Middle East Revolutions: The Coming War For "Arab" Independence and Israel

There is among western nations a strange idea that the settlement of the Israel-Palestine issue into two, viable states will extinguish at least one of the complaints of the "Islamists" and general "Arab on the street".  An idea that this is the cause of "extremism", or one part of it, and a necessity to reduce the tensions between east and west.

This is probably the most naive concept to ever have taken root in the great foreign policy think tanks that have influenced state policy.  The formation of Israel is a matter of history defined by each side of the question.  Some basic information researched by this blog can be found here (Part I, Part II, Part III, Part IV, Part V, Part VI, Part VII.)

The reality of this conflict comes down to two points: the war that never ended and the spirit of anti-colonialism that has never left the Arab constituency.  This is the war that has simply been put off for generations.  Largely because, no matter how often someone attempts implement Lawrence's idea of Arab Unity and an Arab Greater Nation, the desires and demands of the tribes, Shayks and political trends continuously drag them apart.  Because, while their may be a general designation of "Arab" among the population, it can never overcome the great divides within the entire community.

As with the Egyptian revolution, where the case for unity revolved around ousting Mubarek and was almost instantly gone, unity is only over singular ideas and moments.  The Revolution in Egypt is quickly being overcome by the Muslim Brotherhood, the reality of sectarian divides and the weakness of all other parties.  The only idea that is bringing any sense of unity back to the greater polity is now "Palestine".

While secular Egyptian movements had intended to mobilize millions of Egyptians on Friday in order to support national unity and condemn attacks on Christians in Egypt, Islamist forces succeeded in turning the protest in support of what is referred to as the "Third Palestinian Intifada".

It seems true freedom will be sacrificed once again to the driving political ideologies of others.   This is, as with the failure of the Arab contingency to take what was about to be handed to them on three other occasions in the early twentieth century and turn it into a battle they are destined to lose.  Again. 

The current interim government of Egypt is blocking the movement to the Sinai.  They at least recognize that Egypt and the surrounding nations are hardly in a position to confront Israel directly.  While the marchers were chanting "millions of martyrs to Jerusalem", the reality of a "peasants' crusade" would, indeed, result in millions of martyrs that would result in Arab states attempting to go to war on behalf of the martyrs and, once again, failing.  That is, if they can convince Jordan to allow them to cross the territory or can figure out how to cross the narrow Sinai peninsula in great enough numbers not to be completely slaughtered and pile up in the hole as most attempted breaches in history have shown.

As with the last war with Israel, Jordan was coerced by it's association with the Arab League.  The Arab League is quickly becoming a farce, being replaced by things like the Gulf Cooperative Council and Egypt and Iran jockeying for political position in the region.

As Syria is torn in half by unknown forces that are similar to Egypt.  The Brotherhood, liberals, leftists, etc all looking to make it their own fight. 

What is more than likely is that the end state of the status of Israel and anything that could be called Palestine will come at the tip of a gun and missiles.  Not necessarily because the MB wants a greater war.  They would prefer to do it the slow way, the same way in which they have been Islamacizing Egypt, taking over by population density.  That is the purpose of pushing for the "Two state" plan to have Palestine recognized as a state with the 1967 agreed upon borders.  At that point they can allow in a greater part of the "refugees" for a population boom that would attempt to mirror Israel.

The obvious points of insisting on the right of return for "Palestinian Arabs" is to take over Israel by dent of population and, if it is not allowed to take that position, a continuous cause for war.  This last purpose is the most likely.  So long as there is some "enemy" that it can point to as the "cause", they can continue to consolidate their hold over the general populations of the Middle East, bringing their ideology into the main by slow degrees.   It is very ironic to read from the "liberals" (left, center left largely) that the US is looking for the next enemy to confront as it is "perpetually at war".  No one has examined that the perpetual theme of war is the status of any entity in power or coming to power because someone always wants that power.  People who think that there is a future of "sharing" or "social justice" washes greed (capitalism) away and creates peace.  It isn't "greed", it is power and the thirst for it will never end.  It is a matter of how that power is used and to whose benefit.

The liberals are being broken slowly by their inability to be anything separate except whether to implement a minimum or maximum wage or a taxation program.  They want a different education program but the MB has already taken that ministry through negotiations with SCAF.  They will get different, but it will be about on par with that offered by the previous administration except with the inclusion of more Islamist bent educators and any religious or "humanity" education will be from their perspective.  Of course, leftist ideology will remain the main theme when it comes to "social justice" because this is the most acceptable aspect for the Islamists.

The enemy of liberalism and democracy in Egypt is not the United States.  It is entirely Egyptian made and they are willingly throwing freedom under the bus.  Continuously there are posts that insist that the Islamists are part of Egypt and must be given their place at the table.  There is no perception of history that shows that the intellectuals and free thinkers consistently giving ideologies "space at the table" and then finding themselves the first to be oppressed, imprisoned and killed. 

The warnings fall on deaf ears and those ears will be followed by muted voices. 

The Brotherhood has shown again and again that they have the power of the street.  The NAC (National Association for Change), April 6 and various others called for a "unity march" in Tahrir while the Islamists issue a call through the mosques for a march to Palestine to remember "Nakba", the catastrophe, when Israel declared State Hood, May 14, 1948. 

The Islamists have shown their power.  The Liberals and the Leftists will get what is left over if there is much of anything as the Islamists slowly push the entirety of Egypt towards confrontation with Israel.

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Syria Revoltion: Who is Fighting Nobody Knows

Golan Druze Perspectives On The Syrian Uprising

via Michael Totten Everybody is in the propaganda business:

So when the opportunity recently arose to join a tour to the area with a group of foreign journalists unable to currently get visas to enter Syria, I too went along to hear the next best thing; the perspective of the Golan Druze - most of whom who have friends and family in Syria - on the uprisings there. As so often is the case in the Middle East, not least when talking to the Druze, attempts to peel back the onion-like layers to get to the facts raised many more questions than they provided answers. 

The office of the Al Marsad human rights organisation in Majdal Shams is located near the village square, high up on the breezy slopes of Mount Hermon.  A little prior research had shown that Al Marsad's concept of human rights appears to be limited to writing reports and briefing foreign visitors exclusively on one subject: how awful the lives of the Druze residents of the Golan are under Israeli rule. At least one of its reports indicates that it has associations with the Hamas-linked 'European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza': the outfit which organises the flotillas, including the one last year which ended in extreme violence initiated by its IHH participants, and which was founded in 2007 by the Muslim Brotherhood's European branch – the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe.

