Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV: Damned If You Do

Having watched the 37 minute, Pentagon Briefing 31 July 2007 on Gen. William Wallace's findings regarding the death of Cpl Pat Tillman, I was interested in finding out how exactly could the famous football star's potential death as a fratricide could be, as Deputy Secretary of State Geren called it, "close hold". In other words, how would Sec. of Defense Rumsfeld and the President not know several days later that this was a possibility when the entire platoon knew and so did their officers? More so because the AAR had occured on April 23 and an AR 15-6 investigation was opened on the same day?

Mind you, it is not that I don't understand Afghanistan is 12,000 miles away from the United States. But, Pat Tillman? The heroic, patriotic man who had given up millions to defend his country? Wouldn't somebody want to know what happened?

And how could a command believe the right thing to do was NOT tell the family or pass that information on, up the chain of command?

Was Gen. Kensinger solely responsible or was he left holding the bag?

That is the question that is being sought in congress today even though Gen. Wallace's completed report ends at Gen. Kensinger. Of course, Wallace is a general in the United States Army and has no power over the civilian authority of the Secretary of Defense so his investigation rightfully ends there.

Without passing judgment on Rumsfeld and since I only have documents pertaining to the Army's investigation, there are some very good reasons that Kensinger and several general officers are being held responsible for the failure of providing the Tillman's with appropriate information.

From the AR 15-6 2005, conducted by Brig. Gen. Jones, on page 1977, the name is redacted, but this officer explains clearly that they chose not to provide the Tillman's with information for the very thing that they were accused of - namely "cover up". I believe this is Lt. Gen. Kensinger, though I cannot be certain due to the redacted name. It could be someone directly below him in the chain of command. It is certain it is someone who had direct responsibility for notifying the Tillman family.

-Feb 17, 2005 -I was the [redacted] on 22 Apr 04. As stated in my earlier statement in this investigation, I do not recall the specific date on which I learned Spc Tillman's death may have resulted from friendly fire; however, it was a few days following the incident but prior to 29 Apr 04 when the [redacted] sent a message to the Commanders, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and USASOC advising the death was potentially a fratricide.

In general discussions relating to the friendly fire determination as the cause of death for Spc Tillman, I advised since an AR 15-6 investigation was ongoing and subject to approval by CDR CENTCOM, no one should state definitively that friendly fire caused the death of Spc Tillman.

I am aware the provisions of AR-600-8-1 and 600-34 regarding providing information to the family of suspected friendly fire and status of the pending investigation. In my opinion, neither of these regulations clearly requires the command to inform the family of possible friendly fire as cause of death when there is an investigation pending. Although 600-8-1 provides language to inform the family of a suspected friendly fire, AR 600-34 notes the importance of waiting until the investigation is complete before releasing information prior to findings of the investigation. Further, under AR 15-6, the approving authority can change or substitute findings or recommendations of the investigating officer.

In my opinion, the commander makes the decision on what information to provide the family at notification or thereafter, except that he cannot pre-empt the pending investigation which would go to CDR CENTCOM for approval. I saw no regulatory requirements for the [redacted] to inform the family that we suspected friendly fire prior to completion of the investigation.

I was sensitive to the issue of information to the family and pending investigation since we handled a similar situation June 03 OIF. In that case, preliminary information to the family indicated the service member's death likely resulted from friendly fire. The CDR CENTCOM approved the AR 15-6 investigation into the incident as the approving authority, he added a finding to note there was enemy fire during the fight. Although the additional finding did not change the finding that friendly fire caused the death under investigation, it did create additional challenges for the command in dealing with the family of the deceased, including allegations of cover up by the military.

Ultimately, in considering any information provided to the Tillman next of kin, I advised caution in providing information relating to friendly fire pending completion of the investigation.

I believe my original assumption is correct and this is LT Gen. Kensinger. I don't know if anything else needs to be said after reading this though there are reams of statements I've reviewed and some that are equally pertinent to the question of casualty notice, office of personnel and various other people who were and were not directly responsible for this failing to properly notify the family.

It seems clear that some sort of strange risk aversion overcame this officer and deluded him/her into believing that the command's reputation or even some overweening desire to defend the rights of the possible shooters (though it doesn't read that way) stood above the honest and deserved care for a fallen soldiers' family. This officer blatantly states that he re-interpreted the regulations requiring information to be given to the family regarding pending investigations into friendly fire incidents.

The worst of this is, the AAR and preliminary statements from those involved clearly stated that they understood it to be fratricide on more than one occasion long before the end of the investigation. Further, to hold it long enough that Cpl Tillman's friends and fellow platoon members could tell them without the proper respect and support that should have been provided by the military is nearly criminal.

