Showing posts with label Troop Surge. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Troop Surge. Show all posts

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

Major Attacks Down 50% in Iraq: What Does It Mean?

Nothing right now. One of the things that I've been cautious about is allowing statistics to sway my opinion on the status of the war. Neither an increase nor a decrease in casualties determines the status of the war. Neither do increases or decreases in attacks. Not in terms of trying to compare them from any period over the last four months or four years.

Major attacks decline in Iraq h/t Ace of Spaces

One of the reasons that the main stream media is slow to take this up is the same reason that I am reluctant to use it as a measurement for success. Largely because we have heard and seen these decreases and increases over many different periods of time. It often reflects when we have picked up our operational activities. But, it has also reflected different realities of fighting in a desert country with high temperatures and a society that is still tied closely to agriculture and animal husbandry. Even the United States has planned invasions of Iraq around known weather patterns and seasons.

I have no idea where the data comes from for the "50%" drop, but the Brookings Institute index, that I have reviewed in past periods and that has sometimes been used to reflect one political idea or other about the status of Iraq, does not really reflect that decrease. There must be data from the military or other organization that reflects this change.

Some things that might skew current number are seasonal and cultural considerations.

This is not simply related to our efforts, but are directly related to how the insurgents conduct their operations. Some of which is dictated by the weather. throughout the last four years, attacks have spiked in late spring as the weather has warmed and the rains that make the terrain difficult have decreased. Then, through mid to late summer, the attacks taper off. Largely because it is simply too hot to conduct operations, even at night. They pick up again towards mid fall when the weather is cooler and the rains have not begun. There is the months of Ramadan where everybody has a long vacation and it gives the part time insurgents time to participate more fully.

Then you have the overlying issue that Iraq has a large part of its population involved in agriculture and animal husbandry. The cycles of planting and birth also predict upticks in attacks based on availability of personnel to carry them out. (keeping in mind that early spring is time for planting and when lambing is most prevalent and early fall is also the beginning of harvesting foods, culling herds and breeding the remaining herd for the following spring).

The final tally for the year and subsequent comparison does not represent any real intelligent data that we can base "winning" or "losing" on. In fact, during a recent argument with an "escalation of war" alarmist, I pointed out that all wars have escalated more towards the end with more deaths than at the beginning. That is in classical warfare and counter-insurgency. That is typically how one armed force defeats another.

The real question will be whether the Ramadan period and next spring offers the same kind of conflict or whether it drops off to near nil. The number of attacks today are significant only to the point that it indicates our interdiction and harassment operations along with COIN are successful in interrupting their current operations. Will it significantly decrease their future capabilities? We won't know until the future of course.

In short, these numbers mean nothing until it is a sustained decrease in deaths and wounding of Iraqis and Coalition and a requisite increase in economic indicators.

Read also:

Mike Yon: Three Marks on the Horizon

Ligers
Ashes and Dust

H/T Mudville

Sunday, August 05, 2007

State of the Insurgency: SitRep Iraq

At U.S. base, Iraqis must use separate latrines


Here at this searing, dusty U.S. military base about four miles west of Baqouba , Iraqis— including interpreters who walk the same foot patrols and sleep in the same tents as U.S. troops— must use segregated bathrooms.

Another sign, in a dining hall, warns Iraqis and "third-country nationals" that they have just one hour for breakfast, lunch or dinner. American troops get three hours. Iraqis say they sometimes wait as long as 45 minutes in hot lines to get inside the chow hall, leaving just 15 minutes to get their food and eat it.


This is how well you know it's going in Iraq. When the media has nothing to print but a story about alleged discrimination on a US base in Iraq. The reporter goes on to talk about Truman ending segregation in the military before finally getting around to asking some folks why the bathrooms are separate:

There's also disagreement on the reason.

Marquez cited security. "We are at war, and operational security (OPSEC) and force protection are critical in this environment," Marquez wrote. "We screen all our local nationals working and living in the FOB, however, you can never know what's in their mind."


After the official word from the command, the reporter went around and asked other soldiers why they thought it was segregated. It was widely differing from cultural bathroom habits to hygiene and back around to security. They conclude by noting that FOB Warhorse is the only FOB with separate bathroom facilities.

This is when you know its boring over there. Reporters are now worried about possible discrimination against Iraqis and TNC (third nation contractors). Apparently, big bombs did not go boom during this embed rotation so they had to come up with something to talk about.

I believe that just about says it all.

However, I'll point out a few other facts, such as the fact that Al Qaeda is having a harder time setting off big bombs. You know that because it has not made your headlines in almost a week. It is taking a longer and longer cycle to make big propaganda splashes in the media.

However, US, Iraqi and coalition forces are making big strides against al Qaeda in Iraq's leadership.

U.S. troops kill Iraq shrine bomber


Haitham Sabah Shaker Mohammed al-Badri was killed in a U.S. operation Thursday east of Samarra, the U.S. military said in a statement.

The military said al-Badri was the al-Qaida in Iraq emir of Salahuddin province, and the mastermind responsible for the bombing of the Askariya mosque's minarets on June 13.

"Al-Badri was positively identified by close associates and family members," the statement said.


He was probably responsible for the bombing of the golden dome as well and, by fall out, the deaths of hundreds of Iraqis in sectarian reprisals.

He's not the only one:

Operations in Iraq's North; Mosul's emir killed


Bill Roggio notes that operations in the north have been picking up as Babil, Anbar and Diyala are cleared out. Insurgents are falling back to other positions including to Samarra where Al Badri was killed directly after US forces began tandem operations in Samarra, Ninewah and al Salahidin. He goes on to state:

To the north in Mosul, the operational tempo against al Qaeda's network has been relentless. U.S. and Iraqi security forces have conducted numerous raids in the northern city over the past few months, killing or capturing multiple high value targets. The latest raid, by the Iraqi Army, resulted in the death of Safi, al Qaeda's emir of Mosul.

While conducting a series of operations throughout the city, the Iraqi Army spotted Safi and three bodyguards, and gave chase. Safi and his bodyguards were killed after they pulled over and opened fire on the Iraqi troops. Prior to the killing of Safi, U.S. forces captured Khalid Abdul Fatah Da’ud Mahmud Al Mashadani, a senior Iraqi member of the al Qaeda political front, the Islamic State of Iraq
.

Al Mashahdani was a giant score. We are most likely using documentation and interrogation materials to find these forces. Statements by Mashahdani also imply that he is cooperating because he is angry at the foreign influence of Al Qaeda in Iraq which he stated was largely ran by Egyptians and Saudis while the Iraqis put on a facade of control and local legitimacy. He further implied that the foreign Al Qaeda masters were using Iraqis for cheap canon fodder. Not too surprising since we figured that out long before Zarqarwi died. However, people generally have to find out fore themselves and this was a bloody, hard lesson.

No relation but a good point to make is that the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan have been dropping like flies as well. h/t Jawa Report.

Back to Iraq, there are a few issues that are flies in the ointment unless you read between the lines.

Iraqi power grid nearing collapse


Electricity Ministry spokesman Aziz al-Shimari said power generation nationally is only meeting half the demand, and there had been four nationwide blackouts over the past two days. The shortages across the country are the worst since the summer of 2003, shortly after the U.S.-led invasion to topple Saddam Hussein, he said.

Power supplies in Baghdad have been sporadic all summer and now are down to just a few hours a day, if that. The water supply in the capital has also been severely curtailed by power blackouts and cuts that have affected pumping and filtration stations.


Getting down to the "between the lines, nitty gritty":

One of the biggest problems facing the national grid is the move by provinces to disconnect their power plants from the system, reducing the overall amount of electricity being generated for the entire country. Provinces say they have no choice because they are not getting as much electricity in return for what they produce, mainly because the capital requires so much power.

"Many southern provinces such as Basra, Diwaniyah, Nassiriyah, Babil have disconnected their power plants from the national grid. Northern provinces, including Kurdistan, are doing the same," al-Shimari said. "We have absolutely no control over some areas in the south," he added.


One of the big issues is that the provinces feel like the Baghdad government has not been playing fare with them. Like in the days of Saddam, the big money, power, food and reconstruction has been kept in Baghdad and other limited capitols where specific national parties have control over the ministries and money that goes with it from the oil revenues. Michael Yon reports in "Bread and Circus" that Baquba in Diyala has been without food shipments for 10 months due to several issues including Al Qaeda seizing the food warehouses and using it to blackmail the populous and siphon off the food for themselves and to selling it on the black market for pocket money.

Second problem? The food warehouses in Baghdad where it originates from is smack in the middle of Sadr city and run by Sadr goons.

The Mayor of Baqubah, and all the king’s horses and men, were afraid to try to get that food from the warehouse next to Sadr City. The Mayor told me that when a representative from Baqubah went to another warehouse to get medical supplies, he disappeared. And then the Mayor told me flat-out that he knew if he went to the food warehouse, he would be killed.