Read the rest here

 

 

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Middle East Revolutions:Technology Trumps Tyrants

This is a video of protests in Damascus, Syria.  The lights are cell phones.

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Middle East Revolutions: GCC Negotiating Deal for Saleh in Yemen To Step Down - analysis

Saleh Stepping Down in Yemen, with Immunity

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April 25, 2011

by John F Moore

 

It is indeed true that the Yemeni people are denied some justice by this plan, but politics is, as they say, the art of the possible, and it should have been clear to all that Saleh would not leave willingly without immunity. Riding off into the sunset?

This is another development in a kind of crisis-behind-the-crisis: if leaders are subject to ill-treatment on their downfall, will their neighbors take notice and hold on to power with all their might? Saleh has seen Hosni Mubarak thrown in jail (again, justly) in recent days, and surely wishes to avoid a similar fate. The bloody crackdowns in Syria are the efforts of another tyrant to keep himself in power and out of the slammer. The Saleh deal is thus a positive step, in that it shows other troubled rulers that golden parachutes are available. However, it has a downside–the masses are still energized against the regime, because their demands have not been met. Will the elections sate them if they end up empowering a Saleh ally? Will the opposition parties be able to outmaneuver their uncompromising bases and enter the legal political game? If both of these questions are answered with a “no,” then Yemen runs a serious risk of civil war.

There is considerable questions as to whether this deal will actually go through.  The "protesters" are insistent that Saleh go now and go all the way along with any remains of the regime.  There is also the issue of the military which Moore suggests will not result in a military coup because the military is split. 

Jane Novak at Armies of Liberation has the report from BBC that Saleh refuses the deal saying that he will "not be subject to minorities", suggesting that the protesters do not represent a majority of Yemenis.  Her analysis of the situation is here.

 

Yemen is already suffering from “a security vacuum” and political and economic paralysis. Thirty days from now, the economic, political and security landscape is going to be much more bleak, with a level of damage that is nearly irrecoverable in the mid-term. The western consensus is that the protesters demands are immature and unrealistic, but they have it right. Saleh has to go immediately and be brought to trial for his many crimes. The requirement for a perfect transition plan prior to the executive’s departure was not applied in Egypt or Tunisia or contemplated in Libya and, like a war plan, won’t survive first contact with reality. The issue here is damage control. But any future state that is built on the crimes of the past will contain inherent triggers of conflict.

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The Mid-East Revolutions, the Internet and Greek Mythology: God Killers

I've been contemplating the on going debate about the power of the internet in organizing and supporting revolutions.  Any number of people suggest that the power of social media is over stated.  That, even without it or with minimal access, revolutions still manage to organize and that a revolution on the internet must follow the dictates set out by Mao in "On Guerrilla War": in short, they must eventually organize and go into the street.  


While this is true, my own thoughts suggested that, regardless of this fact, without the internet and the speedy flow of information into once repressed environments, modern revolutions would not have occurred.  Not at the speed that they were able to destabilize and reduce existing regimes. 


The debate over that power rages on.  Watching a recent panel at the Middle East Institute, Courtney Radsch insisted (paraphrasing) that the amount of internet penetration could not be evaluated without noting the penetration of cellular phones.  In essence, modern communication makes revolutions in repressive states more than possible, it makes it inevitable.  That pressing "like" isn't just a risk averse manner of participating as Gladwell insists, incapable of translating to the risk necessary to counter the power of real force, but can act as a social power of its own.  


Her counter on the panel took Gladwell's position, insisting that the internet was only a tool and that the real organization necessary for a revolution took place on the streets, in the Mosque and among existing or created organizations.  The debate was interesting, but the two points seemed to be missing the point.  Even Gladwell, writing for a magazine who posted his thoughts on their "e-mag" website, ironically, missed the point.


It wasn't social media, blogs, facbook or twitter, that presaged revolution.  It was the internet period, regardless of the app.  The internet itself is one giant "killer app", a "God Killer" that only myth and legend dared to suggest would come to exist.  Well, only myths and legends if you discount Nietzsche.  

Two Greek myth's portend the power of the internet.  In one myth, Zeus, who has just deposed his father Kronos, is given the same prophecy that had prompted Kronos to eat his own children.  One day a child of Zeus and Metis would depose Zeus and destroy the gods.  Metis was pregnant with Zeus' child.  Taking this prophecy seriously, Zeus swallows pregnant Metis.  Years later, suffering from a horrible headache, Zeus calls for Hephaestus to bring his hammer and open Zeus' head.  Zeus' head splits open and out pops Athena, goddess of wisdom, fully armed and full grown.

Through out Greek mythology, Zeus is constantly on the look out and battling other gods who he deems are threatening his position on the throne of Olympus, who may carry out the old prophesy.  In the meantime, Athena remains one of his favorites.  He gives her his aegis or shield with the head of Medusa as it's insignia.  She takes as her own symbol the "wise old owl" and she gives to man kind various gifts, including the olive tree.  


Athena is the closest thing to a favored child of Zeus.  The entire time, Zeus is nurturing his own destruction and the destruction of the gods at his bosom.  It is not Ares, the god of War, nor Apollo, the shining one, not Artemis nor Aphrodite.  Not even Poseidon or Hades, two of Zeus' brothers who seem constantly jealous of his position.  Even Hera, who in retrospect in attempting to belay Zeus' continuing liaisons producing offspring, is attempting to maintain the status of the gods and Olympus by forestalling the prophesy.

It is wise and thoughtful Athena, the goddess of Wisdom, the daughter of Metis/knowledge, who will eventually destroy the gods because it is the proliferation of knowledge and wisdom that makes the gods obsolete.  When men understood what made the rains come, the rivers flow, the earth to turn, the sun to rise and the moon to shine; when he understood the passions that ruled man, created machines and built structures that would serve generations and could write down his own words that would be passed down through all the ages, man would no longer require the gods


The story of Prometheus, who steals the fire of the gods and gives it to man kind is a similar story. At the end, however, Prometheus is punished by being chained to a rock where a giant eagle ate his liver every day only to have it grow back and start all over again.  Of course, the punishment is too late.  The cat, as they say, was out of the bag.  The fire of the gods was not just the power of warmth, but of light even in the darkest places.  It meant that mankind no longer had to cower in the night from whatever evils lurked.  With the power of fire, mankind could create new and powerful tools that could rival the power of the gods.