And, as noted by Geren, a serious disgrace to the uniform, the Army and it's values. This officer put themselves above their men and their families. That is a stain of shame.

Stay tuned for additional comments on the other officers involved as well as how the press releases were coordinated to end up with the giant gap in this story.

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - The Beginning

Part II: Conspiracy and Death-Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best

Pat Tillman: death and conspiracy - Olbermann is an Idiot


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors

Conspiracies always start with a kernel truth. The situation that begins the "cover up" conspiracy, beyond the "murdered" conspiracy, is the flow of information after the immediate incident. Soldiers in the field describe war as moments of sheer adrenaline followed by long periods of extreme boredom. The firefight that precipitated Tillman's death was intense and over in minutes. This was followed by hours of pulling security, reconnaissance of the area, waiting for the medevac, and planning for the continuing mission. A mission that turns out to be more than "clearing" a village.

According to interviews with the Platoon Leader, the mission was sensitive. They had received information that 100 Taliban were planning on crossing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan to attack BCPs (Border Crossing Points) manned by the AMF (Afghan Military). 2nd Platoon of the 2/75th, Tillman's platoon, was tasked with visiting several BCPs and moving to Tit, Afghanistan where the suspected fighters and/or leaders were coordinating.

After the fight was over, 3rd Platoon moved up to provide security. While the story moves along, between the end of the firefight, the arrival of 3rd Platoon and the subsequent Medevac of the casualties, it was four hours.

A member of serial 2 arrived on the scene, discovering that Tillman was dead and conferred with the remaining member of Serial 1, both indicating that they felt this was probably fratricide.

PLT leader with Serial 1 retrieved the radio and called in the situation to TOC. He called in a nine line requesting medevac for himself and his radio man. He was told that there were two friendlies KIA by the squad leader. He called back to TOC and requested a second medevac for the KIA.

TOC informs 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon of the situation and they move out to make contact with 2nd Platoon.

Two body bags were brought up and Tillman and the AMF were placed inside along with whatever gear and personal effects could be found in the immediate vicinity.

During this time, the last elements of serial 2 from 2nd Platoon had cleared the canyon. Kevin Tillman was in the last GMV. The Platoon Sergeant from serial 1 instructed Kevin Tillman to pull security on serial 2's vehicles. In his statement (pages 612-614) he said he was not informed there were casualties. He was not informed that his brother was KIA. Nor was he informed that it was possible fratricide. While the Platoon Sergeant and several others discussed the probability, they were not prepared to state it emphatically. His first priority was to secure their area, clear the adjacent village and set up a landing zone. He was not prepared to discuss Pat Tillman's death with his brother.

They were also down to seventeen men. Three of which were the shooters and one had witnessed Tillman's death. The entire platoon was shaken by the incident. He was doing what good leaders do: get the men performing their duties and don't give them time to dwell. They were in hostile territory with several hours before relief could arrive. They needed to be aware in case the enemy returned to follow up on the ambush.

As the Platoon Sergeant organized the SKEDCOs for removal of the casualties, he directed another member of serial 1 to join Kevin Tillman to provide security. Kevin Tillman asks him if he has seen Pat. When he doesn't reply, Kevin Tillman asks again and is told that Pat is KIA (according to this witness, Kevin Tillman became hysterical; a second platoon member indicates that Kevin is screaming) . When the casualties are med-evaced to FOB Salerno, Kevin Tillman accompanies the body. This is the correct decision. The Platoon Sergeant is insuring that the appropriate procedures are followed and the chain of command will provide any additional information to Kevin and the Tillman family.

3rd Platoon arrived and took control of the security. Several members of 2PLT indicate they believe this was a friendly fire incident. Because it is dark, 3PLT leader decides to secure the area and wait for morning. Everyone beds down for the night.

Back at base, those at the TOC who heard the nine line medevac knew there were casualties. One of the officers listened to the codes that indicated which members of the platoon were wounded and KIA. He looked them up on the roster and determined that one of the KIA was Pat Tillman. There were four other officers in the room with him. This is what they know:

2 WIA/Wounded (Platoon Leader and Radioman)
2 KIA (Pat Tillman and AMF soldier Thani/Thanos)
The unit was ambushed by enemy fighters in a canyon outside the village of Magareh, Afghanistan. Pat Tillman was killed in the firefight.