But, LTC Fred Johnson had a plan. Read about it in "Bread and Circus"

I believe that the cut off of power to Baghdad has multiple purposes. Mainly that the provincial governors are rebelling against the sectarian government in Baghdad. This is their leverage. In a sense, this is like the federalists v. states rights. A blogger recently noted that, as Anbar and other provinces grow stronger with US presence, local government and politicians are stepping up to the plate. It's the local governments that are getting the support of the people. This may change the dynamics of the national parties and government in Baghdad. Something that is inherently good considering it is the people in the provinces that will end the sectarian violence and bring about national reconciliation, not Baghdad. Baghdad will follow the provinces this time.

The explanation for all this goodness? Besides the fact that it's super hot and no terrorist wants to be digging holes in the 130 degree heat?

JD Johannes has a little video up that shows why the terrorists continue to lose: "Mu, mu, mu Jihad," which roughly translated means "Not, not, not Jihad."



Monday, June 11, 2007

From Outside the Wire

One of my favorite blogs to keep up on things "over there" is Outside the Wire.

JD has some great posts up:

Random Thoughts

Dragon Skin Armor?

All the grunts dig my Dragon Skin body armor by Pinnacle and wish they had Dragon Skin. It fits well and the fit takes a lot of the load off my shoulders which makes it a lot more comfortable. The flexibility is also nice when traversing walls and rooftops.


Best Crop of Officers

This current crop of Company and Battalion commanders could be one of the best ever. Nearly every company commander in theater has already been a platoon commander in combat. Most of the Battalion commanders have been here previously on a Battalion or Regimental staff.

I ask the officers: "When you joined, did you ever think you would be--acting as a city manager, provincial governor, village sheriff, mediator between tribes, spending so much time talking with the locals?"

They all say no.


Losing the Bidding War

The bureacracy--even in combat--is staggering. To get some things done the request has to go through 15! steps of approval.

One Company Commander summed it up like this:

"They trust me with the lives of 100 men, humvees, weapons, ammo, civil affairs negotiations, classified intelligence, radios, everything. But I cannot be trusted with $20k worth of Dinar to hire a crew to build up an IP station?"


Which is interesting, because I keep hearing that the appeal of JAM and AQIZ is the money.

I saw one sheet listing the rewards for tips. But the rewards were lower than what JAM and AQIZ pay.

Is the coalition losing a bidding war?


The Iraqi Police

Like everything in Iraq, the state of the IP all depends on where you are because no two areas are alike.

In Anbar the IP and PSF may be your strongest allies. In Baghdad they may be your worst enemies.

I spent two weeks with the Black Lions, the 1-28 Infantry out of Ft. Riley, KS.

The Black Lions operate in West Rasheed. An area south of the fabled route Irish and bordered on the west by Camp Victory, the U.S. mega base at Baghdad International Airport.

Jaish al Mahadi has been waging a campaign of intimidation, terror and murder against the Sunnis in the area. JAM is winning.


Bold Predictions

In the past I have cautioned people against making predictions about Iraq as they have a habit of not coming true.

But, one prediction I made in late April has, unfortunately, come true.

Late one night while logging video I commented to Andrew Lubin that I thought this Summer would be the most violent and bloody Summer of the war.

It is starting to look that way.

My rationale was, and still is, simple. If the Anbar Awakening works, AQIZ is in trouble and will be seen as losing not only the war against the U.S. but of losing support among their core constituency--Sunni Muslims.


Thursday, April 12, 2007

Broken Windows Theory: Crime, Small Wars and Trash

I discussed Crime and Small Wars previously. It is important to understand how this works in guerilla warfare (small wars).

Crime fuels the insurgency. It provides it cover. It provides it money. It gives the illusion, along with the over all bombs and firefights (that do not represent the whole of Iraq) of insecurity. In reality, common crimes are as egregious as any acts of terrorism for these same reasons.

If we do not combat the crime, then we cannot combat the insurgency. Insurgents and terrorists are self-sustaining through these acts.

Watch this video on the Battle for Baghdad

Jeff Burris, Times Baghdad Bureau Chief, discusses how the Ba'athists left Baghdad with over $2 billion in stolen money from the Iraq Central bank. Since then, it subsidizes its activities through kidnapping, smuggling, theft, counterfeiting, stealing directly from oil pipelines and gasoline refinery to resale at profit and corruption.

The insurgency cannot be stopped simply by combatting insurgents or even the political process. It must become a losing proposition financially. That means that every crime in Iraq, no matter how small, must be addressed through "policing". This entails picking up people for petty theft, going after kidnappers aggressively (regardless of who they kidnap), painting over graffiti, cracking down on corruption and breaking the blackmarket (largely by providing legitimate means of income for non-terrorist related groups).

Second, real broken windows theory requires more from neighborhoods than turning on the insurgents. In order for people to feel invested in their neighborhood, responsible for its security and hopeful for its prosperity, more than "security" must take place. More than "political reconciliation" must take place. The residents must feel like they are responsible and have ownership.

MNF-Iraq - Muqdadiya: A neighborhood watch program has begun to show signs of success since its formation March 5. The program, which includes 15 villages
throughout the Muqdadiya district, hires local villagers to protect their village and
encourages the population to contact their security forces on criminal or terrorist
activity. “The idea is - to protect the village and to clear it from the armed people and insurgents,” said Dr. Abdulla al Jubouri, the former governor of Diyala and founder of the program.

Since the program began, Jubouri said there have been several signs of success
to include roads free from improvised explosive devices, fighting stopped between
what used to be rival villages, schools are re-opened, electric and water services have been repaired.


In broken windows theory, appearances are actually a very large part of the battle. Visual perception, like first impressions, can change the psychology and, thus, the behavior of a person, even whole communities and those they interact with, including would be criminals and terrorists.

Here is the Broken Windows Theory in Action in Ramadi

RAMADI, Iraq – Improving conditions in Ramadi’s Malaab, or “stadium district,” means shops are opening, schools are teaching and the garbage is piling up on the roadsides. Coalition forces have been largely successful in breaking the stranglehold terrorists held on the neck of this formerly affluent community, but the question has remained: Who’s going to take out the trash?[snip]

Even before the vehicle ban, regular trash pickups were intermittent, threatened with the ever present risk of improvised explosive devices. This, coupled with the travel restrictions, has led to heaps of rubble, garbage and other debris littering the streets. Cosmetic concerns aside, the litter posed a more serious concern for occupying forces and residents alike, improvised explosive devices. [snip]

The formula seemed logical. Cleaning the trash would cut down on hiding places for IEDs, making the area for service members and locals alike. Only now, with a diminished insurgent presence, is this cleanup possible.

“We just finished a large clearance operation, so a lot of people are able to come out now,” Lively said. “There’s a little more security now from the enemy activity, and now today, the civilians have asked us to come out and help them.”

The major catalyst for the cleanup has turned out to be the neighborhood residents themselves. Under the protection of Coalition troops, citizens came out in force eager to clean up their community. Wielding shovels, brooms and rakes, adults and children alike tackled the mounds of refuse with a will. Backhoes and garbage trucks operated by Iraqi police and soldiers cruised the streets, bringing towering heaps of trash to an impromptu landfill.


Appearance makes a huge difference, not only to the residents, but to those who would act criminally or be a terrorist in the area. Prosperous appearances not only give hope to the residents, but take it away from the crimnals and terrorists. Prosperity means that the community cares, is active and is watching. Watched communities are less susceptible to crime, thus, terrorism. Visible police and other security apparatus adds to the over all perception along with not letting any crime be considered "acceptable".

Third and finally, is economics. Jobs must be available. It does not have to be a large manufacturer. Micro-economics can move a communities economic status into that next level, one that is, if not making the people wealthy or even "middle class", providing a sustainable, stable and steady income.

One example of micro-economics can be seen in this book about Beauty Salons in Kabul, Afghanistan.

In Iraqs current climate, this must be a cash business, portable and/or appropriate for Iraq. Should be small businesses that require little cash to start up. This is where NGOs and other charitable organizations would be usefull.

It could include such things as basic services, including trash clean up, for the community. The important aspects is to make crime expensive and honest work lucrative. It has to take the young men off the streets and out of the potential hands of the insurgents.

This is on a micro level. The problem that we continue to have has been the "big" projects, like electric grids, that never could and will not in the near future, provide effective supply to Iraq for years due to its size and condition (however slowly it may be improving, it can't keep up with the demand, even in relatively peaceful and prosperous Kurdistan). It may need to be done, but what people needed was a way to survive immediately and that survivability is not only security, but money. The way they get the money is the question.

Plant an IED? Or, make shoes? Smuggle blackmarket items or manufacture bottled water? (a must in Iraq considering its sewage and water treatment problems).

Run a local five and dime? Or, kidnapping?

That is Broken Windows Theory in a nutshell.

Wednesday, April 11, 2007

Crime, Small Wars and Broken Windows Theory

Reading an article Tuesday, I noted some comments that reminded me of a post I wrote in 2005 (right before Kilcullen wrote 28 Articles) that was, if not dead on, at least intuitive to the plan that was developed and is being implemented by Gen. Petraeus starting in January.