These are essentially prophecies foretelling the power of the internet, the power of knowledge and information to destroy modern day "gods".  Zeus never really suspected Athena, goddess of Wisdom, would be his down fall.  Largely because she was not stingy with her power, but gave her wise advice freely to gods and mankind alike.  Like Zeus, modern rulers of even repressive states are forced to embrace the tool, the weapon that will eventually destroy them, because it is the device by which the "gods", rulers of nations, must now conduct their business and organize the power of their growing states.  

However, like Athena, the internet is not stingy with it's power or wisdom, providing it to "gods" and the common man alike.  Whoever seeks wisdom and knowledge can easily find it on the net.  It is the modern day Agora, the Greek Forum, where all ideas are weighed and debated.  Wherever rulers attempt to control this information, users find a new way to obtain it.  Work arounds, dial ups, satellites and mobile devices that keep the flow of information moving in and out of even the most repressive regimes.  


What Greek idea most often wins the debate?  Democracy, literally people's government.  The internet, the super highway of information, has become the God Killer of modern times.


It does not even have to reach every human to provide this power.  However few are exposed in one area carries that knowledge and power out to the rest.  That is the real power of the internet, itself a "killer app".  Promethues' fire, lighting even the darkest corners of the world.  It is freedom writ large, the torch of liberty as never conceived.  


Like Prometheus, there is a tale of caution for those who have provided this killer app to the world: no good deed goes unpunished.  Information necessarily flows both ways.  Whatever power, whatever flow of information goes out of the United States and the "west", something will return to cause it continuous torment.  


The internet has broken the borders of ideas.  That means that even bad ideas can return in the form of individuals such as those who become "self-radicalized" and commit or attempt to commit terrorism in the name of an ideology that is no longer confined to the nether lands of remote nations.  Such ideas cannot be contained any more than the "fire" of freedom and democracy.  Fortunately, the Greek ideas of democracy and god killing remain the dominant idea in the agora.   The first gods to go will be those who refuse to share their power and attempt to control Athena, goddess of knowledge and wisdom, the flow of information.


Still, there is a warning for those gods, the creators and distributors of the fire and wisdom of the internet, Athena's intellectual children and would be Prometheus: go with the flow or become a victim of the God Killer

There is reason to hope the political dynamics in developing countries have changed such that hundreds of millions will now find they can push against an open door into political emancipation. However, the story need not end there. Better communication technology might just help those of us in the West who think that we, too, could use some relief from the dead hand of the state.

 Tax collection is set to become more difficult, as business oozes across traditional national and sub-national borders. Traditional borders evolved long ago in such a way that a government could monopolize almost the entirety of a person’s life within them, but communication technology is expanding each of our commercial spheres beyond them. And so we see a location-based bookstore (Borders) going into Chapter 11 bankruptcy while Amazon expands into more and more product lines....

The same applies to income taxes when work is atomized in the ways described above. Therefore, we see an inexorable decline in business taxes across the world and high-taxed welfare states in Western Europe unconvincingly moralizing about the “tax havens” as their revenues slowly seep away. Communication technology is changing the game in favour of individual liberty by spreading our commercial lives beyond the pens that governments drew for us in more technologically stable times.

The events in North Africa and the Middle East are complex in their causes. Nevertheless, one condition necessary for their occurrence is the proliferation of ever cheaper electronic communication and the dispersive, ungovernable networks they create. The rise of these networks has a neat physical explanation that applies just as much in the West as it has there. If I am right, then the effect of this great decentralization will be a great force for liberty here as it has been “over there.”

Read more: http://www.montrealgazette.com/business/What+Moore+meant+Egypt+will+mean+Western+liberty/4596935/story.html#ixzz1JIAFcIXv

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American Foreign Policy: Kaplan Right and Wrong on Morality in Foreign Policy

Robert Kaplan wrote a recent article in the Wall Street Journal that hit some right notes on Foreign Policy, but also broke loose a few stinkers.  The Middle East Crisis Just Begun.


The good:

Our most important national-security resource is the time that our top policy makers can devote to a problem, so it is crucial to avoid distractions. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the fragility of Pakistan, Iran's rush to nuclear power, a possible Israeli military response—these are all major challenges that have not gone away. This is to say nothing of rising Chinese naval power and Beijing's ongoing attempt to Finlandize much of East Asia.

To his he adds:

We should not kid ourselves. In foreign policy, all moral questions are really questions of power.

This is reasonably true.  He goes on to list out or recent interventions in the Balkans, etc and why Libya intervention doesn't hurt the US and giving up leadership in that role leaves us free to concentrate on our other problems.  He does not list out any activities prior to the 90's as if Fukuyama was correct and it was, indeed, the end of history when the USSR fell.  However, it is part of our foreign policy history that, during this time, the US made most of it's decisions on who to support under the aegis of "bad and worse".  Worse, during the Cold War, was always Communism.  Therefore, the US made it it's business to support anyone who was not Communist, despite the fact that many regimes were definitely oppressive and autocratic. 

What the US understood at the time was "help yourself, before you can help others".  The US had to survive as the strongest free nation, however it could, or it would be unable to support or defend any other free nations, much less the United States.  It did support freedom and democracy where it could, but, when it came down to a choice between populations where Soviet influence was strong or attempting to enter and a ruling dictator that could be influenced by the West, the US would choose the dictator. 

The 90's, as Kaplan points out, was about maintaining the "status quo".  That the US does better where the world is stable, even if half of it is controlled by tin pot dictators.  Investment capital, imports and exports flow, keeping the US economy and GDP rising at a steady pace.  This was important, per Kaplan, because the USSR did not represent the last enemy of the United States.  Hence his discourse on Iran, China and the ever growling Bear of Russia. 

However, this is where Kaplan begins to advocate for the "status quo" as the best hope for the United States to remain on top and not dragged down into every event that represents some form of democracy.  He points out that democracy (democrateyya) in Pakistan would be a crazy idea, as if anyone was advocating that the land of the Taliban and their various fellow travelers, replete with nuclear weapons, was a candidate for real freedom and democracy. 