When the casualties arrived they were sent to the FST (Field Surgical Team). The surgeon in charge declared Pat Tillman and the AMF dead on arrival. The two WIA are treated and kept at the FST. Guards are placed on the WIA. The word is quickly spreading across the base that Pat Tillman was killed in an enemy attack. Members of the press are on the base and searching for information. The clock is ticking quickly for the command. Tillman's fame, the spread of information and the presence of the press has placed severe time constraints on how long they have to notify the family and provide the first press release. Normal time for notification to the family and definitive press release with confirmation of casualties and events is 24 to 72 hours.

This presents a problem for Command. Particularly as the next of kin is Kevin Tillman who is on base. Once that notification is completed, the POA can release the casualty information to the press.

One of the first reports to circulate is that Tillman is killed "charging up a hill" to engage the enemy. This incorrect information likely has one source: the Platoon Leader. During the firefight when Pat Tillman was killed:

The PLT leader and the man with him take fire and attempt to move to the other side of the house. The second man has a radio and is trying to contact TOC to alert them to their position. The PLT leader is hit in the face by a piece of shrapnel from a round that strikes the house and the radio man is also struck. Neither of them can see what is happening after that.

When he arrives at the base, he has no idea that Tillman has died by friendly fire. The last interaction he had with Tillman was a brief discussion on the hill about who Tillman will take for his fire team (which includes the AMF) and what position. Tillman asks his Platoon Sergeant if his squad can drop their body armor and assault the ridge. The body armor is heavy and not conducive to climbing the steep, rocky hillside. He is told "no", not to drop his armor and that the RTO (radio operator) is attempting to coordinate close air support. The Platoon Sergeant directs Tillman to the rocky spur (where he is eventually killed), telling him to not go any further forward. This is to protect Tillman and his fire team from the potential blast.

This is the most likely source for Tillman's "charge up the hill". At this point, it is uncertain whether this information is officially released by the military or if it is rumor picked up by the press.

At the base, Tillman's body is released to the company mortuary affairs by the surgeon in charge. He did not know who he treated until the next morning. 1st Sgt HHC (headquarters and headquarters company) was tasked with identifying Pat Tillman's remains. When he arrived at mortuary affairs, he assisted in removing Tillman's body armor, MOLLE and Nomex gloves placing them in a bag. When he removed Tillman's body armor, he noted that the top right hand corner of the front plate was smashed (correlating with the "thermal marks" that the ME noted during autopsy). He handed them to a supply Sgt.

It is the late hours of April 22 (the day Tillman was killed) or the very early hours of April 23. The Platoon Leader of 3rd Platoon who relieved 2nd Platoon (Tillman's Platoon) has not yet performed a preliminary review of the site nor called in a request for a friendly fire incident investigation (via an AR 15-6). Which he does, following procedures, on the morning of April 23. No one on base is aware that this is a potential fratricide.

The supply Sgt says he took the RBA (Ranger Body Armor not to be confused with the basic interceptor) to a burn site. He states that the right, top front corner of the plate was "crushed", but he didn't know whether it was from being dropped or from a round. He didn't recall any other rounds or holes in the armor or gear. The supply Sgt removed the plates and noted a small, green notebook inside the RBA. In his words, "the kind we use to make notes in the field". He said that there appeared to be an objective name written on the front. He said he did not look inside. Since it contained possible sensitive information about an operation, he burned it along with the gear.

This is the "diary" that is "missing" that plays some central role in certain conspiracy theories. In fact, Tillman has two "diaries". One is actually a personal journal that he keeps at the rear. This journal is given to Kevin Tillman along with Pat Tillman's dog tags and ruck sack (see pages 612-614) after he returned to the base with Pat Tillman's body and the casualty notification officer first tells Kevin that Pat Tillman has three wounds to the head (not stated as yet but suspect that there was discussion about Kevin viewing his brother's body).

The small, green, "flap" notebook is waterproof. This is what the special agents through out investigation continue questioning Tillman's platoon mates regarding this "diary". The concept of a "diary" and "mission notebook" does not appear in these questions. Possibly because Kevin Tillman himself has asked for this "diary". Several indicate they know he keeps a "journal", but haven't seen him with it. Two know he writes in a journal, but believe it is at base. Three, including the Platoon Leader, notes that Tillman wrote in the "green, flap notebook" during the mission. One notes that Tillman wrote in it at the village they were broken down in before the firing incident.

It is unclear whose description of this "diary" is appropriate. Kevin Tillman believes it is a second personal diary based on his statement. The sergeant who said he burned it believes it was simply an operational note book to jot down mission notes.