Marine General says: Anbar Getting Better

Still, on his visit Conway was told by numerous American commanders throughout Anbar that the tide had shifted against the extremist group al-Qaida in Iraq when Sunni tribal sheiks who previously opposed U.S. forces decided to start cooperating instead.

Some commanders said the extremists' key misstep was to interfere with the locals' black market trading, which al-Qaida co-opted in order to finance itself. Anbar stretches west from Baghdad to the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The new cooperation has enabled U.S. forces in recent months to clear extremist elements from even the most violent areas, including Ramadi, and to put more Iraqi forces on the streets, Conway was told. Cooperation by the sheiks also has quickly created a Sunni police force in areas where none existed before.


I wrote in June 2005, Converging War and Tactics

Criminal Rings: These are either an amalgem of many groups or tribal activity with entire tribes participating in one manner or the other. These supply materials, smuggle people, money, information, etc over known smuggle routes. These largely participate based on the money factor and make money from all three of the above noted groups with the largest monetary gain from the Jihadists and Ba'athists. Have no real loyalty or ideological support of any of the first two, though may have more loyalty to tribal groups considering their interactive capabilities.


I wrote the ways to combat these situations:

If I was in the border areas near Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Syria, I would look at ways of infiltrating the smuggling gangs. These gangs work on money, just like drug, car thief and other gangs in the US. The same are in Iraq, but difficulties may arise because many of these gangs are tribal efforts and infiltrating a tribe would be difficult. Thus, to fight this aspect of the war, money, large quantities of money would have to be available to buy them off. Also, the possibility of making money "legitimately" by helping these smuggling groups develop business opportunities that would net them comparative or near to comparative profits.


An Iraqi blogger (blog gone) made the same complaint about crime and the insurgency at the same time- Iraq Criminals and the Insurgency:

Not just terrorist attacks that has been reduced but even regular crimes, as it seems that part of the operation is focusing on capturing regular criminals who are in addition to their usual criminal activities do form, in my mind, the right hand for the Ba'athists.[snip]

Back to operation lightning, a few days ago I witnessed one of these raids by the IP against some thugs in our neighborhood who were apparently part of a big gang specialized in kidnappings and selling arms.


I wrote a similar concern over at the Small Wars Journal in response to several of Kilcullen's posts on the Surge and the actual strategy that was being implemented (largely, a guerilla war version of "Broken Windows"):

One of the most frustrating parts of the iraq strategy and tactics has been watching the "crime" go unaddressed as if crimes such as theft, hijacking, black market, smuggling, car theft, etc. have little to do with terrorists, insurgents or militia. As in the US, these crimes are usually linked to much bigger crimes and criminal rings. It cannot go unknown that smugglers are likely bringing in money, weapons and even fighters to all three spheres that Kilcullen indicated.

It's also likely that these criminal rings selling blackmarket goods are using the money to fund all three of the spheres (insurgent, terrorist, sectarian violence) or being "shook down" for "protection money" that also goes towards larger acts.

Men and boys loitering on the streets, painting graffiti, etc are most likely to either a) be part of the local criminal/terrorist activity or b) susceptible to blandishments or money to participate in some small way including acting as look outs, transporting money, weapons and people, etc, etc.


All of this talk of crime and its effects might seem petty in regards to the "real shooting war" with the guerillas, but I assure you, it is a very important part of the "perception of security" as well as "battling insurgents".

Insurgents have to fund their activities like everyone else. There are only three ways to fund an army: a) pillaging resources and supplies from the local community (sometimes referred to as "foraging", but in this instance, more like "pillaging" as thought of during medeival warfare and movement of armies) or b) commerce (legitimate or otherwise) or c) underwriting by outside nations or actors. Or, in this case, a little of all three. Some more than others.

Illegitimate commerce is the most practical way for an insurgency to fund it's local activities through co-oping blackmarket activities. There are no taxes, they set the prices and their market is boundless in a depressed, war time economy. In the case that was noted above in the "Marine" article, these tribal gangs may be totally in the pocket of the insurgents (such as the six tribes that have not yet pledged to the Awakening Council) or, as noted, being pushed out once they had acquiesced to demands or agreements with the insurgents. In short, the insurgents have pushed out the "middle man".

In another Small Wars Journal article - Iraq's Real Civil War, Bing West wrote:

In Anbar, AQI became the occupier, shaking down truck drivers and extorting shop owners. In the young sheik's zone, AQI controlled the fuel market. Each month, 10 trucks with 80,000 gallons of heavily subsidized gasoline and five trucks with kerosene were due to arrive. Instead, AQI diverted most shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices were higher, netting $10,000 per shipment and antagonizing 30,000 shivering townspeople. No local cop dared to make an arrest. The tribal power structure, built over centuries, was shoved aside. Sheiks who objected were shot or blown up, while others fled.[snip]

Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners.

Politics in Baghdad have swirled around reinstating former Baathists to their prior jobs, thereby supposedly diminishing the insurgency. The central government, though, has given Anbar such paltry funds that jobs are scant, Baathist or not. In Anbar, reconciliation theories count far less than that eternal adage: Show me the money.

When the sheiks delivered thousands of police recruits, they consolidated their patrimonial power by providing jobs, plus pocketing a fee rumored at $400 paid by each recruit. The tribal police then provided security that permitted American civic action projects profitable to contractors connected, of course, to the sheiks.


You can read the rest of what I wrote in 2005 Converging War and Tactics, including thoughts on what is now called PiTTs (Police Transition Teams) and MiTTs (Military Transition Teams). I also suggest reading Tipping Points and this original post on Broken Windows Theory to understand parts of the strategy that must be implemented in order to "win".

A big part of this is going to be putting together the "connections" for the criminal and tribal rings, both inside and outside of Iraq. Another aspect would be to implement an organized crime team and system (computer or other) that tracked these connections and was accessible. I believe we have obviously done something of this nature in order to determine those tribes that would be most willing to work with us. It was a similar method that was used to capture Saddam. Basically, by identifying the people around Saddam and then making a simple organization chart. In fact, they had originally tried to find Saddam through using a complicated computer tracking system that took in thousands of pieces of information, but turned out to be unusable due to the amount and inability to correlate so many points.

It turned out that the simplest connections (tribe and family - like Occam's razor) were the correct answers.

In this case, I believe it would be appropriate to take the next step in undercutting the insurgents financial support by looking over the organized crime connections of the tribes and working to undermine or shut it down. That will require both "policing" and "economics".

Another important aspect that Bing mentions and has to be worked over is the committment and follow through of the Central government in Baghdad to the Sunni al Anbar tribes for reconstruction and money. The money and committment must come from Baghdad. If Baghdad does not make the committment, then there is no reason for the Sunni's to committ to the government. They need protection, both from Al Qaeda and from the Shia extremists who are "cleansing" the Sunni, blame the AQI attacks on the Sunni and who want to realize the total government control of Baghdad and Iraq. The Shia extremists, as portrayed by al Sadr, want to insure the Sunni are weak so that they do not ever have to fear their return to government and power over the Shia.

In "Broken Windows", when New York cleaned up its crime and criminals, it took six years. It took numerous forays into the same neighborhoods, over and over. It took committment. It rolled from neighborhood to neighborhood in slow motion. And many times, people despaired it would ever work. It required doing all of the "little things" and making them as important as the "big" if not more so.

In Iraq, it is not the things that you see on TV everyday. It is not the shootings or bombings, it is not the street to street, house to house battles or helicopters being shot down or shooting into buildings full of insurgents. though, as each neighborhood is taken or its control by insurgents challenged, battles will take place in Baghdad; the battles that we expected on April 10, 2003 are taking place April 10, 2007.

Read also some general comments by Malcolm Gladwell on "Tipping Points". Pay close attention to his comments on "memes as a virus". It paricularly reflects another posting at Small Wars regarding IEDs: Viral Targeting of IED Social Networks. Also, a brief discussion by Gladwell on "Yawns" and contagious diseases.

Really, if you haven't read Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Points you are way behind the learning curve for this strategy.

Quick review of the Tipping Points reading guide.

18. The Power of context infers that epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur. Are certain individuals more sensitive to their environment than others? Think of examples of behavior as a function of social context. How often or to what extent does the environment dictate your behavior i.e. your conduct when at the opera versus being at a baseball game?
19. The Broken Windows Theory argues that crime is the inevitable result of disorder. It suggests that crime is contagious. Do you agree or do you think this risks excusing a criminal’s culpability?
20. Most conservative theories say that the criminal is a personality type whereas the Broken Windows theory and Power of Context suggest the opposite – the criminal is actually someone acutely sensitive to his environment and who is prompted to
commit crimes based on his perceptions of the world around him. Which theory do you believe?


Cross referenced at the Castle and Thunder Run

Monday, April 02, 2007

OPFOR: Exclusive Interview with General Petraeus in Baghdad

You heard it here first folks. OPFOR has an exclusive interview with General Petraeus from Baghdad on the ongoing situation.