No one has been calling for democracy, inside or out of Pakistan for Pakistan.  Not even the revolutionaries in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia or the burgeoning event in Syria.  Even these democracy minded people don't believe that democracy is what Pakistan would get should military rule disintegrate.  That is a red herring and Mr. Kaplan is wise enough to know that.  Yemen is the great unknown.  The US knows that Saleh was basically a career criminal keeping all the other career criminals and jihadists down on the farm.  That does not mean that there are not some forces inside of Yemen who are not criminals and jihadists. 

There has been a long standing low key civil war with inter-tribal conflict as a highlight.  Democracy, whatever its form, is likely to be short lived.  That is if it can remain a single state at all.  The likelihood of Yemen becoming "Balkanized", breaking up into small states with hostiles in the north and south going into internecine civil war, is all but inevitable.  Interesting that Kaplan suggests that the US "stay the course" and not intervene on anyone's behalf.  As if the US was interested in doing so. 

His point worth repeating here is: 

We should not kid ourselves. In foreign policy, all moral questions are really questions of power.

If Yemen goes awry, it would become a hostile neighbor to the Saudi's south and a point of serious problems for trade routes as well as oil distribution in the region.  The problem here is that the US actually has few options.  It can't really support Saleh in the degree that he would require to stay in power and there are no powerful  alternatives that we would like to see in place such as any liberal force in the body politic. 

This isn't a question of morality v. power or morality v. status quo.  This is an issue of reality that the US is going to have to come to grips with, regardless of the outcome.  The same must be said of Saudi Arabia.  This is an example of Mr. Kaplan's argument, but hardly states the case for an over all US foreign policy.

The problem is Mr. Kaplan's main point.  That the US should, in fact, maintain whatever status quo exists in the Middle East in the face of the Iranian problem and the growing Chinese and Russian problems.   He misses several key factors.

Starting with the revolutions, with or without the US, these initiatives were going forward.  The US did not start them nor have a hand in them directly.  Indirectly, constant interaction with the US and other western nations is bound to have an effect on how people see their own situations and, to paraphrase the president, formulate their own aspirations.  Directly, the deposition of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the struggling, though still existent democracy there, put the idea into the people of the region's minds that dictators were not really the all powerful, indestructible, all controlling entities over any people unless the people allowed them to be.

Not to drift off into any ideological meanderings, but the founders of the United States were correct when they pointed out that government comes from the people, even despotic forms, and that people will suffer them as the only form of government they know so long as those "evils" are sufferable.  It isn't a new strain of thought.  It is that vision writ large when we see any popular revolt, much less ones that are calling for real government by the people in the form of a democracy.

It means that the vaunted "status quo" is only the "status quo" so long as the people in any form of majority go along with it.   That means clearly that the US trying to hold on to the status quo does not make itself stronger, but puts itself in a weak position, unwilling and unable to contend with a rapidly changing world.  An idea that is woefully ironic considering that the idea of a free people with a free market and free ideas are better suited to responding rapidly to any changes within and without. 

Worse, it may be framing the US in the same position we framed the USSR all those decades ago.  A power set on maintaining tyrannies all over the world for the sole benefit of maintaining the United State's position at the top of the world.  A position that would not be so threatened if the United State's internal policies were not possibly more detrimental to the great "engine of democracy" than it's foreign policy.

Second, for some reason, beyond a brief mention of Al Qaida, Mr. Kaplan skips completely over the events of September 11, 2001.  As if to say that event was not a policy changing event or that we should not recognize that it is the Salafist Wahabi teachings of the Saudi Kingdom's pet religious projects internally and abroad that brought about that event.  Nor are we to imagine that as a real threat.  As if to brush off that event and the problem of our on going association with the Saudis as inconsequential to the greater problem's facing the US today.  The worst is that Mr. Kaplan does not even begin to imagine that these terrorist organizations are, in fact, proxies in many degrees of all of those other "larger" threats the US faces.

The rise of this theocratic ideology and it's spread through out the Middle East in conjunction with the Iranian version and the ongoing attempts to take down the control of the Pakistani military government to obtain access to it's arsenal makes it a threat equal to or more imperative than the other three threats.  That means that it is imperative for the United States to have a foreign policy that directly counters that ideology.  It cannot be war alone.  Neither does the support of authoritarian states crush the ideology.  It formed full and well beneath the umbrellas of these regimes, regardless of their attempts to crush it.

The single largest threat that the Salafist Wahabi strain of ideology identified to its existence was the spread of freedom and democracy.  It is the most powerful threat against any oppressive or authoritarian regime.  Every enemy of the United States and free nations around the world identifies it and knows it.  It is difficult to comprehend how Mr. Kaplan fails to do the same.

Third, Mr. Kaplan seems to have donned a pair of blinders to the truth of history.  Democracy and freedom have been on the rise for decades.  The number of states that have risen to throw off dictatorships and tyrannical states to become, in fact, functioning democracies, has increased, not decreased.  It is difficult to accept, under that premise alone, that the US should do anything (or nothing as he would have it) to maintain the status quo.  Particularly as it is the rise of these states that has provided markets for US products and allies along the way.  The challenge here would be for Mr. Kaplan to explain how that has been detrimental to the United States.

Fourth, in that same vein, it was the stated US policy during the Cold War that defense of democracy and freedom abroad meant the extended defensive line for the United States instead of a United States alone and under siege within it's own borders.  When it comes to the issue of Iran, Mr. Kaplan seems to insist that all of these impending democracies, such as Egypt, and any changes in countries bordering Saudi Arabia, makes all of those states weaker against Iranian influence and outright hegemony. 

The problem with that analysis is the assumption that a democratic Egypt, or instance, would not have it's own national interests to protect.  Interests that align more directly with the US and the West in general than with Iran's plan for the Middle East.  It also ignores the possibility of Egypt rising as it's own center of influence on the region, against Iranian attempts at influence.  Even as a democracy. 

No one in Egypt, in act, is calling on the Iranians to help them establish their democracy or invest in their country.  Not the MB, the socialists or the liberals.  They are not calling for the Chinese to come and help them.  Even if, as Mr. Kaplan supposes, these events play into China's hand by the US acting in these events  and giving the Chinese direct access, it is incorrect to believe that supporting freedom and democracy as opposed to maintaining dictatorships and authoritarian regimes makes the US weak. 

