Securing Iraq: A Three Part Series Outlines Current Strategy

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The Problem With Afghanistan: They Have No Petraeus

And, apparently, have not implemented the new counterinsurgency manual and tactics or can't because there are not enough forces.

From Matt Sanchez - Nate Fick on Afghanistan Counter-insurgency

The second pillar of the academy's curriculum relates to the first: The more you protect your forces, the less safe you may be. To be effective, troops, diplomats and civilian aid workers need to get out among the people. But nearly every American I saw in Kabul was hidden behind high walls or racing through the streets in armored convoys.

Afghanistan, however, isn't Iraq. Tourists travel through much of the country in relative safety, glass office towers are sprouting up in Kabul, and Coca-Cola recently opened a bottling plant. I drove through the capital in a dirty green Toyota, wearing civilian clothes and stopping to shop in bazaars, eat in restaurants and visit businesses. In two weeks, I saw more of Kabul than most military officers do in a year.[snip]

Of course, mingling with the population means exposing ourselves to attacks, and commanders have an obligation to safeguard their troops. But they have an even greater responsibility to accomplish their mission. When we retreat behind body armor and concrete barriers, it becomes impossible to understand the society we claim to defend. If we emphasize "force protection" above all else, we will never develop the cultural understanding, relationships and intelligence we need to win. Accepting the greater tactical risk of reaching out to Afghans reduces the strategic risk that the Taliban will return to power.

Read the rest: Nate Fick on Afghanistan Counter-insurgency

This is the only place that Fick loses me:

Winning that consent will require doing some difficult and uncomfortable things: de-escalating military force, boosting the capacities of the Karzai government, accelerating reconstruction, getting real with Pakistan. It won't be easy. But the alternative, which I glimpsed while staring down the barrel of that machine gun, is our nation going zero for two in its first wars of the new century.

No mention of Iran? Actually, my issue is the vague "getting real" with Pakistan. Some people believe that we should be striking deep into Pakistan in order to kill or disrupt the Taliban and AQ. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. It is not that the current government of Pakistan is feared to strike the US or any of our allies/forces in the region. The "real" issue here is Musharref's tenuous hold on the government and the huge percentage of Islamists (dare I say "fundamentalists") in the country that, under the right push could force a coup in Islamabad and leave the nuclear weapons in the hands of AQ's fellow travelers.

President Bush recently urged Musharref to hold democratic elections regardless of the situation. It is a principled stand that is much more difficult to follow when the consequences can be huge for Pakistan. Of course, many dictatorships have withheld elections for one "security" reason or another, but this is not a bogus condition in Pakistan. In fact, a change in leadership could place Pakistan firmly outside of our influence and lead to the third front in the war as some like Nate Flick believe is the right move.

From this perspective, there is no good outcome from such an event. Military forces are already operating at 150%. Our NATO allies would not support such an attack and it would certainly bring to fruition AQ's sought after World v. Islam War. It is the same reason that we do not attack Iran, but rather use economic and political pressure to change the regime.

Of course, this means that all groups continue to make war with us without suffering a righteous blow to deflect or destroy them. What we need to do is press forward in Iraq, stabilize it and then transfer our counterinsurgency efforts to Afghanistan. We can always deal with Iran and Pakistan through other means or at a later date. First we need to free up forces and not by arbitrarily leaving one battlefield, but leaving it with a "win" firmly established.
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Nate Fick wrote One Bullet Away and appeared in the book Generation Kill written by a reporter who was embedded with Fick's unit on the push to Baghdad in 2003.

My Comments here:

Thoughts on Generation Kill

Managing War

I always temper my conclusions on Fick's writings by recalling these two references. Fick left the military shortly after his tour in Iraq which ended shortly after the fall of Baghdad. One quote sticks in my mind:

..when the stark realization hits Lieutenant Fick that, to be a great Officer, you must be able to order the death of everything that you love.

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Chai Tea, Mud Huts, etc

I started a series in 2005 called "Chai Tea", mainly because I was trying to emphasize the way that a counterinsurgency is won. Not by bullets, but handshakes. In some respects, the Democrat party is not wrong when it insists that politics, not the military, will win the day.

On the other hand, they have placed the greater emphasis on "world politics" rather than the type of politics that make a difference. That being the close in contact with everyday people living in the lands of Iraq and Afghanistan.

This report from Centcom, Earning and Maintaining Trust, shows you the close in "chai tea" aspects. In Iraq, everything is done over chai tea and a cigarette.

In the Army, the only constant is change. Soldiers are always moving from one position to another and taking over different duties. But in Iraq, the challenge for new leaders like Tillman is, how do you take over a relationship? Rowan and Muhanned worked successfully together because they had a strong personal bond. Tillman will have to build that trust all over again.

“That’s the challenge of counter-insurgency warfare,” Rowan said.

“It’s difficult,” agreed Tillman. “It’s really just about the individual person’s personality.”

Over tea and cigarettes at Muhanned’s house, Rowan made a big show of introducing Tillman.

“Sir, I look forward to working with you,” Tillman told Muhanned, when Rowan was done.

“I will put my hand in your hand. You will protect me, and I will protect you,” Muhanned replied.

The meeting continued for almost two hours, with conversation bouncing from topic to topic. One minute they were talking about putting trash cans on the street corners, the next minute about a trip Muhanned’s son was planning and the next about security threats in the area. In between, Muhanned’s wife served a huge lunch.

When the meeting was over, Tillman said it had been an eye-opening experience. At his previous unit, the focus had been almost entirely on raids and kinetic operations. Tillman could only remember a few times when he had actually sat in an Iraqi’s house and talked.

“Here, they’re interacting. They’re constantly getting out there and talking to local leaders,” Tillman said. “The mindset is just totally different.”

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Green Berets in Afghanistan

I don't write enough about Afghanistan. Neither does the rest of the world of media, but I wanted to bring to your attention the upcoming National Geographic special on the Green Berets in Afghanistan.

You can see videos starting here:

Interview with the Producer (who was injured, along with his cameraman, in one of the rising IED attacks in Afghanistan)

Goodwill trip to the Afghani people (the special forces intelligence officer explains how the Taliban use villagers to ascertain information and draw out forces for potential ambush)

Facing IEDs (on this trip, a really good look at how the intel comes down about impending attacks and how a stupid mistake -hopefully, a mistake - by the Afghan forces leads to a truck being blown up, dead and wounded)

As the producer states, you can see what these men sacrifice, day in and day out, working on a remote base and largely relying on their own resourcefulness, to win their part of the war; the one that started on 9/11/2001.

You also get a sense of how they are implementing real counterinsurgency (less guns, more politics (backed up by guns) and a lot of chutzpah.

Watch it at 9pm EST, Sunday June 3rd

They also have a blog: NGC Blog (everybody is getting into the show)

Jerry Newberry - Special Contributor and Director VFW Communications

So it's about 0700 and the sun is just coming up over the 8,000 ft. ridge to the east of the Korengal Outpost – better known as the "KOP."

My t-shirt is still drenched with sweat from the exertion of climbing the steep ridgelines to the south of here. My hair plastered flat to my head from wearing a Kevlar helmet during the all-night patrol.