On the burning of clothing and gear, the supply Sgt indicates that, while it is common to burn contaminated clothing that might present a bio-hazard (app directives provided on page 628), it is not common to burn equipment like the RBA or the MOLLE if it can be cleaned and redistributed for use in the company. However, he indicates when he opens the bag that the RBA was saturated with blood and "matter" as well as the NOMEX gloves. Following procedures, he decides to burn it due to its condition. He says that he is not directed by anyone above him to do so, but believed he was following proper procedures.

This action also lends to the conspiracy theory that someone was trying to cover up the incident. However, no one at the base knows that this is a fratricide at this time. No one has reason to believe that an AR 15-6 (informal investigation) into a friendly fire incident or criminal investigation will be opened and that anything needs to be retained as evidence. They are simply following basic procedures to dispose of potentially bio-hazardous materials.

However, there are contravening orders regarding the clothing and body armor of deceased soldiers. If they are deceased "in the field" and no medical aid can be rendered, the body armor and clothing are to remain with the deceased. The MEs at Dover explain that, even without a formal criminal investigation, they collect raw data on the damage to the equipment in order to improve the body armor at future dates. The ME does indicate that less than %50 of all casualties arrive with their clothes and equipment. Largely because many of the deceased do receive some sort of medical treatment before expiration and the clothes are removed during treatment. Sometimes because the mortuary affairs need to use other identifying marks and sometimes because mortuary affairs at the front do not know that they need to send this equipment (this is based on the MEs estimation).

To add to the confusion, another sergeant reports that he stored the body armor, had it packed and returned to Ft. Lewis Washington along with other gear. Both sergeants indicate that they completed an inventory sheet regarding the disposition of the armor. [update:this turns out to be the body armor of another ranger, identification unknown, who was also struck by friendly fire. His body armor had impact points to a magazine in the right front, lower pocket; some may be "ricochets" off another object per the crime lab report and detailed analysis page]

All of these events lend to the "perfect storm" that Deputy Secretary of the Army Geren refers to in causing confusion and complications in resolving the matter. All of the actors at this level are simply performing their functions as they believe are appropriate. (see Geren -37 mins long, to be reviewed in next installment Pentagon Briefing 31 July 2007)

On the morning of April 23, Tillman is flown to Bagram, Afghanistan accompanied by his brother Kevin. 3rd Platoon Leader requests and investigation be opened into the friendly fire incident. The rest of 2nd Platoon returns to FOB Salerno. 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon continue the mission to Tit, Afghanistan after some investigation into the ambush in adjacent village of Magareh. Five days later, they capture five individuals believed to be responsible for the ambush based on information from the local population.

April 23 or 24 (date unclear) 2nd Platoon conducts an AAR (after action review/report) where the platoon members discuss the event and conclude that it was, in fact, fratricide. Several squad members from the GMV1, serial 2 indicate that they believe they shot into Pat Tillman's position. A chaplain is made available for those of the platoon who request assistance. The Company Commander appoints a presiding officer to conduct the AR 15-6 investigation.

All those involved are told that their mission was sensitive and that, due to the ongoing investigation, OPSEC (operational security) should be followed. Most of them believe this means that they cannot discuss any part of the incident with anyone outside of the command or the investigating body. The platoon members remain open and forthcoming about the incident with their command and the investigating officer. No one believes they are contributing to a "cover up". Most of the field officers believe that they are also following procedures regarding not releasing information on an on-going investigation.

The problem is compounded here: Lt Gen. Kisinger and among several officers.



Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins (including original links to Army CID investigation materials)

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part II - Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - Olbermann is an Idiot

Summary only...

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors

A commenter at Blackfive left a link to the last investigation into Pat Tillman's death by the United States Army. Once can only speculate as to why the media has yet to read this entire document and put a more definitive story out, at least regarding the testimony, instead of dropping little pieces of the interviews and investigation like stinking cow patties in the barnyard. Apparently, no one can be bothered to read the entire investigation documents and watch the videos which can be found here: US Army Criminal Investigation Command Report of Investigation Regarding
Cpl Patrick Tillman huge PDF File, 2nd huge PDF File and Video. All names are redacted, though some of the information is probably available by simple googling.