The point here is that, if these democracy movements are tethered to the natural inclination of people to be free and have a voice in their government instead of bought and sold dictatorships, it pushes the boundaries of freedom out.  Those types of democracies are by nature western leaning.  By fiat, it reduces the boundaries that the Chinese, Russian's and Iranians can ever hope to become a direct or controlling influence because in real democracies, the people are not interested in living in or supporting the types of authoritarian, theological or oligarchic regimes these nations represent.

Mr. Kaplan's main point, that foreign policy is about power and not morality is only partially true.  When morality supports the position of power, ie the spread of freedom and democracy makes free nations stronger, then it seems entirely immoral and detrimental, even to a utilitarian foreign policy supported by Mr. Kaplan, to accept the stats quo as the United States' best interest in foreign policy.

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Christopher Hitchens: Obama Administration Response "Morally Neutered"

Is Obama Secretly Swiss?

The Obama administration also behaves as if the weight of the United States in world affairs is approximately the same as that of Switzerland. We await developments. We urge caution, even restraint. We hope for the formation of an international consensus. And, just as there is something despicable about the way in which Swiss bankers change horses, so there is something contemptible about the way in which Washington has been affecting—and perhaps helping to bring about—American impotence.

This isn't even within the realm of "speak quietly, but carry a big stick". This is more like "close my eyes and hide in the corner and maybe the big, scary monster won't notice me".

Evidently a little sensitive to the related charges of being a) taken yet again completely by surprise, b) apparently without a policy of its own, and c) morally neuter, the Obama administration contrived to come up with an argument that maximized every form of feebleness

.

The United States, with or without allies, has unchallengeable power in the air and on the adjacent waters. It can produce great air lifts and sea lifts of humanitarian and medical aid, which will soon be needed anyway along the Egyptian and Tunisian borders, and which would purchase undreamed-of goodwill.

I said this same thing over at Blackfive yesterday. If all we support is people's "self-determination" (instead of freedom and democracy), then at least let us support it with whatever we've got. We might not need carriers as we have all sorts of other assets in the area (Incirlik). If we are going to have the "Peace Corps" leading our country, maybe they could at least do some of the things that the Peace Corps does on a regular basis.

As I said there, in agreement with Mr. Hitchens, it's time to hold the hand out.

Update: Don't bomb Egypt (we have no idea who we'd be helping)

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Egypt and Democracy: The Ways of Revolution, Social Media and the "Youth" of the Middle Class

There is an old adage that revolutions do not begin in the slums, but begin in the middle classes. Revolutions throughout the 18th, 19th and 20th century have born this out. As incomes rises creating a larger middle class, so do the aspirations for political involvement. Psychologically, the ability to create wealth and manage their personal lives satisfactorily begins to create the idea that they could and should be able to manage their political affairs to their own satisfaction as well.

The American Revolution did not begin on the tiny farms of men barely eking out an existence on small patches of dirt, but the bourgeois merchants and large farmers who were angry that their voices were not heard by the British Parliament. "No taxation without representation." The various revolutions that began in 1848 and spread across Europe and on into the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 were fomented by the children of comfortable middle class families, sitting in the tea houses after classes in the University. Classes that only a generation or two before were unattainable by the masses. It was there that they determined to tap into the demands of the workers, many employed by their own families, to confront the Czar and his unresponsive, unrepresentative Dumas.

Then came the Iranian revolution, the fall of the Communist Block in Eastern Europe and then the USSR itself. All of it brought on by the rise of the middle class and their demand for a political voice. Now comes the Middle East. Egypt is the prime example of how the young middle class, having risen so far, sees no place else to go without removing the very obstacles that hold them down. Usually, whatever government is in place, stacked with entrenched partisans who have been getting their own from insuring the continuation and strength of a ruling party or class. As Eltaway calls them "old men".

Interview with Mona Eltahawy:

And then much more recently, we saw last year in Alexandria, a city on the Mediterranean coast, the police beat to death a young man called Khaled Said. Now, Egyptian police have been known to beat to death people for, sadly, too long, but what happened with Khaled Said was that they beat to death this kind of young, tech-savvy businessman who looked like a lot of the Egyptians who are on Facebook.

And...

Especially Facebook. This [is] Generation Facebook. Kind of upper-middle-class, middle-class generation of Egyptians that have made Egypt the number one Arab user of Facebook. And when he was beaten to death and pictures came out of his corpse and his shattered face, it spread like wildfire. ... But here was this young man who looked like them. And if it could happen to him, it could happen to them. This was a moment for Generation Facebook to understand what it means to live under emergency law and the Mubarak regime.

As in the way of all revolutions, the middle class, not that far removed from the working class, is always able to tap into the issues and concerns of the working poor. The working lower and poor classes had organized into unions and had been striking occasionally, but would subside after some minimum of their demands were met coupled with the fear of serious repression. It was only after the middle class and the working class banded together that the power of revolution began.

One of the continuing discussions amongst many is whether social media such as Facebook and Twitter are the cause of revolutions or just a tool. Malcolm Gladwell, author of Tipping Point, suggests that the power of these tools is over rated. That forms of "high risk" social activism requires more than reading notes on an internet page and pressing "like". It requires personal connections. The idea that to risk life and limb needs a closer bond and that it is the bonds of close friendship, one person with another then another, that gives people the courage to stand up and take a potentially life threatening risk. That people may "meet" in cyberspace, but it is only when they are face to face, forming closer bonds, that this "high-risk" activism can come forward.

He gives an example of the sit ins and other activism undertaken by the anti-segregation, civil rights movement in the south (activism that inspired the Egyptian youth reading Martin Luther King, Jr and other books on the subject, per Eltahawy). There, the first roots of unrest appeared as small groups going to luncheonettes and sitting at the counters, risking violence and death. The movement grew as those involved convinced friends to join them who then convinced other friends to join them, but that those "friends" were not some passing acquaintance on campus. Instead, they had close, personal relationships with people involved that allowed them to make that move and that the underlying organizations had to be in place for this event and others to occur. That, in the end, Egypt did not need Facebook or Twitter to have a revolution.

Some reports of how the revolution began seem to bear this out. Many of the originators were not unknown to each other. They had been meeting and planning for months, even years. They worked with the MB, socialists, unions and human rights groups, but, in the end, they had never been able to pull off the size, unity and plurality of the group necessary to reach their goals.