It feels good to sit down, drink some water and Gatorade. It's good to be back. It's good to be alive.

I've got a minimum of 30 years on the Joes of 3rd platoon – and I'll admit it ain't easy humping these mountains, keeping up with 'em. They've been at it for about 6 months, on an almost daily (nightly) basis, so they've grown accustomed to it.

But the old guy kept up, and I wasn't the last man in the column as we returned to the outpost when the nightlong patrol finally ended.

So I guess that's something.

The troops out here don’t have it easy. It isn’t much different than the conditions many of us who served in Vietnam experienced.

The "KOP" is a remote outpost located at about the middle of the Korengal Valley. Just a few ridgelines away is Pakistan, where al Quaeda, Taliban and foreign fighters re-supply, re-fit, and train for their almost constant operations against this outpost and the troops who patrol the valley and surrounding mountains.

What it's like on "KOP" (Korengal Out Post)

Bottled water is used for drinking and a “water buffalo" provides the water used to wash clothes (by hand or in a bucket) or for showering.

Removed from the immediate company area are the latrines and "showers." Both are rough structures constructed of two-by-fours and plywood. In order to take a shower, you need to fill a 5-gallon jug from the water buffalo and then haul it down a steep, rocky path to one of two showers. You heft the jug and fill the canvas field shower and wash as fast as you can … before the water bag empties.

He reports that the re-supply drops (necessary because the roads are dangerous) sometimes go wide and the food and other items are "unrecoverable" because they land in what is basically no-man's land where bad things happen.

Due to the limitations of re-supply, food and other items are limited and, as Jerry writes, "predictable":

The food is predictable, unchanging. The cook makes do with the supplies that have been provided. One "hot" meal consisting of two dishes – an egg concoction with diced potatoes, shredded turkey bacon AND turkey link sausages – is prepared in a MKT (Mobile Kitchen Trailer). MRE's (Meals Ready to Eat) are favored over the "hot" meals because at least they offer a little variety.

Battalion and Division HQs are concerned and work hard to improve conditions for the troops. To be fair, to the higher-ups, this IS a remote outpost in every sense of the word.

The final analysis:

The KOP is hot, dirty and dangerous. The troops live in extremely Spartan conditions, in continuous contact with the enemy. It’s amazing how they conduct themselves in light of all the difficulties they face daily.

He says they need some support. This is why I belong to Soldiers' Angels. We understand that these guys are on the "front lines" everyday in some of the worst conditions facing the enemy, time, weather and the extreme conditions of daily living in an outpost.

If you haven't thought about it lately, please remember that you can help support these guys and many more like them. Go to Soldiers' Angels and help us take care of our folks in uniform, fighting the hard fight.

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The Awakening Continues

Two stories that continue to explain why the Awakening is spreading throughout Iraq:

Kharmah Awakens

The awakening started in Ramadi and has now spread to Hit, Haditha and points west to the West bank of the Euphrates just north of Fallujah and then to the south near Amariyah/Ferris.

The tribes along the west bank are all tied into each other and some of the sub-tribes who have not joined the awakening are finding themselves in armed intra-tribal conflict.

The awakening has now spontaneously leapt the Euphrates and taken hold in an unlikely area--al Kharmah.

The village of Shiabi, located south-west of Kharmah, below the Kharma river is home to more than a dozen IP officers who work in Fallujah.

In November and December of 2006, as the Iraqi Army let the situation deteriorate in Kharma, AQIZ went on blood spree, kidnapping, torturing and beheading police officers.

It was about this time that General Sadoon, a retired Iraqi Air Force general who lived in Fallujah but whose home village is Shiabi and who is also the grandson of the true Sheik of the Jumayli tribe, organized the men of the village.

The Fallujah IPs gave them rifles, walkie talkies and ammunition.

Diyala sheiks meet to address concerns

TIKRIT — About 45 local sheiks met with Diyala provincial leadership in Baqubah, Iraq, to discuss their tribe’s concerns, reconcile grievances and discover solutions to rid terrorism from the province, May 23.

After the key leaders spoke, the sheiks addressed three main concerns – the failure of the central government to focus on the problems of Diyala, the failure of the Provincial Council to effectively represent the people and the common goal of ridding the tribal lands of terrorists and foreign fighters.

Sheik Ahmed Azziz, Sistani’s representative in Diyala, continued to challenge the leaders to settle their differences and work with the legitimate government; while Ra’ad committed to continue meeting with different nahias throughout Diyala in an effort to create reconciliation at the lowest levels where it can be most easily enforced.

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Information Warfare: Cellular Battlespace and Legend Killers

JD Johannes from Outside the Wire reports on "Cellular Battle Space"

"Alo?"

"Enta shonek habebe?" the Army company commander says into his cell phone.

"Zhien, zhien."

Twenty to thirty times a day Army Captain Brian Ducote's cell phone rings in his shoulder pocket.

Ducote, the commander of the 1-28 Infantry's Bravo or 'Battle' company answers nearly every call, going through a set of greetings himself so that the Iraqi callers know it is him they are talking to before he hands the phone to an interpreter.

The calls range from tips to complaints to pleas.

I'll interpret a few words there from the top: Enta=You; habebe=friend, dear one, etc; Zhien=good.

JD writes under "Assymetric Battlespace":

In Iraq, thinking in terms of territory is often a useless exercise. The sectarian violence is not about territory--it is about people, money and the wasta, the power and power of legends and the near irrelevance of facts to the average Iraqi enhance the assymetric battlespace.

If the assymetric battlespace works against U.S. equipment, tactics and adherence to the Geneva Conventions--the cellular battlespace plays to the U.S. strengths.

The enemy does not have secure communications and you don't need to know much about the NSA to know that the enemy that talks on cell phones is an enemy that is easy to find.

That last reminds me of a scene from an early 1990's movie, "Patriot Games" with Harrison Ford. Agent Ryan (Ford), goes to Colombia where he meets other CIA/NSA folks, goes into a secure room where technicians isolate the voice of a drug lord's enforcer from cell phones, use voice recognition software to match it to other voices to confirm that is the same person they were looking for and verifies that this group is the responsible party for recent murders.

Recent reports indicate that the US was recording hundreds of phone calls and using software to isolate specific words and target particular phone numbers for tracking. Or, technicians who use noise reduction to single out sounds and other voices for ideintification. Or, simply identifying cell towers or phone numbers to track for determining the location of a suspect.

All of these things are possible in Iraq and even Afghanistan, though I imagine that the volume is so significant that the resources are held for high value efforts. What is going on here is a much more low key and right at the heart of the battle. It is direct information gathering using the simplest of tools.

The enemy has been using this tool all along. In fact, in a recent discussion regarding operational security at the Milblog conference, the point was made that the enemy has much more information and in a timely fashion than simply trolling electronic boards and blogs. An innocuous looking Iraqi can be sitting on his front stoop, cell phone in his pocket, blue tooth device in his ear, telling his insurgent friends that a patrol has just left a base, number of trucks, men and armaments. No one would even know he was doing it. The insurgents know within minutes what, when and where.