He terms it "cautiously optimistic".

BAGHDAD

Then there is Baghdad. Baghdad has become the primary battleground in Iraq. “Baghdad, a city the size of Los Angeles, is spread out and very diverse. What you have there is almost a tale of two cities to some degree. It is a tale of one city that is predominantly Shia, those areas in which security is pretty good. Al–Qaeda is trying to get in and blow them up periodically but the checkpoints are stopping a good bit of that. Where commerce has returned, the markets have reopened. We have hardened all the markets. And I’m talking about enormous markets that have tens of thousands of people. Those areas have bounced back very, very well.”

“Then you have the mixed areas though that are still in the sense battlegrounds…All it takes is one death squad just to really literally ruin the neighborhood. They are fault line neighborhoods or they are Sunni Arab neighborhoods that are under threat from both Al-Qaeda, who’s trying to retain them as logistical routes or safe havens, and by, in some cases, Shia extremists who are trying to expand into those areas or to push into another block or another neighborhood.”

“Those are challenging places and they are challenging for the people that live in them as well… In fact we were in one of them just yesterday – the Amariyah area of Baghdad which is just east of the Baghdad International Airport; between that and the wealthy Mansur area, where all the diplomats used to live. And we were out talking to folks in the market and on the street and all that stuff. They are surviving, they are enduring. But you know it’s a pretty tough existence for them, frankly.”[snip]

When I asked the general about the current political situation in America, he made it quite clear that his job was to remain focused on the mission in Iraq. Then he went on to say: “I think that a soldier should understand the mission he has been given and make sure he and his boss have discussed it and they are both clear on it and then ask for what he needs and then do the best he can with what he gets. And, inform people of the risk if he doesn’t get what he asks for. And, if it’s sufficiently less than what is judged to be needed, then he has to go back and say I can’t accomplish the mission, lets change the mission. That’s the approach you have to take.

“I cannot make my recommendations based on what I think the pain is back there for the military services or the White House or Capitol Hill or anything else. All we can do is do our mission to the best of our ability and retain integrity as we do that. And, be willing to note that if it’s not going to happen. I’ve gotta say that. I owe that to 150,000 young Americans and anther 10,000 coalition partners.

General Petraeus believes that the mission is doable, but he cautioned, “It is by no means a done deal.” “There are no guarantees.” “My job is to help the Iraqis establish a better level of security in Iraq – that is job one.”


I said that is most likely to happen here, here, here and here.

Wednesday, March 28, 2007

Things to Read

On scene in Baquba:

The helicopters barely touched the ground at the edge of Qubah long enough for 241 soldiers to leap out and begin moving into the town to go house to house in search of insurgents as artillery fire shattered trees in the surrounding palm groves. At the same time, a convoy of 19 Humvees, two Bradley tanks and several other vehicles rumbled toward Qubah from the opposite end. Gunfights broke out as soon as U.S. troops from the air assault reached Qubah's ruddy streets, with insurgents letting machine guns loose from several buildings. One U.S. soldier took a burst of fire in the chest at virtually point-blank range that knocked him on his back. But his body armor saved him from serious injury, and a moment later he was up after emptying his own weapon into the gunmen while on his back.


Hooah! Get some!

Monday, March 26, 2007

Discussed Before: Algerian Insurgency v. Iraq

This is a great piece explaining exactly where Petraeus got his ideas (aside from T.E. Lawrence), how it works and how, regardless of how well it works, you still lose at home when you are too slow to figure it out.

Indeed, the 1957 battle for Algiers marked a crucial turning point in the fight against the FLN. By 1959, Galula’s principles had been extended across Algeria. Some 600 “specialized administrative sections” were set up, each headed by army officers to oversee civil as well as military affairs. The new structure finally allowed the French army to use effectively its superior numbers (including 150,000 loyal native troops, more than a third of the total) and conventional military hardware. Helping to put the guerrillas on the defensive were such tactics as the division of troops into “static” and “mobile” units to deal with terrorist outbreaks; the use of helicopters for counterinsurgency operations; and construction of a 200-mile, eight-foot-high electric fence (the so-called Morice Line), which shut down the FLN’s sources of support from neighboring Tunisia. By January 1960, the war that many had considered lost three years earlier was virtually won.


Except at home. Do read the rest.

Sunday, March 25, 2007

We Who Are About To Die, Salute You!

Grey Eagle reports at the Milblogs, the likely outcome of the recent House Bill. As already noted, the President will veto this bill, effectively breaking the military bank. The Democrats knew exactly what they were doing. They have delivered their base with an "end to the war", while keeping the center by "supporting the troops" with funds. All of the angst over the "pork" is political strategizing to take advantage of the Democrats one weakness: their other campaign promises to cut "corruption" and be "fiscally conservative", managing and decreasing the national debt.

Of course, no one that follows the fiscal realities of the state could take such promises seriously since buying and trading on debt of the US or any other state is the highest stakes of investment. The US simply represents "blue chip" stock. Thus, there is no real incentive to decrease debt, though, to manage it to inflation at a similar rate as fiscal growth maintains a steady source of income from investment in bonds, treasury bills, etc, while not placing the US in jeopardy. Though, it is a precarious business and requires much grit.

Thus, the Democrats promises of "fiscal conservation" are barely lip service, along with the pretense at managing corruption in congress. Eliminating corruption should be unnecessary, yet, they know their own kind and know that they are all in it for the power and money. What they give to the citizens are the crumbs. To believe otherwise is to believe in faeries and elves.

Yet, somewhere between the things they want and the things they do, the nation continues on like the "great ship" that it is often referred to.

The true purpose of the bill is four fold:

1) Expecting the president to veto the bill, it will place the blame for "defunding" the forces on the President's doorstep. Particularly as the wrangling will continue over funds until someone is willing to compromise.

2) It will effectively slow down or stop all together the "surge" that nearly all of congress was opposed to. Petreaus will be forced to manage with the forces that he has in place. The entire security plan will fall totally on Petraeus's ability to bring up forces already in theater, moving them from support rolls into actual combat. Reserves that almost always exist, though rarely discussed. Further, it will require many more Iraqi troops to leave other areas. Petraeus as a diplomat will be the question. He may well have to convince the Kurds that they have a stake in the maintenance of a unified Iraq so that they will be willing to send additional troops. Victory, in fact, will ride on the next few months.

While the Democrats insist that the time tables and "benchmarks" are "incentives" for the Iraqis, in truth, they are whips upon our forces who, having no choice but to continue the mission as ordered, will break themselves, probably incurring much higher casualties. Their goal has always been "the mission", not retreat.

3) Depending on the length of time it takes to parse out the appropriations, the forces will also be forced to decrease their over all patrols and agressive actions in Iraq. They will slowly be constrained to force patrols within the immediate area of their bases, if not eventually confined to base except for small forces with specific tasks or missions. As the hope of the Democrats, to "engage" al Qaida only. Though, this is but a ruse as well since al Qaida in Iraq does not wear a uniform or badge, blends with the populace as well as with other insurgent groups. Which means, regardless of the posturing by the Democrats about fighting the "true" terrorists, there will be very little action against al Qaida. They will be allowed to flourish.

Further, inability to project force within the surrounding areas will leave our Forward Operating Bases vulnerable to attacks. Whether that is increased mortaring or actually concentrated forces will depend on the area the FOBs are in. Many will be forced to close an bring troops back into larger bases for protection. Again, undermining the Democrats political "strong on terrorism" ruse as the most vulnerable bases will be in the al Anbar province where most of the al Qaida in Iraq and various linked "jihad" groups are active and base from. However, it will be little noted or covered as such an issue since the Democrats and the media will paint this as an effect of the President's veto.

4) Finally, as our forces are forced to retreat into their bases for lack of reserves, arms, ammunition and number of viable vehicles (the rest needing repaired) and the security plan actually fails, whether or not the time table for withdrawal actually survives the next round of political wrangling, will be moot. In fact, the political situation in Iraq, along with the ungovernable violence that will ensue, will force our withdrawal as we will be unable to defend or influence the onslaught and commanders will, by their secondary objective, be forced to make decisions that protect our forces. Those decisions will be to withdraw forces to secure locations, most likely outside of Iraq or home.

For all the posturing about supporting the troops, these acts will lead to more, not less, American and coalition casualties. They will simply appear in clusters around or inside bases, as opposed to one to three a day outside on patrols. This is a sacrifice the Democrats are willing to make, along with our position as a strong nation with a near invincible army.

One may wonder why the Democrats would place our forces and the country in such a position. Many pundits have commented on the various advantageous the Democrats seek. They feel confident based on certain core beliefs, not simply because the Amercian body politic is unenamored with the war in Iraq, but because they genuinely feel that Iraq was not, is not and will not be a security issue for the United States. They are also working from the position that they have held from the beginning of the "War on Terror", that terrorists (in fact, Wahabi, Salafist Imperialists) do not require full on military action, regardless of state sponsors or concentrated areas, but require "surgical" removal, either through small special forces or through covert operations to remove certain leadership and financial elements. Either through covert killing, arrests (make no mistake, the capture and removal of terrorist linked individuals to "CIA" covert prisons or extra-judicious "rendition" was a Democrat creation and they will continue to use it, regardless of political outcry from allies) or through political and financial manouvers they hope will sway nations or others from supporting or financing such actors.