You will not learn the shooters name. The video is not explosive. It is simply long views of the same location from different directions with similar lighting as experienced on the evening of April 22, 2004 when Cpl Pat Tillman was killed in a friendly fire accident. I say that very confidently even though I have only read approximately 100 pages (six interviews of those involved in the shooting, various maps and diagrams). The reader, of course, should always be willing to draw their own conclusions. So far, the complete story appears like this:

On the morning of April 22, 2004 2/75th Ranger (2nd Platoon of the 75th Rangers) was tasked to go to Tit[update: not Manah; manah is where they stop for the broken GMV], Afghanistan near the Pakistan Border to clear the village. So far in the interviews, including an officer at the TOC (Tactical Command), no one knows exactly what they were looking for at the village besides clearing it. No one knows of any specific intelligence that indicates a High Value Target or targets. It may have, in fact, been a simple clearing mission [update: intelligence indicated possible 100 fighters crossing the Pakistan border to attack BCPs - border crossing points- manned by AMF; the town of Tit, AF either had a leader, coordinating persons or possible rest stop for fighters].

The platoon was being led by a ranger who had been previously deployed in Iraq for the invasion. He believes that he was well trained, but admits that his actual combat experience was limited. He says that it amounts to having a few rounds fired in his direction and a grenade land nearby.

On or about 10 AM, one of the HMMVWW broke down. The PLT (Platoon) proceeded together for a few more hours towing the broken vehicle. However, the vehicle was in such bad shape that the steering mechanism no longer worked. Unable to steer the very heavy vehicle made the vehicle towing it dangerous to maneuver as well. The Platoon stopped in another village and called the TOC advising them that they could not continue towing the vehicle. The PLT leader asks to have a "sling load" (helicopter with a lifting device) or tow truck come in to remove the vehicle. TOC informs him that it would take 2 days to get the sling load up to them and that a tow vehicle could not leave the "flat top" (nearby hardened road) to retrieve the vehicle. TOC tells the PLT leader that he will have to bring the vehicle to the flat top and the tow will take it from there.

The PLT leader gives the TOC three options on how he can accomplish that mission:

1) He can split the platoon in two, sending half with the vehicle and half to the objective
2) The entire platoon can accompany the vehicle to the flat top and then continue to the objective
3) The entire platoon and towed vehicle will continue to the objective.

At sometime during this discussion, a local Afghan man approaches and says that he has a "jingha" truck (highly decorated cargo Afghan cargo trucks) that he will use to tow the vehicle for a price. [if any of this is starting to sound like a bad movie, you aren't alone; Custer comes to mind sans overwhelming force of Indians] It is unclear why the PLT leader suggests option one since he and many in his platoon indicate that option 1, splitting the platoon, is a rare action. Yet, the officer from the TOC reminds everyone that much smaller elements, down to squad size, have performed many missions. The officer at the TOC confers with the Bn Cdr (Battalion Commander) who gives the go ahead to split the platoon with half of the platoon accompanying the broken down vehicle (from here forward refered to as "serial 2"). The PLT leader verifies twice this is the action that they are to take both verbally and electronic mail.

Multiple failures as well as simple bad luck begins to effect the platoon as soon as this decision is made. No one checks the "comms" or communications. Serial 1 (the section that Cpl Pat Tillman is with), the half of the PLT that is moving to the objective, has the PLT Leader and a Sattelite Radio. Serial 2, accompanying the towed vehicle, may or may not have such a radio. Upon discussion with the TOC regarding this condition, the TOC tells the PLT leader that, yes, in fact, Serial 2 does have such a radio because they have the commander's HMMVW. Based on the interviews, no one actually checked to see if that was so and if the radios communicated. In other words, no "comm check" before the elements split up.

The leaders of the two groups confer over a map discussing the route to the "hard top" where they will meet with the unit that will tow the broken vehicle back to base. The decide what route that serial 1 will take to the objective. The discuss what route the serial 2 will use to join up with the serial 1 after dropping the vehicle. They depart with the jingha truck driver towing the vehicle.

During this adventure, both serial 1 and serial 2 change routes in progress. The jingha truck driver tells the leader of serial 2 that the path they chose was too steep and his truck would not be able to make it towing the HMMVW. Serial 2 contacts the TOC and tells them they are changing route. No one contacts Serial 1. During the movement to the objective, the PLT leader with serial 1 makes a navigational mistake and turns his group heading back towards the route that Serial 2 is now on.

Serial 2's route has set them up for a classic ambush. The wadi or canyon is approximately 10 meters or 30 feet wide (approximately the width of the average ranch style family home). The walls are steep and the direction of the setting sun prevents easy identification of enemy positions above them on the ridgeline. Several RPGs [update: further review indicates mortars] are fired at their position. None make contact with the vehicles in the convoy. Men tumble out of the vehicles and seek cover, looking for the enemy, but the steep walls and lighting prevent positive identification.