We are finally giving our men the tools to do the same and use the vast resources of the Iraqi people instead of limiting our communications to internal radio and secured phone lines. This vast network of people did not have access to this communication and were forced to often approach the military directly or try stealth means, putting them at great physical risk and opening them up for intimidation. This had previously limited the amount of information we could get.

In a recent article, a writer had complained that the US military should have set up a military government in Iraq until it could transition to Iraq nationals. He complained that this failure had reduced the amount of information that could be collected through regular interaction of civilians with the military government for common every day activities like passports, licensing, tickets, etc. While his over all assessment was correct, he had a "failure of imagination" missing the obvious intelligence gathering tools available on this battlefield: cellphones and email.

Another tool that the military has finally taken advantage of is "YouTube". They are posting videos of activities on it regularly, though not nearly as often or as well produced as the insurgents. However, the simplistic nature of the videos showing soldiers walking around in neighborhoods or in direct combat are much more "real" without all the fake production and chanting that the enemy likes to overlay. However, there is also an intelligence gathering ability using YouTube. On a recent stroll through the YouTube space, this blog site located hundreds of uploaded videos showing people giving lectures on militant Islam, showing insurgent activities and other important information that can and, hopefully, is being mined for information. This takes the place of public media that the enemy has limited control of and limited interaction with except through pre-produced, packaged materials. While the YouTube videos are often "packaged", there are many that are simply raw video.

The cellphone doesn't just allow the regular citizens to contact the US military. So does the enemy:

"The Wolf called me habebe," Ducote said, referring to how quickly Iraqis will use the term of strong friendship with Americans.

The Wolf is a Jaysha Mahdi assassin.

The legend is that he has killed more than 100 Sunni. Nearly every day Ducote or another member of the battalion receive a tip about The Wolf.

Ducote has talked with The Wolf on his cell phone. "We had his brother and started calling around, leaving messages. Then The Wolf himself calls."

Duocote has a conversation with the Wolf that paints a picture of how and why people have joined forces with these disparate groups. It also paints a picture of the battle space and the players.

Address books, video clips, voice mail messages, text messages, pictures, the last numbers called...the cell phone of a JAM or AQIZ is always a trove of information.

Immediately after Abdeel, the JAM Boss for Jihad and Mahala 885 was picked up, the intel staff interpreters started going through his cell phone.

It was a map of the cellular battlespace.

Later in the evening, Lt. Colonel Patrick Frank decides to make a call to Abdeel's boss.

Frank has spoken to dozens of bad guys on their cell phones and needs little introduction.

"One gentlemen I called, who is affiliated with JAM stopped me when I was introducing myself. He said, 'I know who you are. You are Asad Aswad. The Black Lion.'"

JD points out that the Iraqis live by rumor and legends. Reality is whatever the strongest person with the best connections (even with limited tools) can make of it. As the point he made earlier regarding the "Wolf" who is a legend and alleged to have killed over 100 Sunni (probably many who were simply unarmed civilians, but, in Iraq, that does not matter because everyone is an enemy if they do not belong to your group, even three year old children). The way to combat such people as the "Wolf" is to show people that he is not anyone but a 19 year old murderer who, like many such serial killers, likes to hear his own name and exploits. Talking with the commander gives him a certain cache, but, like all those who can't resist the lure of talking to the police, he will eventually give up enough information to have him captured.

The other way to defeat such legends is to create another that is bigger, badder and much more influential, even among the other "legends". That is where the "Black Lion" comes in: Asad Aswad. He is the "legend killer".

Until one day, standing in the market of West Farut, as a group of merchants complain about the mortars the Shia are firing, Captain Ducote asks them when was the last time a mortar landed in the Mahala?

The merchants all look at each other. Ducote knows the exact date the last time mortars fell in the area--because his Company captured the mortar tubes, rounds and team that was shelling West Farut.

Suddenly things begin to make sense to the merchants.

Maybe The Wolf is not immortal. That sniper has not been around...the other assassin has not been around...

Later that night Ducote is repeating the same refrain on the phone to men who heard it in person this morning--fighting a battle of gross rating points with his own voice.

I suggest reading JD's piece thoroughly. It is an excellent insight into our current battle and should spark some ideas on how we could use other tools and techniques, not normally associated with the military, to defeat an insurgency.

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Small Wars: Religion in Warfare III

Well, we've started of at a rip-roaring pace and some folks are already feeling a twist in their tails. Not sure how a scholarly discussion of religion in warfare suddenly became a discussion of personal prerogatives, but I'll skip that right now and suggest that you read Mr. Smith's last commentary on the subject at the Captain's Journal: Smith Responds.

Sometimes the best counsel is the oldest. Smith’s argument concerning the duration of counterinsurgency and public sentiment is similar to that of the Marine Corps commandant (even if somewhat unrelated to the initial subject of Kilcullen’s commentary). Smith’s views on religion and counterinsurgency - far from being debunked - have not yet even been engaged.

That is for the readers to decide.

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Small Wars: Religion in Warfare I

Before we begin, I recommend reading, if at all possible and previously not accomplished, the following to catch up on the subject:

Kilcullen on Luttwak's Critique of the Counterinsurgency Field Manual

Luttwak's basic points drill down to "kill them all and let God sort them out". Or, in a phrase we've used here - total war. He's recommending it right as an approach right now, while we are in theater, after we have proclaimed the liberation of Iraq. That presents several huge problems to me which I address here:

the Middle Ground: On Total War II

In my response to Luttwak, I argue that his historical references are incomplete and inaccurate. I believe that he deliberately misrepresented them in order to re-enforce his central thesis, not because they were literally correct. Thus, making his suggestions far from appropriate to consider in a counter-insurgency.

The Middle Ground: On Total War I

This is my response to another author who also wrote to suggest that we should use or should have used Total War methods in defeating this enemy. Basically, I believe what he was asking was not to fire bomb Dresden, but destroy occupied Paris; or, instead of fire bombing Tokyo or dropping the A-Bomb on Nagasaki, we should have obliterated the Philipines. That is what his suggestions amount to. Note the difference in the places that we laid total waste to compared to those we wage or are prepared to wage street to street battles in. In brief, you destroy the enemy that has declared war on you and you liberate the people who are your allies.

I am making this point on Luttwak as well. Our entire premise for war is that Saddam was an evil tyrant, an occupier if you would, oppressing his people and we were liberating the people of Iraq from his tyranny. You do not fire bomb the people you are liberating. The time for deciding what and how we would fight this war was at the beginning. We set our posture, now we have to deal with it. We can't even change our minds because we have been declaring the Iraqi people our friends for four years. Now we should murder our friends? It would be Stalingrad or the Warsaw Ghetto except this time with 24/7 media.

This is not happening.

Frank Hoffman, Small Wars Journal: Luttwak's Lament

Of course, I like it because it agrees with my original post and comments that I left at Small Wars on Luttwak's lack of historical grasp. Here, though, is where the first real question regarding religion in warfare emerges from beyond the question of "total war". Hoffman extracts it and indicates that it should be addressed as an important aspect of counter-insurgency, which opens up a new can of worms. A basic question is asked: why are we reluctant to address it when it appears to be so strongly entrenched in the enemy?