In fact, tribute to be paid to the new "Barbary Pirates".

Secondly, they view the outcome of Iraq as a "win/win" situation upon withdrawal regardless of whether it is politically stabilized or a genocidal civil war ensues with Iran as a major backer of the most likely to win: the Shia majority. This is exactly why the Democrats have been insisting on opening direct talks with Iran. The Democrats are anticipating their continued presence in congress as a majority as well as the probability of getting a Democrat in the White House. This is why Kerry was speaking to the Iranian representative at the Davos conference, among other issues involving attacks on our forces. Promises of talks with the Iranians may have lead them to insist on Sadr's withdrawal from Iraq and a stand down of his forces as their attacks on US forces using Iranian arms and money were escalating to potential confrontation.

The Iranians have nothing to fear from this action as they are betting on the failure of the security plan and the withdrawal of US forces as well. They have plenty of other political allies in Iraq and probably feel that Sadr could easily return as the "triumphant" head of a new force to "protect" the Shia in Iraq and reconstitute his power, ably pointing out the failure of US forces to do so. In fact, Iranian backed politicos have done this several times. This is why such organizations as DAWA and SCIRI were able to spin up so quickly and gain massive support within their respective regions for the last two votes. The leaders were in Iran and returned with money and guns, securing control of major government and financial institutions as well as businesses. A tested and successful practice of Hezbollah and other Iranian backed organizations through out the Middle East.

In terms of al Qaida in Iraq, there can be no mistaking the expected outcome post US withdrawal. The Democrats are expecting that the Iraqi security forces will be "let lose" along with the militias, to root out and destroy Al Qaida and any other jihadist or insurgent groups with extreme prejudice. The fact that this will include the killing of a large number of Iraqis (Sunni) as well as the probable refugee crisis, barely causes congress to blink. We are talking about the same group of people (almost exactly the same congressional leaders) that stood by and watched 1 million Rawandans be massacred. Many of these same people were involved in political activism that resulted in the withdrawal of US forces and the deaths of millions of Vietnamese, Cambodians and Loasians. Then there is Darfur.

Third, through these auspices, the Democrats are willing to bet on the increased power and rise of Shia Islamists to counter the Sunni Islamists. In effect, causing the Sunni and Shia to turn and face each other as the "closer" enemy. Something that Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden have routinely railed about in their caustic analysis of Muslim behavior in the last century. The Democrats are willing to accept a potential nuclear Iran and the rise of nuclear states in the ME such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

All good, wholesome detente politics, straight from the Cold War manual.

The Democrats are hoping to use Egypt and Saudi Arabia as military counters, but are also looking for financial leverage with Iran. Iran's economy is based on oil, gas and minerals. It has limited industrial capabilities. It's export revenues are dominated by 70% oil receipts. At the same time, over 70% of its population is on some sort of government stipend. The Democrats are looking into the future where they expect something similar to the "Ford in China" moment that began the normalization of relations and the future financial relationship that some feel has kept China from becoming a major military rival (until sometime in the near future where everyone is waiting breathlessly for China to become the number one economic force in the world, leading to their military dominance).

In fact, while Democrats and Republicans alike have been making noises about becoming less dependent on foreign oil, they are seeking ways to maintain relationships with oil exporting nations in the region while potentially opening (or re-opening depending on your view) another oil exporting front. Currently, US policy prohibits any direct financial contact with Iran, including prohibition on purchasing Iranian oil, leaving it largely to the Chinese and Europeans with additional financial ties with Russia. The Democrats are expecting that the Iranian rise will keep the other Middle East regimes dependent on our financial and military backing maintaining favorable leverage for trade and oil prices.

Although, the rise of Iran as a power in the region and as an important oil exporter with increased influence, if not control of OPEC, we should expect the price of oil to continue to rise at unprecedented rates as Iran continues to exploit it for financial gain. The Iranian people who want real democracy? They will have to wait.

As for Iraq, it will a powerless pawn in the region unless it can gain control of the corruption and sectarian strife long enough to develop its real economic power in oil.

Third, the Democrats hope to have an immediate gain. Whether a withdrawal occurs or, on the long shot, Petraeus's strategy works, going into the 2008 presidential race framed by a peaceful Iraq and/or US withdrawal, the Democrats will claim that their efforts brought an end to the war or, at least, US involvement in Iraq. There is the very large possibility that Iraq will simply disintegrate into all out warfare with many regional actors financing one faction or the other. The Democrats will claim that the President's actions are the cause. In all ways, the Machiavillian manouvering and positioning would make the Medici's seem like kindergartners.

While all of this may seem somewhat logical and reasonable, there are immediate sacrifices. Not withstanding the probable slaughter and refugee issues as well as Iraqi independence being handed over to the Iranians, there can be no doubt that Al Qaida in Iraq and its compatriots will see these political actions, funding issues and effects on our military capability as reasons to increase their activities against our forces in order to maintain their appearance of victory over US forces. They will hope to hasten the US's departure so that the Iraqi government and its security forces are weak enough to allow them to consolidate their forces enough to stave off a major Shia offensive and maintain their hold in al Anbar. Certainly, a Shia or government offensive with major Sunni casualties would consolidate Al Qaida's popularity, not only in Iraq, but in the region with many Sunni as they will be seen as "defenders of the faithful".

Our military power as a negotiating chip will be largely mitigated. A positive in many minds who fear the apparent "militarization" of our foreign policy, our status as a super power and the tumult of a rapidly changing world.

We will hope that the last six years without a direct attack on our soil will continue, that our security measures are effective and we will return to treating terrorists as a police and intelligence issue wherein the deaths of our citizens, should it come, require only another manouver, another covert action, another day, month and year that al Qaida, Zawahiri and bin Laden will continue to exist while their myth grows and their followers in proportion.

Afghanistan? Oh, Afghanistan, that invisible, forgotten war. It will go the way of Iraq. Iraq war funding and Afghanistan war funding are the same appropriations bill. Afghanistan, where Teddy Kennedy announced it was a "quagmire" six weeks into the war and a few days prior to the fall of Kandahar. The Democrats did not want to be in Afghanistan either. They will work on accomodation with the Taliban next.

Those who died on 9/11, their families who lost so much and those who risked life and limb in Iraq and Afghanistanwill not have justice, will not be revenged and will not have the final acknowledgement that their sacrifice meant the destruction of a threat against their families and the future generations of the US, but will be simple stepping stones on the return path to detente politics. Nothing more, nothing less. Sacrificed for the presidential race in 2008. An ignoble end for such honored citizens.

The citizens of Iraq who have risked much more than the US and suffered a hundred times more painful death and destruction will have to hope for peace and watch many more die before they have it. Our casualties will continue as a "rear guard" action ensues. In the words of Senator Kerry over three decades ago, "How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?"

Some would say, "ask General Pelosi."

The soldiers' reply, "We who are about to die, salute you!"

Cross referenced at the Castle

Sunday, March 04, 2007

Great Reads If You Have the Time

This one tops the list...

The Warden of Falloujah
By Mike Carlson, Mike Carlson served as the officer in charge of the Camp Fallouja Regional Detention Facility from March 2006 to October. He is now a graduate student in creative writing at the University of Central

[snip]
It's not personal.

The enta who screams "meesta!" every 10 seconds for 48 hours straight isn't doing it to infuriate you, his captor. What it boils down to is that he can't pronounce "mister," and he was carrying that 155-millimeter round in the back of his pickup, and he was going to try to blow you up, and the reason he was picked by the insurgent leaders to haul the shell is that he's soft in the head, which is why he cannot stop screaming "meesta!"[snip]

You won't fire your weapon in anger.

Your truck will stop one night outside Abu Ghraib. You will wait for explosive ordnance techs to clear a suspicious burlap bag. Because there are so many bombs, you never know how long you'll sit exposed on the road. During the second hour, CF-4562 will ask you in perfect English if he can pee. You will escort him to the edge of the road. When he thinks you aren't looking, 4562 will slink away from you and your rifle. You will immediately see through such a feeble escape attempt, and here, outside the site of America's shame, this enta will be one sandal step away from giving you an absolutely justifiable reason to finally click your weapon's selector off of "safe."

You will raise the muzzle slowly with muscles that ache from humping 60 pounds of body armor and ammo and water and Quick-Clot coagulant, but before your thumb moves over the safety, you will automatically say "kiff," Arabic for "stop," because it's been drilled into you as part of the rules of engagement. You will want to shoot, and 4562 will hear that in your voice. He will stop. He will manage a feeble stream of urine before you shoo him back aboard the truck.[snip]

You will return to civilian life.