IN the meantime, the element Pat Tillman was with, serial 1, hears the explosions from the RPGs and turns to find out what is happening. They dismount and move to positions. The PLT leader can hear serial 2 but can't communicate. The communications he does hear are confusing. He directs his section towards the estimated position of Serial 2.

Leader of Serial 2 realizes they are in a bad position and orders his men to "drive out" of the ambush. This includes some men driving vehicles and others dismounted going through the canyon. No one in Serial 2 can see the ambushers. They only see the explosions and hear the gun fire.


[This graphic has been updated to show the correct orientation of the death scene with serial 2 traveling east and Tillman's position to the north pg 1210]

Serial 1 sees enemy forces silhouettes up on the ridge line above the wadi and sets up firing positions along a second escarpment opposite of the wadi and near the mouth where the road serial 2 is on turns in front of serial 1's position. Three members of Serial 1 take positions part way up the hill behind a berm. Pat Tillman, O'neal and an Afghani military force (AMF) take a position on a small spur on the rise behind some large rocks. The PLT leader and another unnamed member take position at the corner of a house on the rise. Other members are equally spread out. They begin firing at the enemy on the ridge.

Serial 2 begins driving out of the wadi. The first HMMVW sees what they believe is enemy forces now on the other side of them and begin firing into those positions. The PLT leader and the man with him take fire and attempt to move to the other side of the house. The second man has a radio and is trying to contact TOC to alert them to their position. The PLT leader is hit in the face by a piece of shrapnel from a round that strikes the house and the radio man is also struck. Neither of them can see what is happening after that.

The M240B (which fires a 5.52 round; important fact to the investigation [uptade: per Capt. JM Heinrichs, the M240B fires 7.62mm round. The ME reports either 5.52mm or 7.62 at high velocity made the wounds]) operator on the back of the first HMMVW in serial 2 exiting the wadi sees an Afghan man with an AK-47, camouflage pants, a purple jacket and a beard on the opposite rise and begins firing. This is the AMF that is in Pat Tillman's position. The AMF is firing into enemy positions on the opposite ridge above serial 2's exit. The M240B gunner affirms later that he is the one that fired at the AMF [update: squad leader in GMV says he uses optics and fires at least six shots at the same man]. O'neal, who was with Tillman, states that they were receiving fire from serial 2. At the same time, the men behind the berm and down from Tillman's position are receiving "walking" fire and one of them gets out a pen gun flare to signal serial 2 that they are "friendlies". Tillman and O'neal have a brief discussion which may or may not have included profanities. Tillman decides to puff smoke to alert serial 2 that they are friendlies.

[This section updated with O'neal's testimony from Page 428] Tillman rises out of his position to throw the smoke grenade, firing pauses for a moment (this is because GMV1 has reoriented fire on the house). Tillman and O'Neal stand up and exchange a few words thinking the danger has passed. They begin receiving fire again. The AMF is killed. O'Neal drops prone on the ground after receiving ricochet fragments and rounds into his RBA (Ranger Body Armor) and striking a magazine on his vest. Tillman also drops to the ground in a prone position on his back. (O'Neal says he believes Tillman was wounded at this time; Tillman had a wound in his left forearm; fragments retrieved were later found consistent with a damaged flashbang in his vest). Tillman is laying on an incline of approximately 45 degrees (see Trajectory). Tillman raises his http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.bold.gif
insert bold tagsTorso from the ground and yells, "What are you shooting at?! I'm Pat F***ing Tillman. Several rounds strike the rock to his front right sending pieces of rock into his clothes, face and arms. One round pierces his flashlight on his M4 exiting and smashing the top, right corner of his SAPI. Three rounds penetrate his head in a close grouping. O'Neal thought he heard running water and asked Tillman if he had "p*****d" himself. He received no response. The firing had ceased. He looked over and saw blood running from under Tillman's head. He grabbed Tillman by his armor and pulled him up (probably why the sergeant found him in a half sitting position with his head slumped over).

A member of serial 2 states that he saw the smoke and believed that one of his unit was trying to lay down cover for maneuvering so he also threw smoke. At that time, someone from serial 1 (Tillman's section) was yelling, "Cease fire!" The squad leader from serial 2 also began to yell, "Cease fire!"