Kilcullen Responds: Religion and Insurgency

Kilcullen believes that religion is no more important than other aspects of the insurgency, particularly the political make up, the drive for power and wealth as well as common power structures within local or greater societies. He believes that religion is a cover for the political and geographical desires of the insurgents, whether it is the local variety or the global Islamist variety.

Frankly, I agree with him in many ways and believe it is important not to get too caught up in the language and ideas of religion. You lose site of what is really at stake and you put yourself in a position where you are arguing with the insurgents' points, some of which are closely held or very close to the faith and opinion of millions. Thus you place yourself in a position to inadvertently call many more the enemy when they are not.

Bing West Responds: Quick Note on Religion and Insurgency (with comments from Kilcullen)

Bing argues that the religious nature of the enemy makes them, if not, undefeatable, implacable. Possibly, even to the point of requiring, if not "total war", much more robust and violent response. Kilcullen responds that not giving the enemy an "out" makes Bing's predictions self fulfilling: ie, fighting to the death, and ignores the importance of wealth, power, etc outside of religion no matter how devout, that often informs part of the opinion and power base of the insurgents.

Since all politics are local and counterinsurgency is the practice of pealing off layers of support, not destroying entire communities, it seems much more practical to address the political nature of the enemy.

Captain's Journal: Response to Kilcullen

The Captain believes that Kilcullen is unnecessarily dismissive of the impact of religion in war in favor of the political language for various reasons -ie, power, wealth, etc- he believes that our current attempts inter-armed forces to be politically correct, not emphasize religion, it's practice or study, puts us at a disadvantage when it comes to dealing with religiously driven enemy.

He contends, more robustly than Hoffman, that we are missing at least half of the war effort because we are inexplicably ignoring it. Which comes back to Hoffman's point regarding whether we are simply too nervous or too socially ingrained with the idea that religion and others' faith is an untouchable to fight a religiously motivated insurgency with any success.

I responded to the Captain that I agreed largely with Kilcullen's take that counterinsurgency is largely about politics, that counterinsurgency is the act of pealing away parts of society from supporting the insurgents, and that the importance of religion is based on where it sits in importance within the local power structure:

And, as Kilcullen points out, it is about where religion sits in the over all power structure of individual societies. In that, I mean, not on a national or ethno-religious basis, but in local society like rural tribes, rural towns, suburbs and cities. In all of these, the importance, position and power of religion depends on the local power structure. For instance, does the Mosque sit above, beside (in tandem or cooperation with), or below the power of the tribal sheikh or town mayor or other power broker in the area (ie, does the mosque exist at the pleasure and with the economic support of this power broker, much as churches of the medieval period were sometimes supported by and financed by the local feudal lord)?

Thus, our emphasis and approach to attacking the ideology or insurgency on a religious basis is dependent on its position in the social setting we are operating in.

I have much more to say on this subject, but please start with reading these for the basis of the argument at hand.

Do you recognize the enemy's religious nature or do you ignore it in favor of the political? What advantages or disadvantages do we suffer?

One point made over at Small Wars is from a reader who wrote about attacking the pseudo-religious scam of al Qaeda in language.

Barnett is in favor, I believe, of totally ignoring the religious aspects, but goes on to say that trying to turn the counter-insurgent battle is a dollar short and a day late.

Additional thoughts on religion in warfare will be forthcoming.

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The Great Wall of Indifference

Combat Outpost Fort Apache, Azamiyah. The news of late has focused upon this Sunni district in northeast Baghdad, where materials for a 12-foot-high concrete barrier have been positioned along a main avenue. Of the dozens of barriers across the city being laid down—principally by U.S. military and contractors—Azamiyah was the one that caught international attention when the residents complained the government was "imprisioning and punishing them for the acts of a few" by forcing all cars to pass through check points. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, on a visit to Egypt, ordered the barrier halted, and the American ambassador agreed to comply.

On the surface, the episode is a triumph for the press in bringing to international attention an injustice, and for the prime minister in immediately responding and standing up for the rights of the Sunni minority.

On the ground, the episode is less inspiring. Here at Fort Apache in Azamiyah, Charlie Company is on the eighth month of a 15-month tour in a combat outpost along the Tigris. (It was the setting for the 2005 documentary Gunner Palace.) Six of the first 110 soldiers to patrol in Azamiyah, a stronghold for Sunni insurgents and al-Qaida operatives, have been killed.

Read the rest here

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Information War: Mass Murder and the Media

An interesting thing happened on Monday, April 16, Iraq, Afghanistan, suicide bombings and terrorists disappeared from the headlines for two days in the wake of a national tragedy. On Friday, April 12, Islamic terrorists managed to set off a small suicide bomb inside the parliament killing eight people and wounding many others. In the scheme of death and destruction usually perpetrated in Iraq by the terrorists, it was only remarkable due to the location.

The weekend news cycle played this event over and over. Friday "announcements" have two purposes in politics.

1) To make the "statement" irrefutable for two days while all principal opposing actors would be going home or doing something else for the weekend.
2) Make the story THE story for the weekend as weekend news is notorious for doing "soft pieces" and simply repeating a summary of the weekly news for consumption, thus insuring continuous play that would also be the opening statement for the next week.

To put out a message at the end of the week when many are heading home, such as politicians and Pentagon spokesmen who might answer back forefully and continuously any impression of such an "announcement" by the terrorists. If it was at the beginning of the week, many interviews could be given throughout the week refuting any claims of a larger meaning to the attacks. It would also have seen the Iraqi Parliament back in session at full force for several days before the week was out, further weakening the impression that the bombing interrupted any significant activities of the Iraq government. By making the bombing on Friday, it would be understood that this story would be replayed through the weekend as the last image of the war.

Yet, weekend news consumption is notoriously low among most of the target audience, thus, important messages are often lost in the weekend frenzy.

On Monday, April 16, the incident, al Qaeda and Iraq were pushed completely off the front page by a mass murder at Virginia Tech. For two days, the internal tragedy took precedence.

In a war where one of the principle players states, "half the battle is in the media", that lack of coverage had to be a minor shock. They could easily be replaced by a lone gunman in Virginia.

Yet, Al Qaeda in Iraq (the Islamic State of Iraq) understands its target implicity. In order to insure coverage would win back the battle space from the tragedy, the terrorists would have to plan and come back with a much larger attack and body account. After what must have been several days of planning, the deaths of 200 innocent people again swept Iraq and Al Qaeda to the headlines.

Greyhawk notes that it was also timed with the return of Congress from their spring break.

It may be that the bombings and damage were simply coincidental or it could be that the time between the previous attack on Parliament and this latest massacre was used to plan and execute the attacks. However, it is not unusual for al Qaeda operatives to plan events or "announcements around important dates or events.

Whatever the facts, it did result in pushing the VT tragedy from the front page of the news cycle.

This is how Al Qaeda fights its wars.

On cue, Reid pronounces the war is lost.

