society and democracy. That is what the people of Egypt want. But, if a majority of people want Sharia as a basis of law by a majority, then it must abide by it. They say that they will not forsake their faith. Said they did not use their banners to lead the revolution because they were not the only ones, but they were part of it (and they were, stand by).

Do not seek a post or job in the government. Backing El Baradei. Will work with anyone of anyone religion or any political party who has the main value "freedom". Says no one with any "responsibility" has said that the treaty with Israel should be abrogated. Then goes on to harangue Israel and their aggressions. The solution should be "justice". UN should implement UN resolution.

Anchor points out that the MB candidates only had ten percent votes. He said that the elections were rigged. He expects that if they get a chance to run in free elections they would get 30% to 38% of votes (actually, this is pretty close to my estimation coming soon on political make up). However, he supports free practice of religion. On the other hand, his prediction of getting over 30% of the vote kind of contradicts the whole "we don't seek post or job in new government".

The revolution was all people. Women with veils, women without veils, etc. Revolution of the people (sort of suggesting that they understand they do not represent a majority; goes along with comments by anchor about losing membership and splintering of party that he denies).

Other thoughts coming on the possible political make up of the New Egypt.

Summary only...

The One Good Thing About the Muslim Brotherhood

I know, it's crazy to even suggest it, but the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has one good thing going for it: Aymen Al-Zawahiri and the Al Qaeda idealogues hate it.

Or, maybe it is more accurate to say that they dislike them intensely and possibly despise them as being sell outs.

How do we know? Well, we'd have to get in the wayback machine and read Al Zawahiri's book, Knights Under the Prophets Banner, written in 2000. In it he devotes an entire chapter to the failure of the Muslim Brotherhood, what he considers their "bargain with the devil" and Al Qaeda's break with that organization. Not the United States as the devil, but with democracy, socialism or any other system that is not purely Islamic in nature.

In Chapter Nine of Knights Under the Prophet's Banner, he alludes to a previous book written entirely on the subject of the Muslim Brotherhood's failures entitled, The Muslim Brotherhood's Bitter Harvest in 60 Years. In the short, it is about the MB's rejection of Global Jihad for the local as opposed to Al Qaeda's world wide war. It is about the MB's decision to pursue political gains through existing systems instead of instituting an Islamic Caliphate through violent struggle, without compromise, with only shariah law as its basis. It is about members of the MB wanting their piece of the pie and forgetting about sacrifice in the name of the Islamic Cause.

Understanding that Zawahiri's actual mentor, Sayyid Qutb, insists that democracy and freedom are anathema to true Islam as it places man and his governance above Allah's. Even if that democracy is dressed in Islam, it is false, halal and down right evil since it "confuses young men" about real Islam and the way of jihad.

He first called this movement and several others out in generic terms in KUPB before getting right down to calling out the Muslim Brotherhood.

to alert the readers to the hidden and open enemies, their wolves and their foxes, so that they can be on their guard against the brigands who wish to rob them."

In Chaper 9 he says that the MB have made mistakes that are tantamount to crimes that must be punished. One of which is to equate Muslims with non-Muslims in "all the material, moral, civilian and political rights of a citizen." They created a new "fiqh" which goes against all accepted Islamic jurisprudence and have refused to fight with "pride and dignity" for their faith, choosing instead to "live in humiliation" under the "new world order". I believe that is a reference to secular democracy or, at least, under the auspices of the Western Infidels and the current Egyptian regime. They have misguided the Muslim youth about the true meaning and duties of jihad.

In short, the MB's position in negotiating with the Mubarek regime and angling for a political position within an apostate system and state may have made them the worst enemies and traitors to the Global Jihad.

One could hope that someone, low down on the State Department's totem pole, so as not to give the MB too much legitimacy, might whisper that reminder in the MB's ear.

Welcome to the party. We suggest you strap on your kevlar and helmet forthwith.

Summary only...

Nature Abhors a Vaccuum and So Does Politics: Muslim Brotherhood to Negotiate Directly With Government

If there is a hole, somebody always feels like they have to fill it. Usually for their own benefit.

I had a bad feeling that this was going to happen when the protests dragged on and no unifying voice(s) or idea(s) beyond "Mubarek Must Go" was being heard. It grew worse when I heard Mahmoud (Sand Monkey) give an interview with Parker Spitzer on CNN. Spitzer asked several times about leadership that Mahmoud pushed aside or simply insisted that the lack of leadership and the spontaneity of the event was its own power. No leaders need apply. That sentiment was echoed over and over again posters on Twitter, Sand Monkey's account and even over at Jan 25.

As we are finding out and even Vaclav Havel pointed out,

If the uprisings in Eastern Europe had taken a month instead of just a week, he said, the results might have been different — and far worse.

"Time is a crucial element," he said. "The longer it takes the bigger the danger of a far worse dictatorship than Mubarak's."

The MB, very strategically, refused to take a lead role in the protests, letting it remain a demand from the broader street. However, as the days waned, they obviously decided that the momentum was shifting and they had better get their foot in the door while they can. The Egyptian Government, led still by Mubarek, are excellent games men. They have already figured out how to dissect and eliminate the protesters' power.

Divide and conquer is first and foremost. They must figure that the MB, as a long standing organization with their own agenda, would be willing to compromise in order to obtain some of their objectives. Obviously, the MB would hope to consolidate those gains once they are given the nod of legitimacy. A legitimacy they instantly gained the moment Mubarek et al opened direct negotiations.

Second, by establishing the MB as the "opponent", they would hope to make themselves the party of the lesser evil. Thus, the citizenry will have two major parties to elect from. The party that wants to oppress them through establishing draconian religious law and the party that just wants to repress them by secular means.

Makes the Democrat and Republican party almost appear angelic in comparison.

The Muslim Brotherhood, however, issued a statement indicating they would not be appeased until Mubarek is gone. Giving lip service to the general uprising's demands, keeping them "unified" and in the streets at least until the MB gets what it wants. If they succeed, then they can claim the great historical and political power of having been the instrument of ousting Mubarek. Imagine that playing to the greater Egyptian polity for the next two decades of "elections". Democracy yes, freedom...eh, not so much.

All the while, the liberal reformers are languishing in the square and on the internet, years behind the MB's organization ability and political skills. It is almost too painful to watch. The power of the protests had a "use by" date. The liberals in the group appear to have been drunk on the success of their impromptu protest and the sheer hope of making a change to realize it. Until now.

As Michael Ledeen always says: Faster, please! Except, of course, today. Support our SOB, screw democracy?

There is only one problem with that, it has become apparent that Mubarek is going to go sometime in the near future. Today, tomorrow, six months from now. He's going. Who are we going to support after that? Is there anyone in the NDP who has the power to hold it together? Someone suggested that we should put pressure on such "next leader" to begin democratic liberal reforms. The problem will be, they aren't Mubarek, they don't have the power and any sign of give would be cause for the same thing we are seeing today. Maybe worse.

What Mubarek could have done towards organizing an eventual change to liberal democracy, he didn't and now that time is past. New ideas, please. The old ones are growing quite raunchy.

I do agree with one commenter over at Ledeen's: these autocrats aren't going to be able to hold on forever. We need real contingency plans to act on instead of, as Consul at Arms says, "hope" and "expectations".

Can we please, please, identify some liberal democrats and get them some support?

Summary only...