You will be jumpy and vaguely unsatisfied, disconnected from the civilians around you who care only about text messages and gas prices and catty e-mails. Navy doctors will find Iraqi sand trapped in the innermost pathways of your ear canals. Your wife now snores, and all her unfamiliar noises combine to drive you from your bed.

On one such night, you will turn on the television news and see that Anna Nicole Smith's death has trumped the coverage of America's 3,118th fatality, 31-year-old Petty Officer 1st Class Gilbert Minjares Jr. You will note that, at 39, Smith was younger than most of the helicopters flying in Iraq. You will turn off the TV and sit in the dark and feel your eyes water as you think about how you took 55 Marines and sailors into a combat zone and brought all 55 back home, and that no one in America besides you and those 55 really cares or understands what you went through.


That's only three exerpts of twelve. Go read the rest.

I'd say creative writing classes were paying off.

Desperation Helps Out in Baghdad

The long and short of it is, whether you see it as a knock at the administration and the Iraq government or the bare knuckles truth, it is time to change tactics and that, of course, is why Petreaus is there.

As they say, it's not over until it's over. I don't like comparisons between wars, but in every military conflict generals have changed and leaders have taken new drastic steps in order to bring the interminable war to a swift close. I don't see it as Sherman's March to the Sea, or Replacing McClellan, D-Day Landings or Rolling Thunder bombings. Every situation requires a different tactic. If hands off in Baghdad didn't work and promising not to leave didn't work, then it's time to change.

The only thing I believe we should hold steady on is not leaving. Particularly, without having made every effort, I do mean every, to insure that Iraq does not fall into total chaos and spread across the region.

Part of that is this - Into Sadr City

As U.S. and Iraqi forces attempt to pacify the capital, mixed couples who symbolize Iraq's once famous tolerance are increasingly entangled by hate. Forced by militias or insurgents to leave their homes because one partner is from the wrong sect, they find few havens because of the other partner's affiliation. These strains, fueled by displacement, separation and fear, are beginning to tear apart such families, weakening bonds that for many Iraqis hold the hope of sectarian reconciliation.[snip]

As U.S. and Iraqi forces attempt to pacify the capital, mixed couples who symbolize Iraq's once famous tolerance are increasingly entangled by hate. Forced by militias or insurgents to leave their homes because one partner is from the wrong sect, they find few havens because of the other partner's affiliation. These strains, fueled by displacement, separation and fear, are beginning to tear apart such families, weakening bonds that for many Iraqis hold the hope of sectarian reconciliation.




Saturday, March 03, 2007

Iraq: Divide and ??????

Iraqi Troops and Sunni Tribesmen battle insurgents (al Qaida backed?): 50 killed.

BAGHDAD, March 1 -- Iraqi security forces backed by Sunni tribesmen killed dozens of suspected Sunni insurgents over several hours of fighting Wednesday in a village in western Iraq, Iraqi police officials said Thursday.

The fighting was unusually fierce for an Iraqi-led operation and was also notable because of the collaboration of tribesmen in volatile Anbar province. In recent months, the U.S. military has aligned itself with dozens of tribal sheiks who are collaborating in an effort to drive the Sunni insurgent group al-Qaeda in Iraq from the vast desert territory.


Sunnit on Sunni violence

BAGHDAD, Iraq - Six Sunni men who had received death threats for meeting with local Shiites were killed Saturday in execution-style slayings, police said.

Gunmen stormed a house in Youssifiyah, 12 miles south of the Iraqi capital at dawn, police said. Inside, the men — all relatives from the Mashhada tribe — were separated from women and children and then shot to death.

The motive of the attack could not be independently verified. But police, citing information from surviving relatives, said the victims had received threats from Sunni insurgents after participating in a reconciliation conference with Shiites last month.


Sunni on Shi'ite or, more appropriately, Al Qaida on Shi'ites with the trademark "throat slitting". The police are planning to come out swinging.

Ministry operations director Brigadier General Abdel Karim Khalaf told AFP that all 14 officers missing after their convoy was ambushed on Thursday had been found dead in the streets of Baquba, north of Baghdad.

"The minister is following this case closely and has given the order to hunt these people down and punish them. The police chief in Baquba has collected intelligence information, and the operation is under way," Khalaf said.

On Thursday around 55 members of the Iraq's Shiite-led interior ministry forces were travelling from Baquba to the nearby town of Khalis to go on leave when they were ambushed by Sunni insurgents.

The gang managed to capture 14 of them, Khalaf said.

Shortly afterwards, a coalition of insurgent groups led by Al-Qaeda said in an Internet message that the hostages would be killed to avenge the alleged rape of a Baghdad Sunni woman by Shiite police.

Late on Friday, a second message said the killings had been carried out and promised that a video of the murders would be released.

Uday al-Khadran, the mayor of Khalis, told AFP: "They were found in the streets of Baquba. Their throats had been cut and their hands were bound."


Look forward to this getting even hotter as the sides divide and re-divide again.

Then again, some parts my actually cool down.

BAGHDAD — At a time of epic displacement, Fuad Khamis has done something extraordinary: He has moved back home.

"When I arrived, I was overwhelmed and frightened at the same time," says Khamis, a Sunni Arab taxi driver from Baghdad's religiously mixed Sadiya neighborhood.

His house was damaged and there wasn't a piece of furniture left. But the father of five says his Shiite neighbors have welcomed him back with hugs and kisses.


Mission into Sadr City begins shortly.

In Sadr City, home to two million impoverished Shi'ites, U.S. forces will face an elusive enemy. Mehdi Army commanders have fled and the black-clad militiamen are keeping a low profile, avoiding a confrontation with U.S. troops.

Portraits of the scowling Sadr stare down from many billboards. Sadr's network of social and religious services has deepened a sense of Shi'ite militancy, making the eastern Baghdad enclave almost impenetrable for outsiders.

Barefoot children play by pools of raw sewage and goats are herded amid mounds of rubbish, although projects funneled by the Shi'ite majority in power appear to be bearing some fruit.

The sectarian loyalties of Iraq's security forces, whose police is heavily Shi'ite, have cast doubt that Maliki will crush Shi'ite militants with the same determination as he is pursuing Sunni Arab insurgents.

This time things will be different, said Major-General Kareem Abdul-Rahman, Iraqi commander for eastern Baghdad.

"I have but one order from Maliki: to enforce the law," he said.

Wednesday, February 28, 2007

Cheers: Iraqi Style

Apparently, everyone knows who belongs to the death squads.

BAGHDAD, Iraq - U.S.-led strike forces seized suspected Shiite death squad bosses Tuesday in raids that tested the fragile bonds between the government and a powerful militia faction allowing the Baghdad security crackdown to move ahead.

The sweeps through the Sadr City slum were part of highly sensitive forays into areas loyal to radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who has ridiculed the 2-week-old campaign for failing to halt bombings by suspected Sunni insurgents against Shiite civilians. [snip]

The pre-dawn raids appeared to highlight a strategy of pinpoint strikes in Sadr City rather than the flood of soldiers sent into some Sunni districts.

Bombings have not slackened off, with at least 10 people killed in blasts around Baghdad on Tuesday. However, an apparent success of the clampdown can be measured in the morgues: a sharp drop in the number of bullet-riddled bodies found in the streets of the capital, victims of sectarian death squads.

The number of bodies found this month in Baghdad — most shot and showing signs of torture — has dropped by nearly 50 percent to 494 as of Monday, compared with 954 in January. The figure stood at 1,222 in December, according to figures compiled by The Associated Press.

"We have seen a decrease in the past three weeks — a pretty radical decrease," said Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, the No. 2 U.S. commander in Iraq.


It's interesting to see the numbers reported as an improvement, though the press does throw in that qualifier "bombings have not slackened", but they are killing less people. What is really significant to me is that the withdrawal of the Mahdi army has in fact resulted in a 50% decrease in the dead, meaning that the Shia may have been the de facto winners of the "who can kill the most" contest. It would be remiss to point out that the decrease is also due to known Sunni/ba'athist/ al qaeda insurgents either being rounded up or keeping their heads down. But, in terms of number of potential killers fielded, the Mahdi army had everyone beat by at least 2:1.

Meaning, of course, not only was Moqtada in Iran's pocket, he was heading the biggest thugocracy in Iraq.

Many Sunnis have long alleged that most of killings were by Shiite militias, such as the Mahdi Army or rogue elements within the Shiite-led police.


Frankly, Maliki probably had no choice but to turn on Sadr. Technically, Maliki was a co-conspirator or conspirator after the fact in killing his own citizens because he let Muqtada and his Mahdi go crazy. His credibility is barely hanging on from my point of view.

On another note:

Iraqi authorities, meanwhile, have arrested a suspect in the attempted assassination of Shiite Vice President Adel Abdul-Mahdi, an aide said.

The aide said the arrest was made after reviewing security camera video from Monday's blast, which ripped through an awards ceremony at the ministry of public works and killed at least 10 people. Abdul-Mahdi suffered leg injuries.