In a further attempt to maximize its media exposure and attempt to paint the insurgency as "legitimate", the Islamic State of Iraq appoints "ministers" for everything from "war" to "agriculture and health". The entire purpose is to indicate that, far from a weak and hidden group of skulkers and criminals in limited areas, they actually have control of an area and are able to govern it, complete with concern for the people and the area's economics.

Unfortunately for the Islamic State of Iraq, it's borders are unknown, its ministers wear masks and will not be giving an interview on CNN or even al Jazeera anytime soon.

MSNBC provides an excellent analysis of ISI's hopes from the announcement:

The announcement unveiling an “Islamic Cabinet” for Iraq appeared to have multiple aims. One was to present the Islamic State of Iraq coalition as a “legitimate” alternative to the U.S.-backed, Shiite-led administration of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki — and to demonstrate that it was growing in power despite the U.S. military push against insurgents.

It also likely sought to establish the coalition’s dominance among insurgents after an embarrassing public dispute with other Iraqi Sunni militants. [snip]

The video came on the heels of a rare public dispute between the coalition and other insurgent groups.

In past week, another Sunni insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, has issued statements accusing al-Qaida of killing its members and trying to force others to join its ranks. Al-Baghdadi tried to patch up the dispute by issuing a Web audiotape this week calling for unity and promising to punish any of his group’s members who kill other insurgents.

Al Qaeda aims and lands another dead on target.

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The Middle Ground: On Total War II

Following up yesterday's post regarding Total War in Iraq, Small Wars Journal posts a response from Col. David Kilcullen, currently serving on Gen. Petraeus's staff in Iraq, to an article in Harper's Weekly- Dead End: Counterinsurgency as Military Malpractice.

Col. Kilcullen necessarily and briefly focuses on the complaints Luttwick has regarding the newest counter-insrugency manual, FM 3-24, refuting several by pointing out that Luttwick was reading the "draft" version and several of his complaints had already been addressed.

In reading Luttwak's piece, the first issue is that Luttwak, who has many things to his credit, but fighting an insurgency is not one of them, tends to state things in a very affirmative manner. One such statement:

But while they are willing to wear the uniforms and accept training up to a point, Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni Arab ascendancy over Iraq. Besides, their families would be in deadly peril if they were suspected of loyalty to their government, and by extension to the Americans. Some of those policemen and soldiers know much about the insurgents and where exactly they might be found, but are still of no help in finding them, precisely because they are insurgents themselves.

This totally ignores current trends in al-Anbar and the surging "Awakening" or "Salvation Council" who have certainly have been fighting al-Qaida. But, more profoundly, he tends to label all he surveys as thus: "Sunni Arabs are naturally disinclined to help capture or kill insurgents who are fighting to restore the Sunni Arab ascendancy over Iraq".

I believe this premis is exactly what leads Luttwak to his conclusions that, since ALL are insurgents, why fight a "counter-insurgency"? Why not simply declare them all the enemy and fight the war in that manner?

In short, he is advocating the same tactics as this previous author, but under a different guise:

The simple starting point is that insurgents are not the only ones who can intimidate or terrorize civilians. For instance, whenever insurgents are believed to be present in a village, small town, or distinct city district—a very common occurrence in Iraq at present, as in other insurgency situations—the local notables can be compelled to surrender them to the authorities, under the threat of escalating punishments, all the way to mass executions. That is how the Ottoman Empire could control entire provinces with a few feared janissaries and a squadron or two of cavalry. The Turks were simply too few to hunt down hidden rebels, but they did not have to: they went to the village chiefs and town notables instead, to demand their surrender, or else. A massacre once in a while remained an effective warning for decades

.

Apparently, the only successful counterinsurgencies that Luttwak has found were those committed by the most brutal oppressors simply because they were brutal and did not care about public opinion. In fact, he starts out with the successors of Ghengis Khan who equally used "terror" (40,000 heads at the gates of the city) in order to instill fear and quail the population, often before he even arrived.

He goes on to talk about the Romans and their use of "sticks and carrots", but largely focuses on the "sticks". He completely misses, or breezes by, a central point, even in discussing Ottoman rule: the people who don't resist are not necessarily cowed by all the violence, but may, indeed, have eventually accepted the rule of these two empires because there was a political or economic advantage. Or, at the very least, did not significantly change their way of life. For instance, he touches on religion and its influence over people, uniting them for war. There is a historical precedent for Rome trying to inflict its religion on the masses it had conquered, particularly in later years, worshipping Caesar as a god. However, provincial governors were notorious for paying this concept lip service and allowing the masses to practice their religion largely unmolested.

A good example of this is actually written in the bible in the story of Pontius Pilate, the Pharisees and Jesus. While some see Pontius Pilate as having abdicated his responsibilities as a just adjudicator and allowing a wrongly accused Jesus to be crucified, his symbolic "washing" of his hands, interpreted as washing away his guilt by modern Christians, was in fact persuing the usual provincial practic of staying well out of the religious affairs of the subjects. As long as the ruling religious party was satisfied and rebellion turned away. Historically, Pontius Pilate went back to Rome, if not exactly disgraced, hardly a distinguished governor covered in glory and wealth. His governance was plagued by many little uprisings which he put down alternately with political cajoling and, as Luttwick notes, some harsh punishments.

But, the most important aspects of Roman rule were not actually its relying on harsh punishments. It was because these provinces benefited from their interaction with Rome through security and economic development. Traders of silks and spices from the far east would not have seen the small Roman outposts along the infamous Silk Road as an oppressive presence, but a source of security that allowed them to trade and flourish. Roman ships going in and out of ports in the Mediteranean, such as Constantinople and Alexandria, bought and sold goods that fueled local economies.

That is not to say that every subject was happy under the yoke of Rome, but it is quite fantastic to believe that it was simply the fear of reprisals that kept many of the subject nations deferential to the empire. Particularly, as Luttwick notes, since Rome had, in all actually, few legionnaires in comparison to modern armies, covering a very large territory. If, in fact, it was simply reprisals that kept the populace cowed from insurgency, the Romans would have needed a much larger force.

One other problem that Luttwick necessarily breezes over in order to make his point is that, while Rome itself might have had a bare 300,000 legionnaires, the local populace actually formed its own constabulary and local auxillary forces, not inlcuding the legions that were raised out of these subject nations. Many of whom joined for the exact reasons that Luttwick disdains: the benefits of pay and citizenship.

Rome, nor the Ottoman Empire, could exist for hundreds of years simply on the prospects of putting down insurgencies over their entire empires with only exemplifying punishments.

That is not to say that crucifying 6,600 slaves along the Apian way was not an effective deterent to future insurgencies. However, not many years after Pompey ended the last dregs of the insurgency, Gaius Julius Caesar returned from battle, fought a civil war and, during its years, literally bought off many would be resisters. Including an attempt to abolish the use of slaves in businesses in order to provide work for common Roman citizens. He understood the idea that Romans may be attached to their republican ideas and ancient ways, but could be brought to his side by succombing to its benefits. This order was later rescinded, of course, because his wealthy supporters bulked, but the attempt at socio-economic engineering to purchase support should not be ignored. Neither should his rather astute reversal. One could even call it a "political solution".

