Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part II - Trajectory

Welcome Protein Wisdom and Blackfive visitors


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Looking around the internet, one of the main questions continues to circle around the three wounds that Pat Tillman received to his "forehead" as indicated by the ME. His report and interview also indicates that the three wounds were within a 2" to 3" grouping.

Most of the internet questions seem to be generated from the idea that there was one shooter. Also, from the perceived wisdom that a fully automatic weapon could not place three rounds in a limited area. Finally, that the movement of a body, either from already being in motion (ie, walking, running, standing up or sitting down) or put in motion from a GSW is looked at as effectively canceling the ability of a shooter from placing rounds into the same location. One commenter said that, if he could know the number of shots fired in a general location, the probability of more than one round striking the same target could increase.

The first question cannot be full answered as the rounds that actually killed Tillman are not available for ballistic testing nor can be evaluated to see if they are even different calibers. Keeping in mind that this was a battle scene in hostile territory, that forensic scientists for such battle field analysis are not immediately available to secure a location and search (as one would expect in a civilian setting) and that the wounds were such that the bullets nor fragments were contained within the cranial cavity, it should not be surprising that the question remains unanswered except for the inconclusive testimony of those involved. Although, the CID did review the death site and was able to evaluate the trajectory of the incoming rounds based on the impact to the surrounding area.

The remaining questions are also best answered by the examination of the "kill zone" that was conducted by several groups including the final CID in March 2006. The following images are low grade black and white images from the PDF files provided by the FOIA. These are found here, pages 193 and 194. I have enhanced one of the photographs by simply adding color indicators where the black and white indicators were on the originals (which can be viewed at the above link; click images to enlarge).



In this photo, the "D" marks where "Thanos", the AMF attached to Tillman's fire team, was located at his death, head pointing down hill. The red pin points indicate small arms impact points on the rock just to the right and in front of Tillman's final position indicated by the "A". Note the tight grouping of rounds that impacted the rock. This would indicate that the shooter or shooters had the position "dialed in" and had excellent weapons control. There are twenty two (22) impact points on the rock, not including the wounds on both "Thanos" and Tillman. Tillman received between four and 10 rounds directly. The final number is unknown due to the unavailability of his body armor and MOLLE for examination. This number is based on the fragment wounds he received in his upper extremities from the damaged flash bang and the eyewitness that had examined Tillman's MOLLE and body armor at the base before it was destroyed as well as the three known wounds to his head. Besides at least one round in the flash bang and three in the forehead, the eyewitness believes he saw up to seven (7) rounds in Tillman's body armor. The front plate was "shattered" (pages 147-152).

Of particular interest should be the ground around this rock and the rock to left (right in the photo) with the black cross. This ground is raised behind the rock indicating that it gave minimal cover. O'Neal was lying prone behind the rock. Tillman was found in a "sitting" position, his legs straight out in front of him, torso leaning against the rock with the "X" and head slumped forward.

Based on the limited cover and Tillman's position, it is unlikely he was kneeling or standing at the time he was killed. He was most likely lying prone between the two rocks and then sat up to throw the smoke grenade when he was shot. Again, review of injuries and known equipment indicates that he received multiple rounds, possibly "walked" into his final position. Other rounds impacted a flash bang he was carrying on his MOLLE, the MOLLE itself (worn on the upper body over the "vest" or body armor) and his "forehead". The rock behind him most likely maintained his upright position as he was struck. [update: according to O'Neal's interview(page 428), they received fire for under a minute in sparse cover; Tillman decided to "puff smoke"; firing ceased for a few moments; both determined the danger was over and stood up; they waved their hands trying to indicate they were "friendlies"; firing resumed; both dropped prone on the ground, O'Neal behind the rock and Tillman beside him (possibly laying on his back on the incline beside the rock making more sense of the diagram)[update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; O'Neal and Tillman exchanged a few words, O'Neal said he was praying, O'Neal believes Tillman was injured at that time; then Tillman allegedly yelled, "What are firing at?! I am Pat *expletive* Tillman!" and then O'Neal heard nothing; he thought he heard running water and asked Tillman if he had "urinated" on himself; he received no response; the firing had ceased; he looked over and saw blood running from under Tillman's head; he grabbed Tillman by his armor and pulled him up (probably why the sergeant found him in a half sitting position with his head slumped over)] Eyewitness indicate that there was circular blood splatter on that rock behind Tillman's head which would support the proposition that he was sitting in an upright position in front of the rock when he was killed. [update: this is probably still true; very likely Tillman raised his torso up off the ground in a slight reclining position while he was yelling [update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; possibility that he was only struck with one round in the head in that position and additional rounds as he lay dead accounting for close grouping of wounds; the proposition that he was a "stationary" target still holds; looking at the diagram and trajectory lines, this makes even more sense].