All fire ceases. The entire fire fight has lasted less than 5 minutes [update: this is an estimation based on the details. no one offers up a time line yet]. A member of serial 2 begins checking the situation. He hears someone yelling that they have casualties. When he reaches Tillman's position, he finds the AMF laying with his head pointed down hill. Tillman is in a sitting position with his legs in front of him. He is slumped forward with his torso leaning against a rock that was partially to the rear and left of his position. According to this member statements, he found O'neal holding on to Tillman's arm and possibly trying to talk to him. He states he could see that Tillman's "head was missing". [based on later statements and the ME report, a large portion of the back of Tillman's skull was missing when his body arrived at Dover]. He states that O'neal said, "Your guys shot him. One of your guys shot him!" He told O'neal to get his weapon and secure the position.

A member of serial 2 arrived on the scene, discovering that Tillman was dead and conferred with the remaining member of Serial 1, both indicating that they felt this was probably fratricide.

PLT leader with Serial 1 retrieved the radio and called in the situation to TOC. He called in a nine line requesting medevac for himself and his radio man. He was told that there were two friendlies KIA by the squad leader. He called back to TOC and requested a second medevac for the KIA.

TOC informs 1st Platoon and 3rd Platoon of the situation and they move out to make contact with 2nd Platoon.

Two body bags were brought up and Tillman and the AMF were placed inside along with whatever gear and personal effects could be found in the immediate vicinity. The wounded and the KIA were medevac'd separately to the FOB.

3rd Platoon arrived and took control of the security. Several members of 2PLT indicate they believe this was a friendly fire incident. Because it is dark, 3PLT leader decides to secure the area and wait for morning. Everyone beds down for the night. The next morning, 3PLT leader called together the remaining members of 2 PLT to discuss what had happened. They concurred that it was a friendly fire incident. 3PLT leader walked to the different locations indicated by 2PLT and took pictures of the area and looking out towards the positions involved. He sends a squad to the ridge line above the wadi where Serial 2 believes they were being fired on from the enemy and where serial 1 says they saw silhouettes and muzzle flashes. No one can find any trace of the enemy.

After arriving at Tillman's position and taking pictures, he finds part of Tillman's missing skull and places it in an Ammo can to be sent back to the FOB and eventually catch up with Tillman's remains. [this is not just a gruesome detail; but central to the investigation and concerns of conspiracy to cover up]. 3PLT leader calls TOC and notifies them that he believes this was a case of fratricide and requests an investigation be opened.

It is the morning of April 23, 2004.

Part II: Is there a conspiracy?

There are several problems that arise during the fire fight and after that seem contradictory or abnormal. Most of which have explanations that simply do not fit expectations of a criminal investigation, though, that alone does not implicate them in a conspiracy.

The story of Pat Tillman's death resulting from enemy fire was not due to an original conspiracy to cover it up, but appears to be the result of time, space and communications. As far as the TOC knew the night of April 22, 2004, 2nd Platoon had come into contact with the enemy and it had resulted in two wounded and two KIA. 2PLT leader was injured and medevaced but had no idea that his platoon members or 3PLT believed that there was fratricide.

It was this first report that began to filter up and out. It's continuation for several days appears to be simply the result of time and distance.

In the next piece, I'll discuss the other issues that have been contrived into a conspiracy to cover up Pat Tillman's cause of death. It should be remembered, as we go forward, that Tillman's family was told by his best friend that Tillman was killed in a friendly fire incident while the command indicated that they were still investigating the incident.

However, based on the first part of the investigation and subsequent testimony regarding that evening, it seems safe to declare that there was no known conspiracy to kill Cpl Pat Tillman. His death was a matter of existential circumstances and possible inexperienced leaders and members of his platoon.

One thing is certain, the media and many others could have taken a little time to read the investigation and providing better information than throwing out pieces and statements to sensationalize what is already a fairly sensational story.

Stay tuned for the rest of the story...

Part II: Conspiracy and Death-Trajectory

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Cross posted at the Castle

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Ivorian Prince Killed In Iraq as Member of US Army

Ivorian Prince Killed in Iraq

ABIDJAN, Ivory Coast - A U.S. soldier killed in Iraq who was the son of a king in this African country was buried here Saturday in a princely ceremony.
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Spc. Ebe Firmin Emolo, 33, joined the army two years ago and became a paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne Division. He was killed along with three others when their vehicle struck an explosive in April.

Emolo was a prince, the youngest son of King Nanan Boa Kouassi III of the Agni people, said Ettien Amoakon, the chief of staff of Ivory Coast's defense minister, who assisted with the burial.

In the town of Abengourou, 130 miles northeast of Abidjan, Emolo's coffin was followed by hundreds of mourners, including U.S. military representatives and members of the royal family.

The crowd wept as he was laid in the ground in a cemetery.