Again, Luttiwak dismisses this important aspect of "counterinsurgency" in ancient empires in order to make his central point: insurgencies are won or "countered" by equal amounts of "terror", "reprisals" or "collective punishment". The fact that we are politically and ideologically undesiring and incapable of enacting such "terror" on the populace is seen as ceding the entire populace space to the insurgents:

Needless to say, this is not a political limitation that Americans would ever want their armed forces to overcome, but it does leave the insurgents in control of the population, the real “terrain” of any insurgency. Of course, the ordinary administrative functions of government can also be employed against the insurgents, less compellingly perhaps but without need of violence.

He says there is a way to obtain information on insurgents through natural association with citizens and the government, but he believes this is also ceded because, unlike post World War II Germany and Japan, we did not institute a military governance and take over the day to day activities that would place us in control of those spaces and information. Again, he dismisses the entire purpose of having "joint security stations" or "combat outposts" or "civil affairs patrols and projects" without nary a mention of the increased contact, control and security for the population which necessarily leads to this "intelligence" being shared.

Again, all to get to his central thesis:

All its best methods, all its clever tactics, all the treasure and blood that the United States has been willing to expend, cannot overcome the crippling ambivalence of occupiers who refuse to govern, and their principled and inevitable refusal to out-terrorize the insurgents, the necessary and sufficient condition of a tranquil occupation.

In otherwords, because we are unwilling to kill hundreds of thousands and then press home this advantage over a subjugated nation through tough military governance, Luttwick is declaring counterinsurgency as a complete and utter waste of time and people.

The big "loss".

One point Luttwak makes which has some basis in fact is that, regardless of the political ideology that is being implemented, people can and will fight against what others may see as their "own best interest". It would seem that democracy and freedom are by far more beneficial than living under a tyrant such as Saddam. Yet, as Luttwak points out, the removal of Saddam did not benefit the "Sunni", but tossed them from power. He also points to their co-religious status with the "foreigners" to indicate that this is a stronger bond than any idea on freedom or democracy.

However, I believe that this is a failed evaluation of the Iraq insurgency as well. Not taking in all the permutations of the "insurgency", he fails to comprehend the things that make people fight and the things that, ultimately, separate them from other groups or members of the insurgency as well as provides the wedge by which they can be and are being split from each other politically, materially and militarily. He also fails to recognize that, regardless of how strong an ideology is perceived to be in the general populace, the same things that would make the citizens and government of the occupying country give up the fight, are at work on the insrugent supporting populace of the occupied: casualties, exhaustian, severe economic depression and political in fighting.

Another historical, let us call it, incompleteness, is his reference to Joseph Bonaparte's rule of Spain and the ensuing insurgency:

The very word “guerrilla,” which now refers only to a tactic, was first used to describe the ferocious insurgency of the illiterate Spanish poor against their would-be liberators, under the leadership of their traditional oppressors. On July 6, 1808, King Joseph of Spain presented a draft constitution that for the first time in Spain’s history offered an independent judiciary, freedom of the press, and the abolition of the remaining feudal privileges of the aristocracy and of the Church. At that time, abbeys, monasteries, and bishops still owned every building and every piece of land in 3,148 towns and villages, which were inhabited by some of Europe’s most wretched tenants. Despite the fact that the new constitution would have liberated them and let them keep their harvests for themselves, the Spanish peasantry failed to rise up in its support.

He goes on to say that this was because the church used the central thesis that Bonaparte and the French were out to destroy the Catholic religion and, of course, because the occupier of the throne and alleged "liberator" was not Spanish. A central reason why Bonaparte could not rouse the peasants to overthrow their traditional leadership in favor of this grand republicanism. While Catholicism and nationality may have been over-arching ideologies that tied the insurgency together, Luttiwick takes in the "grand scheme" and totally dismisses the reality of an occupying French Napoleon army.

This army did not come into towns and immediately set up provincial, indigenous governments or institute elections. Its first actions, being a foraging army, was to literally steal or demand food, clothing, wine, horses, transportation, etc from the local populace. It raped and pillaged (not quite in the medieval manner, but attrocious none the less) its way through Spain. There was no economic benefit to the occupation and certainly no direct or local presence or shift in ideological governing, thus, no immediate benefit to the local populace.

What good was freedom of the press if the French Army drove by and took all your recently harvested produce and livestock? What good was an independent judiciary if you could not feed your family?

These are the basics at work in Iraq. It is not only survival against the potential murderous actions of the insurgents, but a deep instinct of personal survival against the deprevation of basic needs. One might also add that, had the Spanish Catholic Church instituted the second Inquisition against its own followers in the middle of a rebellion, it would be suffering the same fate as Al Qaida as it kills "apostates", "heretics" and "spies": feared and reviled.

There in lies the truth about insurgencies. For all the ideological ties that bind, a population can and will determine when remaining with the insurgency is no longer beneficial.

In short, incomplete or inaccurate history does not a failed counterinsurgency make.

I'll let Kilcullen reference the Field Manual issues Luttwak degrades.

H/T Mudville


Cross referenced at the Castle

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Broken Windows Theory: Crime, Small Wars and Trash

I discussed Crime and Small Wars previously. It is important to understand how this works in guerilla warfare (small wars).

Crime fuels the insurgency. It provides it cover. It provides it money. It gives the illusion, along with the over all bombs and firefights (that do not represent the whole of Iraq) of insecurity. In reality, common crimes are as egregious as any acts of terrorism for these same reasons.

If we do not combat the crime, then we cannot combat the insurgency. Insurgents and terrorists are self-sustaining through these acts.

Watch this video on the Battle for Baghdad

Jeff Burris, Times Baghdad Bureau Chief, discusses how the Ba'athists left Baghdad with over $2 billion in stolen money from the Iraq Central bank. Since then, it subsidizes its activities through kidnapping, smuggling, theft, counterfeiting, stealing directly from oil pipelines and gasoline refinery to resale at profit and corruption.

The insurgency cannot be stopped simply by combatting insurgents or even the political process. It must become a losing proposition financially. That means that every crime in Iraq, no matter how small, must be addressed through "policing". This entails picking up people for petty theft, going after kidnappers aggressively (regardless of who they kidnap), painting over graffiti, cracking down on corruption and breaking the blackmarket (largely by providing legitimate means of income for non-terrorist related groups).

Second, real broken windows theory requires more from neighborhoods than turning on the insurgents. In order for people to feel invested in their neighborhood, responsible for its security and hopeful for its prosperity, more than "security" must take place. More than "political reconciliation" must take place. The residents must feel like they are responsible and have ownership.

MNF-Iraq - Muqdadiya: A neighborhood watch program has begun to show signs of success since its formation March 5. The program, which includes 15 villages
throughout the Muqdadiya district, hires local villagers to protect their village and
encourages the population to contact their security forces on criminal or terrorist
activity. “The idea is - to protect the village and to clear it from the armed people and insurgents,” said Dr. Abdulla al Jubouri, the former governor of Diyala and founder of the program.

Since the program began, Jubouri said there have been several signs of success
to include roads free from improvised explosive devices, fighting stopped between
what used to be rival villages, schools are re-opened, electric and water services have been repaired.