Mona Eltahawy suggests in her interview that Gladwell and others' take is a complete misunderstanding of social media. First, it provided a space to meet. Not just for those already known to each other, but to find like minded individuals to share ideas with, to motivate and coordinate. The internet was a vast space with possibly billions of users logging on and off every day. They could move from space to space to talk and hide in the virtual world (a tool, by the way, that organizations like al Qaeda have been using for years).

Secondly, and this has been the problem with many in the older generations as she points out, those who do not use the internet as anything more than a "tool" completely misses how actual friendships can grow in the virtual world, building into trusting relationships, over time. It is not the physical reality of seeing someone that creates friendships, even over huge distances, capable of taking great risks. These friendships are built on sharing ideas and events, communicating on a daily, if not hourly occurrence, allowing one, two or even larger groups of people to share in the very personal day to day conversations and activities of otherwise unknown individuals. These friendships can become as strong as any in the physical world.

This lack of comprehension has severely limited the ability of organizations to counter problems such as "self selected" radicalization and internet related terrorist activities. In these cases, young men do not require the actual physical, face to face meeting of a "recruiter" to inspire, instruct or organize an attack. It only requires the user to log on and become "connected", even to people thousands of miles away. There are multiple cases of these events within the United States including the recent case of Maj. Hassan who opened fire on Ft. Hood.

Third, and it is surprising that the author of Tipping Points misses this, eventually, an idea takes on a power of its own, reaching critical mass or, in his words, "the tipping point". As Gladwell notes, it begins with "mavens" or respected people putting out an idea. Whether that is that pink tennis shoes are fashionable or that crime in a neighborhood will not be tolerated (as in New York's program to reduce crime). Then come the "salespeople" who take up this idea and start spreading it to people that they know. Finally, enough people catch on that it spreads like wildfire without the need for these ubiquitous middleman "salespeople".

How does the idea that pink tennis shoes are fashionable spread from New York to LA to London and Tokyo? In the past, it was through other media such as photographs, news papers, magazines, etc. Still, these media paths were often inter-related. As we know, a corporation can own multiple media organizations across the country and even globally, passing information among themselves, often at the insistence and assistance of "editors" who, in a way, acted as the continuing "salesman" for these ideas. The same can be said for ideas born in think tanks that are inter-related or political organizations, etc, through the meeting of people in real spaces, exchanging ideas. Baring out Gladwell's theory that it is in the physical, real time meeting of people that works to move ideas and, in the case of "high risk" activism, like revolution, move it out into the open.

What the new paths of "social media" allow people and ideas to do is leapfrog over these conventional paths of inter-connectivity. All it requires is a search engine and a keyboard. Someone can virtually search for something of interest, find it and latch on without ever having first shared those ideas with anyone else in the physical world. Allowing these ideas to take on a power of their own.

Eventually, these groups or ideas become so large that they "meet" in cyberspace as one anonymous person leaves a link here or a link there, driving people to these sites and bringing them together. Where, in the virtual world, they develop these close friendships and the strength and courage to act upon it in the real world. Hundreds and thousands who never personally met.

In the case of Egypt, that is how the protesters were first able to pull in enough people to begin the movement. What was first the leapfrog of ideas to groups, became the impetuous for numbers to come out, on their association in the virtual world alone. In some cases, their actions mirror Gladwell's concept that personal association, face to face, helped motivate people. Certainly, friends in the real world connected via Facebook and Twitter, shared these links and then spoke among themselves in the virtual world and real world to convince themselves of the necessity to act. On the other hand, there were many individuals who, out of fear of ridicule or reprisal from friends, family and the authorities, spoke not a word in the real world, but were motivated to act by their cyber-connection alone.

As Gladwell suggested in Tipping Points, eventually an idea takes on a power of its own, the shear numbers driving people to join and be part of this "something" that was going on. It happened both in the virtual world as well as in the real world. In the real world, those who had cooperated in the virtual were eventually forced to come to the streets, but it was their virtual connections that provided the numbers. As most observers have seen, the number of participants becomes a power of its own: strength in numbers, building courage to act by the shear momentum of "the mob". It was these numbers that then called down the masses of working poor to join them, people they did not know, but seemed to share their own concerns.

Finally, the thing that is missed by observers such as Gladwell and others that Eltahawy says dismissed them as "Facebook generation" pressing the "like" button. Aside from the fact that this little button, if pushed enough times, can drag an idea to the top of the list of a search engine for any anonymous, unconnected persons to find, it was the speed of the connections, both in the speed of the internet as well as the speed at which people can connect, that gave rise to this revolution.

Gladwell is correct to say that Egypt's revolution did not need social media to have a revolution. Eventually. It would have found any number of paths to connect as was the case in the American Revolution through pamphlets, newspapers and groups of people. Or, the case of the Bolshevik Revolution that came together in the tea houses, read books, published newspapers and pamphlets, etc, etc, etc. Even the Polish Solidarity movement that found its path through meetings and sermons in the Catholic Church. The difference is in the speed at which the Egypt revolution grew and reached "the tipping point".

Eighteen days.

It took years, some reading history would say "decades", for the American revolutionaries to talk, connect and share ideas until they were able to reach a point of "revolution". Likewise, the Bolsheviks languished in their basements and tea houses, slowly gathering adherents and building organizations to take on the establishment, building numbers of ever growing dissenters, making marches and spreading their revolution.

In Egypt, the problems and base groups lingered in the background, disorganized and incapable of growing because they lacked the ability to get their message out and meet in real time with other like minded people. People who no longer reached for paper pamphlets and newspapers, but read and spoke on the "net". Social media allowed them to leap frog over their predecessors in revolution. It did not take decades nor even years to grow their numbers once they were able to connect. It took two years, if we look at Elataway's narrative. Starting in 2008 with the April 6 Youth Movement to build some numbers to begin the real discussion of ideas.

Then came June 2010 with the death of Khalid Said. It took only six months from that moment to create a network of tens of thousands. Leapfrogging their historical counterparts. Then came the call for the Jan25 protests that drew in nearly a hundred thousand "friends" on the site, not including the thousands of others who connected through the "friend" of a "friend" of a "friend" on the internet. A march, the size and plurality of which would have taken previous "protesters" months to plan, organize and act, took only a few days. The speed of that organization the establishment of "old men" could not match.

The regime fell eighteen days later. Yes, even after it had cut the internet because the "real world" connections that Gladwell suggests is necessary had been built, but not before the virtual connections had paved the way.