"As a soldier, Emolo was one of the best," said U.S. Gen. Maj. David T. Zabecki, who accompanied the body on behalf of the U.S. Army.

Emolo came to the United States in 1999 and joined the Army in 2005. He was married and had been living in Greensboro, N.C., where he worked as a security officer at a hospital.

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Soldier Down - Kick Stands Up: PGR Missions Confirmed

John at Castle Arrggh! linked to the story of two soldiers who were killed in Afghanistan on Sunday by a loan gunman in uniform. Reports indicate the Afghani was dressed as an Afghan Soldier, but a message in Angel forums from a soldier in the unit indicates that he might have been dressed as a Afghan police officer.

Thanks Tammy,
I love poems like those, they always bring a little Tear to my eyes.

Its been a little tough here the past couple days, we lost A couple guys from here Sunday. We had a memorial service for Them on Tuesday, I knew one of them, not close but still, when You walk up to their picture and salute them, its heart breaking..
It was a senseless shooting, two guys killed two wounded, some frigging clown dressed up as a police officer.

Well we go on, and deal with it,

The Patriot Guard Riders are confirming the mission for Monday, May 14th in Leavenworth for Col. Harrison. Additional information will be updated here when it is received. Stand-by for details.

A special message was posted in the PGR Forums for the family and in rememberance of Col. Harrison:

To the family of COL James W. Harrison Jr. We have mourned the loss of this great leader who has served his country with honor and was well respected amongst his fellow soldiers. COL Harrison - I have been honored to serve as your Executive officer of the 5th Military Police Battalion CID for a year and half from 1999-2000 in Kasierslautern, Germany. Your superb leadership was well respected by the entire Battalion as well as the 202d Military Police Group CID. Thanks for your continued frienship over the past eight years. As my mentor, I thank you for all that you and your family have done for my family and myself. You were loved and well respected by the Hunt family and we have been honored to again serve with you here at Fort Leavenworth. Our families were close friends and we enjoyed the dinners at your house. When we heard the news our family was shocked and we immedately went to your house to comfort your family. My kids (all 8) made cards for your wife and boys and we sent over some pictures of my promotion ceremony that you participated in last fall. It has been very difficult for all of us who knew you well and were close to you. Our country has lost a great leader who was well loved and repected by his troops. I understand how hard it was to pull your retirement paper work and take this job in Afghanistan. You have sacrificed your life for our great nation. You will not be forgotten and you will always be remembered. I have your picture with myself and my wife at my promotion ceremony in my office at work. I was honored to have you participate in my promotion ceremony (Pictures enclosed). It will hang in my office always, where ever the Army takes me. You will be missed - my mentor, my friend. Our thoughts and prayers will always be with the Harrison family who have supported thier husband and father throughout his military career. May God bless you with his eternal peace always!

Hans F. Hunt
Lieutenant Colonel, Military Police
(Patriot Guard Member)

All Angels, military, PGR and troop supporters stand by.

MSgt Will Sabulu

There will be a Memorial Service/Military Roll Call for Master Sgt. Wilberto Sabalu Friday May, 11th at 11am at Soldiers Chapel on Fort Leonard Wood.

The PGR has been invited and we, will provide a flag line for this service. Also MSG Sabalu is scheduled to arrive at Ft Wood sometime on Saturday. So final arrangements have not been set. Keep reading this thread, I will update it as information is available..

Joe Smith
Sen Mo Ride Capt

Update on the Ride Mission for his funeral has not been provided. Stand-by for details.

Special messages in the forums:

Wil was a friend of mine and was a member of our Family, Freedom Of Road Riders. He was loved by all that knew him, with his positive outlook on everything and his enduring smile. Wil volunteered to go over to Afghanistan, because he felt as a soldier, that he needed to serve in this conflict against terrorism. He was due to come home to us in three weeks.

Wil, I thank you for your service, for your ultimate sacrifice to preserve my freedoms, and I weep at your loss, our Chilly Willy

From Keith at Post 1

To the members of the PGR,
I would like to thank everybody for their heartfelt wishes and condolences for MSG Sabalu. I have known Wil for several years now as his supervisor, fellow NCO and friend and I can honestly say that he was one of the most honest, hardworking and trustworthy men I have known. He was not only well liked by his soldiers and peers but also his supervisors. He was the NCO that people knew that they could count on to not only get the job done but get it done properly. Amy, I know that the upcoming times are going to be extremely rough but if there is anything that I can do please let me know. I have spoken to several members from the DB and they have all expressed their sorrow at losing Wil. The 31E's will not be the same for having lost such a great person.

SFC Collier, Keith (RET)

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