In broken windows theory, appearances are actually a very large part of the battle. Visual perception, like first impressions, can change the psychology and, thus, the behavior of a person, even whole communities and those they interact with, including would be criminals and terrorists.

Here is the Broken Windows Theory in Action in Ramadi

RAMADI, Iraq – Improving conditions in Ramadi’s Malaab, or “stadium district,” means shops are opening, schools are teaching and the garbage is piling up on the roadsides. Coalition forces have been largely successful in breaking the stranglehold terrorists held on the neck of this formerly affluent community, but the question has remained: Who’s going to take out the trash?[snip]

Even before the vehicle ban, regular trash pickups were intermittent, threatened with the ever present risk of improvised explosive devices. This, coupled with the travel restrictions, has led to heaps of rubble, garbage and other debris littering the streets. Cosmetic concerns aside, the litter posed a more serious concern for occupying forces and residents alike, improvised explosive devices. [snip]

The formula seemed logical. Cleaning the trash would cut down on hiding places for IEDs, making the area for service members and locals alike. Only now, with a diminished insurgent presence, is this cleanup possible.

“We just finished a large clearance operation, so a lot of people are able to come out now,” Lively said. “There’s a little more security now from the enemy activity, and now today, the civilians have asked us to come out and help them.”

The major catalyst for the cleanup has turned out to be the neighborhood residents themselves. Under the protection of Coalition troops, citizens came out in force eager to clean up their community. Wielding shovels, brooms and rakes, adults and children alike tackled the mounds of refuse with a will. Backhoes and garbage trucks operated by Iraqi police and soldiers cruised the streets, bringing towering heaps of trash to an impromptu landfill.

Appearance makes a huge difference, not only to the residents, but to those who would act criminally or be a terrorist in the area. Prosperous appearances not only give hope to the residents, but take it away from the crimnals and terrorists. Prosperity means that the community cares, is active and is watching. Watched communities are less susceptible to crime, thus, terrorism. Visible police and other security apparatus adds to the over all perception along with not letting any crime be considered "acceptable".

Third and finally, is economics. Jobs must be available. It does not have to be a large manufacturer. Micro-economics can move a communities economic status into that next level, one that is, if not making the people wealthy or even "middle class", providing a sustainable, stable and steady income.

One example of micro-economics can be seen in this book about Beauty Salons in Kabul, Afghanistan.

In Iraqs current climate, this must be a cash business, portable and/or appropriate for Iraq. Should be small businesses that require little cash to start up. This is where NGOs and other charitable organizations would be usefull.

It could include such things as basic services, including trash clean up, for the community. The important aspects is to make crime expensive and honest work lucrative. It has to take the young men off the streets and out of the potential hands of the insurgents.

This is on a micro level. The problem that we continue to have has been the "big" projects, like electric grids, that never could and will not in the near future, provide effective supply to Iraq for years due to its size and condition (however slowly it may be improving, it can't keep up with the demand, even in relatively peaceful and prosperous Kurdistan). It may need to be done, but what people needed was a way to survive immediately and that survivability is not only security, but money. The way they get the money is the question.

Plant an IED? Or, make shoes? Smuggle blackmarket items or manufacture bottled water? (a must in Iraq considering its sewage and water treatment problems).

Run a local five and dime? Or, kidnapping?

That is Broken Windows Theory in a nutshell.

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Crime, Small Wars and Broken Windows Theory

Reading an article Tuesday, I noted some comments that reminded me of a post I wrote in 2005 (right before Kilcullen wrote 28 Articles) that was, if not dead on, at least intuitive to the plan that was developed and is being implemented by Gen. Petraeus starting in January.

Marine General says: Anbar Getting Better

Still, on his visit Conway was told by numerous American commanders throughout Anbar that the tide had shifted against the extremist group al-Qaida in Iraq when Sunni tribal sheiks who previously opposed U.S. forces decided to start cooperating instead.

Some commanders said the extremists' key misstep was to interfere with the locals' black market trading, which al-Qaida co-opted in order to finance itself. Anbar stretches west from Baghdad to the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The new cooperation has enabled U.S. forces in recent months to clear extremist elements from even the most violent areas, including Ramadi, and to put more Iraqi forces on the streets, Conway was told. Cooperation by the sheiks also has quickly created a Sunni police force in areas where none existed before.

I wrote in June 2005, Converging War and Tactics

Criminal Rings: These are either an amalgem of many groups or tribal activity with entire tribes participating in one manner or the other. These supply materials, smuggle people, money, information, etc over known smuggle routes. These largely participate based on the money factor and make money from all three of the above noted groups with the largest monetary gain from the Jihadists and Ba'athists. Have no real loyalty or ideological support of any of the first two, though may have more loyalty to tribal groups considering their interactive capabilities.

I wrote the ways to combat these situations:

If I was in the border areas near Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Syria, I would look at ways of infiltrating the smuggling gangs. These gangs work on money, just like drug, car thief and other gangs in the US. The same are in Iraq, but difficulties may arise because many of these gangs are tribal efforts and infiltrating a tribe would be difficult. Thus, to fight this aspect of the war, money, large quantities of money would have to be available to buy them off. Also, the possibility of making money "legitimately" by helping these smuggling groups develop business opportunities that would net them comparative or near to comparative profits.

An Iraqi blogger (blog gone) made the same complaint about crime and the insurgency at the same time- Iraq Criminals and the Insurgency:

Not just terrorist attacks that has been reduced but even regular crimes, as it seems that part of the operation is focusing on capturing regular criminals who are in addition to their usual criminal activities do form, in my mind, the right hand for the Ba'athists.[snip]

Back to operation lightning, a few days ago I witnessed one of these raids by the IP against some thugs in our neighborhood who were apparently part of a big gang specialized in kidnappings and selling arms.

I wrote a similar concern over at the Small Wars Journal in response to several of Kilcullen's posts on the Surge and the actual strategy that was being implemented (largely, a guerilla war version of "Broken Windows"):

One of the most frustrating parts of the iraq strategy and tactics has been watching the "crime" go unaddressed as if crimes such as theft, hijacking, black market, smuggling, car theft, etc. have little to do with terrorists, insurgents or militia. As in the US, these crimes are usually linked to much bigger crimes and criminal rings. It cannot go unknown that smugglers are likely bringing in money, weapons and even fighters to all three spheres that Kilcullen indicated.

It's also likely that these criminal rings selling blackmarket goods are using the money to fund all three of the spheres (insurgent, terrorist, sectarian violence) or being "shook down" for "protection money" that also goes towards larger acts.

Men and boys loitering on the streets, painting graffiti, etc are most likely to either a) be part of the local criminal/terrorist activity or b) susceptible to blandishments or money to participate in some small way including acting as look outs, transporting money, weapons and people, etc, etc.

All of this talk of crime and its effects might seem petty in regards to the "real shooting war" with the guerillas, but I assure you, it is a very important part of the "perception of security" as well as "battling insurgents".