Could Egypt have had a revolution of the "youth" without social media? History tells us that, yes, they could have. Eventually. A youthful middle class searching for the path to improve themselves past their parents' station and into the environs of the ruling class who hold their power through restrictions, laws and regulations, will eventually find its way. However, Egypt would not have had a revolution now, in 2011, without it.

That is the power of the internet and Social Media. As some have suggested, dictators should fear it because what they do not allow in the open space of the real world, can move at lightening speed in cyberspace.

As in the way of Egypt when they cut the internet, there is always the cell phone.

Summary only...

The Hated West, Freedom, Democracy, Iraq and the Middle East: Irony

Maysoon Shaladi (ex-pat, living in UK tweeting about Libyan uprising, angry with lack of western coverage or pressure on the situation, paraphrasing Lincoln)

Those who deny freedom to others deserve it not for themselves

If there was any irony to be had from the current multiple situations in the Middle East, it is the continuing reviling of the dratted "West", demands for western interference in the name of obtaining democracy, damning the west for supporting dictators, denigrating the "late" coming of western governments to supporting their cause even as they scream for them to stay out now, using twitter and facebook (a western invention only available due to the freedom to think and create) to stoke their revolutionary fire, all under the guise of democratic aspirations (arguably a western Greco-Humanist-Christian concept though I am certain I have had an argument with an Islamic acquaintance in the past who insisted it was an Islamic invention).

I have to say that with some of my own irony even as I support their democratic aspirations with the full knowledge that some of my friends may not get exactly what they expected without another fight, as other alleged democratic uprisings are likely to result in some unfriendly and dangerous situations coming to fruition (Yemen comes to mind immediately) without true democracy.

Neither can I forget the absolute reviling of the West over Iraq and the final institution of democracy (yes, at gun point) that did exactly what it was supposed to do: give an Arab people their own government and the Middle East the idea that people CAN rule themselves democratically, regardless of race or religion. That it was the dreaded Neo-Con (alleged Jewish conspiracy still being bruted about in reputed and allegedly non-partisan ME news sites) that expressed that idea and pushed leaders in the ME to institute some form of liberality and representation in their governments.

While it cannot be said that the Neo-Cons started the idea brewing in the minds of people in the ME (it has been there for awhile, considering their long interaction with western democracies and various attempts at establishing representative governments), it was the dreaded head Neo-Con, president Bush, that pushed, prodded and pulled these governments to let off some of the levers of oppression in the recent past. The Domino Theory of Democracy. How ironic is it that some writer for an ME news organization actually says that the Neo-Cons did not believe that Arab, Islamic people were ready for democracy.

Bush left, the Neo-Cons went out of power and the realpolitik folks took over and were left holding the bag. Apparently crossing their fingers on both hands that that little sortie into meddling had little effect or could be contained. Dictators sighed with relief and tried to go back to business as usual.

Freedom is the fire in the minds of men. Now it's a conflagration.

Of course, the ME is all abounding with fears that the west (new friends) is trying to "steal" Egypt's revolution by rushing in with assistance post mortem. That is ironic and extremely humorous in a gallows sort of way. Sorry, but we've been there all along and in the way of all friends, not everything we did seemed in our friends' best interests as, with all friends, there is always some kind of ego and self interest apparent.

Case in point, even as a "late comer", had the western nations not warned off Mubarek, the Egyptian Military and now the Bahrain government from smashing freedom of expression, the blood shed in these nations would have been so much more worse (for sure, the Bahraini's would not have pulled back their military and allowed the people to occupy the square again after the last few days of attempted violent suppression). We don't have the same power in Yemen or Libya, nor am I sure we want to exercise it in light of who might be demanding the overthrow of the government.

I know...ironic. Or, to our ME friends, hypocritical. I can't wait until they have to make their own decisions about which way their country goes and how often they must compromise in the name of their own security. It is, ironically, easier to blame outsiders and some dictator for the things we are not directly responsible for. Not so easy when we have no one to blame but ourselves.

On the other hand, it wasn't American blood being spilled and we certainly did not occupy Tahrir or Pearl Square in the name of the people. It is their revolutions after all. We are merely interested by standers, pushing and pulling, praying for the best even as we look on with extreme trepidation and the sure knowledge that we can do little to help or hinder in either direction, but expending great political capital and possible future security to do. So that, in the end, we are doing as people have so ironically screamed that we are not: standing by our basic principles of freedom and democracy.

One can't give too much credit to the Neo-Con faction I suppose. The idea that freedom and democracy would counter any despotic and oppressive idea was imagined a long time ago by people much more thoughtful and intelligent than we poor substitutes. It was brought forth as a foreign policy by Truman and nursed throughout the Cold War in various forms with much back and forth on its support and many, many mis-steps along the way. Even the Great Liberator Reagan was not adverse to supporting despotism in the short run while pushing freedom some place else.

The entire idea was that short of actual military interference, people would naturally come to that conclusion by simple interaction with western democracy through social, political and economic means. Hence, the fall of the USSR and the eastern block. It has been and continues to be a very long, slow road with plenty of twists and turns that prevent a reliable predictor of the future, but it is the long view of democratic nations.

And, the irony of all ironies is that, with every creation of a democracy, with every inch forward of freedom, the US and other nations will see their power diminish as new competition arrives in the form of newly freed minds and economies with states working towards their own interests. Shooting ourselves in the foot and destroying the idea of American Exceptionalism for the basic principle:

"all men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness"

Yes, ALL MEN (and women, too). There was never such a grand idea with the such a potential, inherent self-destruct mechanism.

It is, of course, bad form to expect any gratitude for a supposedly selfless gift (more irony as it isn't exactly selfless; the hoped for purpose is to expand alliances, open markets and create over arching security, but that is another post). We are ever humble in the face of Liberty (yes, yes, I said "humble") and the sure knowledge that it is the Free Will and a thinking brain given by our common Creator that provides us the basis democratic government (more irony as my atheist friends would insist that mind was created through eons of natural evolution, but that, as I said before, is another post).

So, with all of the irony that is inherent in this rambling post, I leave the (paraphrased) words of a great western actress, Betty Davis, instead of "your welcome" or even "congratulations" (as in a previous post) to our newly liberated friends and those struggling for something similar.

"Fasten your seat belts. It's going to be a bumpy ride."

Summary only...

Revolution in the Middle East: Rebirth of Pan-Arabism?