The aide declined to give any further details about the arrest or the suspect. He spoke on condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to brief the media.


And, they are still rounding up the Army of Heaven would be assasinators of Ayatollah Sistani:

In the southern Qadisiya province, Iraqi security forces said they captured 157 suspects linked to a shadowy armed cell called the Soldiers of Heaven, or Jund al-Samaa. The group was involved in a fierce gunbattle last month with Iraqi forces who accused it of planning to kill Shiite clerics and others in the belief it would hasten the return of the "Hidden Imam" — a descendant of the Prophet Muhammad who disappeared as a child in the 9th century. Shiites believe he will return one day to bring justice
.

I would personally like to see some more info on that and a little proof that the people wre "Army of Heaven", largely because Qadisiya is Sadr/Dawa enclave and are known to get rid of their political opposition with all sorts of claims.

This will continue to be interesting to watch. I think the final "interesting" note is how quiet Congress is. Many blame it on Murtha speaking out of turn, but my bet is more like a "collective breath holding". Most politicos know how to hedge bets and this deafening silence is sounding like it.


Tuesday, February 20, 2007

11 Point Plan for Victory in Iraq

From Pat Dollard the official 11 Point Plan for Victory in Iraq. Couple of items I have posted about in the past as something I would do. One of which I talked about over a year ago re: embedding with police and military right in the citie, is already happening for at least the last year.

Here are points I've noted previously on this blog.

6. A massive assault is shortly due to be launched on Ramadi, the capital of Al Qaeda, and the remnants of the Sunni Insurgency, in Iraq. Ramadi has degenerated to a sort of post-modern trench warfare, Marines and Soldiers locked away in a variety of new urban outposts, while all the schools have finally been closed and it is nigh on impossible for the average citizen to conduct his daily life. The deadlock must be broken, and Al Qaeda must finally be ejected.


You may wonder why you would announce that you were going to assault Ramadi Fallujah style. Lots of good reasons:

A) The regular citizens will be less willing to allow enemy forces to stay and may demand/force them to abandon some of their positions in town. It's self preservation. Like the propaganda about Ghengis Khan and the 40,000 heads outside the city gates, the Al Qaida propaganda from Fallujah is a two edged sword. It might have provoked many to join the insurgents/ Al Qaida and it might have made some generals and politicians leery of the "bad publicity" about alleged civillian deaths from US hands. However, the broadcast and images also reminded many that the US can bring unmitigated destruction that is less than discerning.

All in all, any citizen in a city that is about to be assaulted will want to: a) make the insurgents leave; b) join the insurgents; or c) leave the city in self defense. Either way, it has a way of sorting out the "hardliners" and resolving it once and for all.

B) Send the insurgents running. Announcing the oncoming Fallujah attack sent a number of high profile forces running from their redoubt. When they run, they are less protected. When they are less protected, they are easier to find and kill.

C) The early announcement also provides opportunity for indecision and infighting among the enemy. It may shake up the leadership. Some may stay and some may go. It may cut the forces that actually have to be dealt with inside Ramadi in half.

D) The enemy may send "re-enforcements" from other areas to fight the "big battle". Again, they move, we find them. Again, they come, the people leave, it makes it easier to pick the "bad guys" out.

9. Immediate, highly visible Infrastructure improvement first focused on the peaceful and cooperative areas of Mosul, Amara and Karbala. The idea is to make other areas around jealous of the rapidly modernizing cities, in order to incent them to tow the line of cooperation with the new Iraqi Government.

Such improvements will include, but are not limited to dozens of new bridges being built to accommodate the literally trebling of auto ownership in Iraq since the liberation; the building of many new hospitals to modern standards of medicine ( Ever been to an Iraqi hospital? Just stay home where it’s cleaner and send someone to fetch some drugs ); a massive campaign for fresh American private sector investment, and a raising of all school standards, with a centerpiece of several new universities being built.


The big discussions have been about how much money it costs to do security compared to how little is being spent on reconstruction. Here's the truth, they should have spent it about equally if not more so on the reconstruction. Highly visible reconstruction. For too long the insurgency has been governing the advancement and economics of Iraq. While we were busy letting them do that, it looked like Iraq was crumbling regardless of how many dams, hydro-electric plants, electric grids, schools, etc were being built.

Most of "what the insurgents stop" is BS anyway, but unless an Iraqi (or an American for that matter) can see it on their way to work or on their TV screen everytime they glance at it, it doesn't exist. It has to be nationally and internationally visible.

Second, it has to mean something to the people and have an immediate impact. Many discussions have gone on about the electricity problem in Iraq. Depending on who you listen to, the electrical output has collapsed and insurgents routinely damage the conduits or the infrastructure was already badly damaged, is being repaired as quickly as possible but cannot meet the demands. Both are likely true, but there are very few, if any, things that can be done that can have a huge and immediate effect. It takes years to build dams and plants, it takes years to develop the kind of output to meet the gigantic growth in demand.

Hospitals, on the other hand, are immediate, huge and needed. As Dollard notes, Iraqis only go to the hospital if they have internal bleeding, need major surgery or are comatose. Those places are death traps. Mostly because they are badly funded, in horrible structural shape, very old equipment and understaffed. But, if the hospital (not clinic) is big enough, it can be seen from everywhere and, since it serves the needs of the people immediately, it will be worth more for them to protect it. Even the insurgents have laid off attacking hospitals after the 2005 attack on the Children's Hospital. Very bad publicity.

I also recomment big government buildings and steel girded high-rises.

Yes, it makes them targets for the insurgents, but it also makes them important to the people. Also, as bizarre as it might sound, it is cheaper to rebuild anything that the insurgents knockdown than to keep paying $5bil/day for "war and security). It's a version of the "broken windows theory". Whatever is destroyed, rebuild it bigger and faster. That is how you defeat the insurgent.

You must make the insurgent irrelevant to the future of Iraq. He can fight, but he can't win.

10. Electoral Reform: The old system of national parties selecting candidates for positions was believed to have unfairly tipped the balance in favor of the Shiites and led to too many Pro-Iranian, Pro-Achmedinejad candidates ( like the nutbag terrorist Al Sadr ) receiving too many seats in the parliament. A new system of local candidates simply stepping forward and adding their name to the ballot will instead prevail.


Many have thought this was needed, but I am not sure how this is going to happen. The Iraqis have their constitution. Petraeus may try to conjole, but he certainly cannot force the national assembly to recreate the electoral process. Maybe this is in reference to local politics?

Nationally, this would have been nice if the areas had been formed into districts and individuals run for individual seats instead of this bizarre parliamentary process that simply allows the party that wins X% to fill Y seats. Some of which have no connection to or reference to the districts.

We'll see what they mean by this.

Very interesting indeed.

Friday, February 16, 2007

Venomous Snakes of the United States: Copperheads


The past few days, leading up to the Feb 16 debate on the Iraq war in congress has been an eye opener. The Democrat wing of congress has been planning to play both ends in order to appear to be doing something while actually not committing to any thing. I have noted they want to maintain their base "anti-war" crowd as well as chip away at the center, "we were for the war, but now it's too costly and confusing, but we don't want to lose" that cost them the last Presidential election. They are desperately trying to craft their message towards the 2008 Presidential Elections, while selling out the Troops, the Iraqi people and our allies in the region.

It's not just the Democrats. There are some Republicans that are willing to sell their (R) and their valueless souls in order to maintain their split constituency back in the home state.

There are no principles on Capitol Hill, just manouvering while our soldiers continue the mission and children are murdered by one group or the other.

The press paints all as "sectarian" fighting, trying to redefine the fight as a "civil war" while the President gives uninspiring speeches on why we should continue to the fight.

Is it any surprise the American people are thinking that this is no longer a war they should be involved in or worried about?

The entire time, very few even mention that Al Qaida is in Iraq and active.

The entire Capitol Hill is a giant snake pit of copperheads willing to sell out everyone for political position.

Rep. Murtha (D) Pennsylvania recently outlined the Democrat strategy: "slow bleed". Now that the Dems have control of the major military funding committees, they hope to limit available forces and funding to the military in Iraq by introducing individual bills that try to enforce extended times between deployment for units and individuals, try to limit the number of times a unit or individual can be deployed and limit the period of deployment.


All of which is to force the military to make do with fewer and fewer troops on the field who would still need to perform the same jobs, still be in the same danger, but would not have the amount of force protection to insure their safety or perform the mission. There is only one outcome to this strategy and it is a forced "redeployment" of troops. Lets call it what it is, a forced retreat that will mean more death and injury for our troops as it is slowly strangled by the snakes in congress.

It is not hard to understand how that will occur. It is a fallacy to believe that this "reduction" will force a depletion in missions thus keeping our troops out of harms way. To believe that is to completely misunderstand or purposefully ignore the types of missions that would still have to occur in order to supply our forces that will still be in theater as well as support the Iraqi Army and police, even if they were in a position to stand up in the manner and number necessary to do the job our forces have been doing.