Insurgents have to fund their activities like everyone else. There are only three ways to fund an army: a) pillaging resources and supplies from the local community (sometimes referred to as "foraging", but in this instance, more like "pillaging" as thought of during medeival warfare and movement of armies) or b) commerce (legitimate or otherwise) or c) underwriting by outside nations or actors. Or, in this case, a little of all three. Some more than others.

Illegitimate commerce is the most practical way for an insurgency to fund it's local activities through co-oping blackmarket activities. There are no taxes, they set the prices and their market is boundless in a depressed, war time economy. In the case that was noted above in the "Marine" article, these tribal gangs may be totally in the pocket of the insurgents (such as the six tribes that have not yet pledged to the Awakening Council) or, as noted, being pushed out once they had acquiesced to demands or agreements with the insurgents. In short, the insurgents have pushed out the "middle man".

In another Small Wars Journal article - Iraq's Real Civil War, Bing West wrote:

In Anbar, AQI became the occupier, shaking down truck drivers and extorting shop owners. In the young sheik's zone, AQI controlled the fuel market. Each month, 10 trucks with 80,000 gallons of heavily subsidized gasoline and five trucks with kerosene were due to arrive. Instead, AQI diverted most shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices were higher, netting $10,000 per shipment and antagonizing 30,000 shivering townspeople. No local cop dared to make an arrest. The tribal power structure, built over centuries, was shoved aside. Sheiks who objected were shot or blown up, while others fled.[snip]

Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners.

Politics in Baghdad have swirled around reinstating former Baathists to their prior jobs, thereby supposedly diminishing the insurgency. The central government, though, has given Anbar such paltry funds that jobs are scant, Baathist or not. In Anbar, reconciliation theories count far less than that eternal adage: Show me the money.

When the sheiks delivered thousands of police recruits, they consolidated their patrimonial power by providing jobs, plus pocketing a fee rumored at $400 paid by each recruit. The tribal police then provided security that permitted American civic action projects profitable to contractors connected, of course, to the sheiks.

You can read the rest of what I wrote in 2005 Converging War and Tactics, including thoughts on what is now called PiTTs (Police Transition Teams) and MiTTs (Military Transition Teams). I also suggest reading Tipping Points and this original post on Broken Windows Theory to understand parts of the strategy that must be implemented in order to "win".

A big part of this is going to be putting together the "connections" for the criminal and tribal rings, both inside and outside of Iraq. Another aspect would be to implement an organized crime team and system (computer or other) that tracked these connections and was accessible. I believe we have obviously done something of this nature in order to determine those tribes that would be most willing to work with us. It was a similar method that was used to capture Saddam. Basically, by identifying the people around Saddam and then making a simple organization chart. In fact, they had originally tried to find Saddam through using a complicated computer tracking system that took in thousands of pieces of information, but turned out to be unusable due to the amount and inability to correlate so many points.

It turned out that the simplest connections (tribe and family - like Occam's razor) were the correct answers.

In this case, I believe it would be appropriate to take the next step in undercutting the insurgents financial support by looking over the organized crime connections of the tribes and working to undermine or shut it down. That will require both "policing" and "economics".

Another important aspect that Bing mentions and has to be worked over is the committment and follow through of the Central government in Baghdad to the Sunni al Anbar tribes for reconstruction and money. The money and committment must come from Baghdad. If Baghdad does not make the committment, then there is no reason for the Sunni's to committ to the government. They need protection, both from Al Qaeda and from the Shia extremists who are "cleansing" the Sunni, blame the AQI attacks on the Sunni and who want to realize the total government control of Baghdad and Iraq. The Shia extremists, as portrayed by al Sadr, want to insure the Sunni are weak so that they do not ever have to fear their return to government and power over the Shia.

In "Broken Windows", when New York cleaned up its crime and criminals, it took six years. It took numerous forays into the same neighborhoods, over and over. It took committment. It rolled from neighborhood to neighborhood in slow motion. And many times, people despaired it would ever work. It required doing all of the "little things" and making them as important as the "big" if not more so.

In Iraq, it is not the things that you see on TV everyday. It is not the shootings or bombings, it is not the street to street, house to house battles or helicopters being shot down or shooting into buildings full of insurgents. though, as each neighborhood is taken or its control by insurgents challenged, battles will take place in Baghdad; the battles that we expected on April 10, 2003 are taking place April 10, 2007.

Read also some general comments by Malcolm Gladwell on "Tipping Points". Pay close attention to his comments on "memes as a virus". It paricularly reflects another posting at Small Wars regarding IEDs: Viral Targeting of IED Social Networks. Also, a brief discussion by Gladwell on "Yawns" and contagious diseases.

Really, if you haven't read Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Points you are way behind the learning curve for this strategy.

Quick review of the Tipping Points reading guide.

18. The Power of context infers that epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur. Are certain individuals more sensitive to their environment than others? Think of examples of behavior as a function of social context. How often or to what extent does the environment dictate your behavior i.e. your conduct when at the opera versus being at a baseball game?
19. The Broken Windows Theory argues that crime is the inevitable result of disorder. It suggests that crime is contagious. Do you agree or do you think this risks excusing a criminal’s culpability?
20. Most conservative theories say that the criminal is a personality type whereas the Broken Windows theory and Power of Context suggest the opposite – the criminal is actually someone acutely sensitive to his environment and who is prompted to
commit crimes based on his perceptions of the world around him. Which theory do you believe?

Cross referenced at the Castle and Thunder Run

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Men in Black

Men in Black Fighting the Taliban

Now his unit is deployed in Afghanistan's Zabul province, a vital staging post for insurgents in southern Afghanistan, and the role-playing experience has paid dividends.

Recounting a recent clash, Hearn said his unit rushed in a blocking force to cut off the valley that was the site of the Taliban stronghold. Mortars were targeted on the expected escape route and airstrikes readied before fighting erupted.

"They (the militants) did exactly what we would have done if we were acting as OPFOR," Hearn said. The Taliban fighters were trapped, and a number were killed, he said.

But while the soldiers may be better able to predict how the Taliban will act, the battalion's tactical insight may not be enough.

The "Men in Black" — who get their name from their earlier roles as black-uniformed Soviet bloc troops — suffer from the problem faced by other U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan: They're too few in too large a place.

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Discussed Before: Algerian Insurgency v. Iraq

This is a great piece explaining exactly where Petraeus got his ideas (aside from T.E. Lawrence), how it works and how, regardless of how well it works, you still lose at home when you are too slow to figure it out.

Indeed, the 1957 battle for Algiers marked a crucial turning point in the fight against the FLN. By 1959, Galula’s principles had been extended across Algeria. Some 600 “specialized administrative sections” were set up, each headed by army officers to oversee civil as well as military affairs. The new structure finally allowed the French army to use effectively its superior numbers (including 150,000 loyal native troops, more than a third of the total) and conventional military hardware. Helping to put the guerrillas on the defensive were such tactics as the division of troops into “static” and “mobile” units to deal with terrorist outbreaks; the use of helicopters for counterinsurgency operations; and construction of a 200-mile, eight-foot-high electric fence (the so-called Morice Line), which shut down the FLN’s sources of support from neighboring Tunisia. By January 1960, the war that many had considered lost three years earlier was virtually won.

Except at home. Do read the rest.

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