Reading an interesting article from Al Jazeera. The author, Jaswant Singh, suggests in his opening paragraph that this is the re-emergence of "pan-Arabism". That the revolutions are a show of Arab Unity.

In the days and weeks ahead, there could arise occasions when the news from Cairo is not uplifting, but let us never forget that Egypt has taken a giant step, which in reality is a giant step for all Arabs. After all, Egypt is the heart, brain, and nerve center of the Arab world. True, it once spawned the radical Muslim Brotherhood, but it also gave birth to Islamic socialism and anti-colonialism, Arab unity, and now a democratic affirmation of the people's will.

That is an odd take on the situation. The truth, when looking close enough at each of the subsequent revolutions, seems very far away from Arab Unity.

Pan Arabism was the idea that the nations of the Middle East, largely populated by "Arabs" and sharing a single faith, Islam (with it's multiple sects based on various Islamic jurisprudence, but let's not get into that) and one similar language (disrespecting indigenous languages or dialects) would unite to create an Arab Republic. Based on socialist-Islamic-democratic ideas, this Republic would create a political and economic giant that could compete with the various economic powerhouses of the time (USSR, United States, Europe). Most importantly, pan-Arabism would overthrow colonial powers and throw off western influence.

Pan Arabism enjoyed it's Hay-days in the mid sixties, barely getting off the ground and taking its last breath after the Six Day War with Israel. The rivalries for power over any such Arab Republic could never compromise enough nor could the realities of the real socio-economic necessities of the states depend only upon themselves. Most of these states had little in the way of natural resources to establish any industrial base besides oil, some states having more than others. A republic would require those states to share their wealth in some manner. That was not going to happen.

Are the revolutions from Tunisia to Egypt to Bahrain, Libya and Yemen the new "pan-Arabism"? No.

They certainly share some unique similarities such as peaceful protests, demands for a more representative government and despots ranging from incredibly corrupt and murderous (such as Gadaffi in Libya and Saleh in Yemen) to "despot light" (such as Bahrain), but the people involved are so disparate and their reasons unique to each of their situations that it is hard to envision this as some sort of new Pan Arabism. In fact, it is likely that these situations will both contract pan Arab state cooperation and increase it, for a time, leaving the states very much separate entities whose cooperation will still be determined by the circumstances of each situation.

For instance, Egypt is largely Sunni Muslim with Christian and Shia minorities. Egyptians see themselves as a group of people, powerful within their own right and with their own economic and political position to maintain. They are hardly likely to want to fall in with the Saudi government on all fronts. Especially now that they are democratic and Saudi Arabia is not.

Saudi Arabia will want to influence how Egypt leans in the Middle East so they will, undoubtedly, funnel large sums of money through various social and religious programs. Largely to keep Egypt from heading into the Iranian camp. Iran will do the same in the hopes of pulling Egypt towards their own sphere of influence, but it is even harder to see that occurring. Egyptians view the Iranians as both oppressive and possibly fanatical. The question will be whether the new Egypt will comprehend their unique place between these two rivals as a very real, potential power broker in the Middle East.

Far from shifting power into the hands of these two houses, it may shift completely towards the country on the Mediterranean Sea.

In Bahrain, the demand for political representation has only its similarities in that parts of society are excluded or limited in participation. However, those who have been limited in Bahrain are the Shia majority, making this a sectarian issue.

While the protesters in Bahrain have taken their cue from Egypt by largely "peaceful" demonstrations, they are not Egypt or Egyptians. They are not largely "cosmopolitan" in their views nor is their an overwhelming "liberal" demand to their protests. Few are seeking to over turn Sharia law nor liberalize the economic infrastructure. They just want to have their voices heard in the political arena and have their very local concerns about government heard and acted on.

Further, representation within the government is hardly likely to pull them towards any unity with other "Arab" nations. They have their own indigenous, social identity. Expressed in their protests are definite over tones of nationalism (witness protesters in each nation carrying their national flag, painting their faces with their national flag colors, etc), but we aren't talking about "Arab" nationalism. We are talking about "Bahraini" nationalism. As we can talk about Egyptian nationalism and Tunisian. That hardly opens the way for a new "Pan Arabism". In fact, democratic governments are usually overwhelmed far more with their local concerns and addressing their constituents direct needs such as jobs, education and security.

As far as Libya and Tunisia go, their populations are much more religiously conservative than their Egyptian neighbors. Overthrowing their dictators who have used an amalgam of secular, socialist and Islamic rule isn't more likely to pull them towards liberality, an issue that Egypt will now struggle with, but more likely to pull them towards conservative Islamic rule. The only real opposition that has existed in these nations for decades.

What we may see in the way of cooperation between these states will be three fold: 1) supporting democratic governments between them as a bulwark against the influence of non-democratic, Middle Eastern States (including Saudi Arabia and Iran) and overt western influence as they seek to establish their national identities; 2) economic cooperation; 3) security cooperation (see number one).

The most influential in the short run will likely be one and two with emphasis on #2: economic cooperation. If Egypt and Bahrain can stabilize quickly, there is a potential that new economic doorways will be opened as Libya (if Gadaffi can be overthrown) and Tunisia seek to improve it's infrastructure and economic conditions. Everything from technology to roads to agriculture will need to be built. If Libya and Tunisia can keep from exploding into sectarian or religious strife and security is largely guaranteed, Egyptian and Bahrain investors could see ample opportunities to develop businesses in these nations.

The major hindrance, beyond potential security issues in these nations, would be what resources or sources of wealth does Libya and Tunisia have that would lure investors and builders? They do have one excellent resource: a cheap labor pool that would be happy to improve their economic situation by any amount.

Then there is Yemen. It is difficult to see that Yemen would become any sort of democracy in a post Saleh era. Out of all of the so called "democratic revolutions" in the Middle East, Yemen is the least to actually represent it. This is about tribal areas that differentiate widely from each other attempting to gain their own power, not install democracy. We're talking about warlords in the south and despotic wannabe's in the north, each with its own tendency towards Islamic fundamentalism.

Still, while each of these "revolutions" is taking place in "Arab" countries, this isn't about an Arab identity. This is about Tunisian, Egyptian, Bahraini identity with a whole lot of tribalism thrown in to the rest of the states. A new era of Arab cooperation is not being born here. It is a new era of people in nations demanding that their nation represent them in all of their various forms and desires.

What these new nations will do with that representative government, the world awaits with bated breath.

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