Our troops are out routinely sweeping the roads for IEDs, watching for ambushes and doing reconnaisance. None of which goes away because we have "reduced" the number of troops in the field. We will still have forces in theater who will still need food, clothing, medical supplies and many other needs. Most of that comes via the roads and convoys. All of which are made safer by the aggressive patrolling of our forces who find and dismantle over 50% of all IEDs. Forces, who by their presence in the area, keep the heads low of any enemy who want to plant more IEDs.


If they are stuck on their bases because they do not have appropriate force protection, who will insure that they are not cut off from supplies or from back up by quick reaction forces by IED laden roads, ambushes and other tactics that would quickly leave individual bases vulnerable and thus huge numbers of our forces?

Worse yet, these units know they will need to protect their perimeters and have projected force into the area in order to defend themselves and keep from being attacked or over run by enemy forces, enemy forces organized and led by the continuing presence of Al Qaida that would like nothing better than to see our forces confined to bases where they can be attacked with impunity (as seen from the attack on Abu Graihb Prison).

It is only by continuing presence patrols that these enemy forces cannot gather enough men or in one place without being found and quickly eliminated. If our men can no longer leave the wire, they will not be able to maintain this security and will be vulnerable to mass attacks that will result in mass casualties.

At the same time, they denounce the Iraq forces as incapable of standing on their own, demand that they stand on their own and, simultaneously, imagine that these Iraqi forces will be able to maintain such security as to not put our men in jeopardy.

The entire purpose is to make the military's position untenable in Iraq and force the generals to abandon the strategies that protect them, protect the main population of Iraq and maintain its tenuous hold on democracy and unity. The military would then be forced to report that it was unable to continue the mission and the President would be forced to withdraw our forces or see a total disaster take place in the face of base bound forces.

In such a way, they hope to force retreat, but not call it retreat. They will simultaneous claim to be protecting our forces and saving the military while making the same vulnerable in the extreme with the very likelihood of increased casualties from IEDs, ambushes and straight on attacks.

Rep. John Murtha (news, bio, voting record) of Pennsylvania, tasked by Democrats to direct the next step, says his approach "stops the surge, for all intents and purposes," and would "force a redeployment — not by taking money away, by redirecting money."


News to Rep Murtha, that is the same thing. If you redirect it from the troops in Iraq, then they do not have it. That is taking it away. Only a fool would be fooled by such double speak. The Democrats have a habit of likening Iraq to Vietnam, but this is the closest "Vietnamization" of Iraq you can get. That is exactly what was done to force the troops home: redirecting the money to pay for flights home instead of ammunition and deployment of reserve or replacement troops.

Former Rep. Martin Frost, D-Texas, said Democrats have made a "very clear point" this week by putting the House on record against Bush's troop buildup and now must be careful not to overplay their hand by seeking to cut off funding or limit deployments right away.

"They don't want to be a scapegoat for the Bush administration's failures," Frost said. "This is Bush's war, and there should be no confusion about who's war it is, and Democrats should not set themselves up to have that done to them."


As if this entire war is about the twisted play of politics on the hill. It is only thus because the Democrats made it so.

They are not principled enough to say that they will not vote for the next war budget and demand retreat. Instead, they want to be like snakes crawling through the grass, striking from behind and then crawling away so they can pretend they are not responsible for the outcome, whether that is the death and injury of our troops, the death that will surely come en masse for the Iraqi people and the disintegration of Iraq and the region.

The venomous calculation that it takes to pretend to care about our troops, to care about the Iraqi people or be serious about national defense while zig-zagging through the morass of public opinion in order to establish a tenable position for the previous election and the next, is, frankly, astounding.

Make no mistake, there will be bleeding, but it won't be the figurative "slow" bleed of congressional support, funding or reduction of available forces. It will be the massive bleeding of our troops blood, the blood of the Iraqi people and the blood of many other people in the Middle East as our "slow bleed" leaves them vulnerable to the expansion of unchecked Islamist terrorists back into the surrounding countries. Many of which have been our allies providing intelligence to track down terrorist, stopping terrorists within their own countries and insuring the flow of vital resources to this nation, no only to enable continuing military activity in Iraq AND Afghanistan, but to insure our economy remains stable and even flourishes.

The Copperheads aren't just Democrats. On February 14, Congressman Ric Keller (R - florida) gave a speech in which he likened Iraq to a neighbor that is unwilling to mow his own grass:

Let me give you an analogy. Imagine that you have a next door neighbor who refuses to mow his lawn, and the weeds are up to his waist. You mow his lawn for him every single week. The neighbor never says thank you, he hates you, and sometimes he takes out a gun and shoots at you.

Under these circumstances, would you keep mowing his lawn forever? Would you send even more of your family members over to mow his lawn? Or, would you say to him, you better start mowing your own lawn or there’s going to be serious consequences for you?


This is what passes for intelligent thought on the subject. Iraq is not our neighbors "lawn" that needs to be "mowed". It is, in fact, a volatile country that is not simply presenting "unsightly tall grass" and driving down the value of neighboring property. That is the most you can expect from your neighbor's "unmowed grass".

From an uncontrolled and disintegrating Iraq you can expect that Iraqis will die en masse from the creatures crawling around it's "unmowed lawn". You can expect that Iraq's neighbors will be killed and made unstable from this "unmowed lawn". You can expect that these creatures will be building nests from which they can strike you and your neighbors, quite likely killing you; killing the people of the United States and any number of people around the world.

For this ignorant analogy alone, Representative Keller should be driven from Congress like the copperhead that he is.

Rep. Murtha recently stated that, when we leave, the Shia will drive al Qaida from Iraq. He leaves out the details of how that will play out. The Shia, long persecuted in Iraq and the victims of much of the violence from Al Qaida dominated attacks, will not only drive Al Qaida from Iraq, but many, many Sunni who are not involved and not responsible. There will be death on a scale not yet seen in Iraq for all the lamentations of the current conflict and its toll. While many scream of genocide regarding Darfur and lament the inaction of Rawanda and the delays of Kosovo, true genocide will again take place in Iraq. This time it will be the Sunni who pay, regardless of their affiliations or lack of.

But, not before the conflict expands as Sunni Arabs around the Middle East run to the rescue of their persecuted co-religionists. The battles will be repugnant in their barbarity. We cannot pretend we do not know as we have seen the results over and over again in the slaughter houses of Fallujah and the bullet riddled bodies in the streets of Baghdad. No one involved in this battle will ask who is "innocent" or try to stem the blood shed. They will truly force every person within the nation to take sides as the battle escalates and the barbarity goes beyond cruel.

Those that go to join the Sunni in defending themselves will be quickly swept up into al Qaida organized brigades and affiliations. For all the moaning about the number of terrorists "created" by our presence in Iraq, the number that will be easily recruited and assimilated into these organizations will be beyond comprehension.

Finally, when Rep. Murtha's one truly cognitive point comes true, where will the millions of refugees go? Where will these tens of thousands of more Al Qaida trained, financed and indoctrinated fighters go?

The refugees will go into neighboring countries where they will become an overwhelming economic and security burden on many of our allies such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. It is also unlikely that, once tasting blood, brutality and embibing the religious ferment of al Qaida that these fighters will simply return back to their countries with no further danger. They will be rightly able to claim that the United States abandoned the innocent Sunni, along with the relative few that are culpable, to be murdered and driven out by vengeful Shia and allowed Iran to dominate the region.

There will be no need for conspiracy theories on the Arab street. It will play out for them on Al Jazeera in graphic detail. If we are worried about the "Arab street" now, it takes little to imagine the kind of hatred that will be generated after the oncoming slaughter and political instability.

By this and the foment sown by the al Qaida indoctrination, there is little stretch of the imagination to understand that the backlash will reach back into the United States. They will be even more driven to attack the US, its allies and vital resources that could result in death and injury to our citizens as well as a collapsing economy from the cost of energy resources to the restriction of all types of goods that traverse the waterways of the region.

To simply buy Rep. Murtha's pronouncement as an effective strategy is beyond stupendously ignorant.

Finally, our allies as well as our enemies will be shown that we cannot be trusted when we give them our hands in friendship, pledging defense. We will have shown, once again, that we weigh the cost to benefit ratio heavily in favor of our own political posturing while the lives and the freedom of our allies are considered less than a thistle on the wind.

When we abandon Iraq, it will not be simply ceding control to the Iranians or ceding territory to terrorist organizations, but we will have ceded a valuable position that has allowed us to offer protection to nascent democracies in Eastern Europe and break away republics from Russia.

What will we offer to them? A handshake on one hand and a copperhead in the other?

To paraphrase Congressman Keller, our neighbor's grass does need to be mowed, but our neighbor is not 9000 miles away. Our neighbor is in Washington DC and his overgrown lawn of crab grass and weeds has been hiding a snake pit full of copperheads. They need to be driven into the open so their venomous fangs can be seen as the danger they represent.

Because everybody knows, Copperheads Kill.




-Out with the copperheads! The only acceptable outcome is Victory over the Islamists!



Cross referenced at the Castle