These images are not to scale. In other words, you cannot tell how far away the shooter was, nor how high or low in comparison to the position. This image shows Tillman, "Thanos" and O'Neals position looking out to the shooters' position(s). "A" indicates Tillman's final position. "D" indicates "Thanos" position. "C" indicates O'Neal's position. "B" indicates the approximate location of the "small arms fire". The blue lines are the approximate trajectory and the orange outlines are the approximate outlines of the two rocks bracketing Tillman's team's position.

According to the SAW operator, he was scanning the 9 O'clock position when one of his team members yelled, "contact" at 3' O'clock. One or more of his team members performing dismounted security, began firing towards a position on the hill where he believes he saw an Afghani male "Paralleling" the GMV. The SAW operator said that he spun his weapon around and shot two "ten round" bursts into the area to provide "suppressive fire". He believes he was between 200 and 300 meters from his target. CID and previous investigations indicate the position was approximately 200 meters from Tillman's position.

Specifications of the M240B (Squad Automatic Weapon)



According to Field Mannual 3-22-68, the M240B can provide "suppressive" fire up to 1,800 meters; has an effective range of 1,100 meters while mounted on a tripod, 800 meters on a bipod; and "point" (aim/directly on target) 800 meters Tripod, 600 meters bipod. It can fire "sustained" 100 rounds per minute with 6-9 round bursts, 4 to 5 seconds between bursts.

Update: The squad leader in the first HMMVW to exit the wadi or canyon said he fired six (6) rounds (two 3 round bursts) definitely striking and killing the AMF (Afghan Military Forces) that was just in front of and to the right of Tillman's position. He knows this because he was looking through his scope when he did it and positively identified the uniform the AMF was wearing when he was killed. (see trajectory)

A gunner on that same HMMVW was firing an M240b (SAW) using a 7.62mm round. He said he oriented off of his squad leader and the muzzle flashes from Tillman's position, thinking it was the enemy, and fired two (2) bursts of ten(10) rounds into that position. A second gunner on that same vehicle was firing a M249 using a 5.56mm round. He said he also oriented to where the others were firing and placed at least three (3) bursts of five (5) rounds into that position.

In other words, there were so many shooters and rounds going into that position, it would be impossible to know which of the three shooters or weapons actually made the wounds. However, the number of rounds certainly indicates

Conspiracy From Supposition

According to the ME who examined Tillman's remains, he could not verify the distance from which Tillman was shot based on the wounds. He did state that there was no stippling or gun powder residue that would indicate that Tillman was shot from less than 5ft.

It was this statement that was inaccurately reported by most news organizations, including FOX news, working from an AP report.

In the same testimony, medical examiners said the bullet holes in Tillman's head were so close together that it appeared the Army Ranger was cut down by an M-16 fired from a mere 10 yards or so away.

Not only did they extrapolate the number of yards, but the type of weapon possibly used. Two medical examiners interviewed indicated that they could not tell the weapon used, only approximate the round because there were no fragments or other materials to examine to determine the actual size of the round or the weapon.

Page 118, Questions to Medical Examiner 2:

Q: Do you believe all entrance wounds were from the front of Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes
Q: In your opinion, could small caliber rounds such as the .223/5.56 or 7.62 have caused the defect in Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes. The size, characteristics, beveling of the skull, the impact points are more rounded instead of slit like as is on the rear of his head, all of the characteristics were consistent with what I saw during the autopsy of Cpl Tillman.

At no time does the ME indicate what type of weapon used. He only indicates that a small range of calibers could have made the wounds. The M240B fires a 7.62mm round.

The questioning continues regarding distance (Page 119):

Q: During the conduct of this investigation, there are some questions as to the distance in which Cpl Tillman was struck. Can you determine the approximate distance the shooter had to be from Cpl Tillman for him to sustain such injuries?
A: No. But it was not within a few feet. It was not a contact wound or associated with close range discharge of a weapon. When I say "close range" I am referring to withing four to five feet.
Q: Based on your observations, can you eliminate the injuries sustained by Cpl Tillman as close range?
A: Yes.
Q: What about an intermediate wound...5 - 10ft?
A: We don't use such terms in this office. If there was stippling or soot, it may have been within 5ft, but I cannot be sure of distance in this case. These are indeterminate distance gun shot wounds, however, they are not close or contact wounds.

Similarly, on page 27, the investigator asks the same questions, the physician replies that there is no way to tell the exact distance. He believes it was from more than 5ft away because there is no stippling or residue. He does make this statement:

"I cannot give you an exact distance, but I have heard several theories such as .50 weapon was used, or Cpl Tillman was shot from a moving vehicle, or he was shot from 85 meters or further. In my opinion, none of these theories were the case. In my opinion, Cpl Tillman was have been shot from much closer range than 85 meters"

It is the investigator that suggests the range to be 5-10ft away, not the medical examiner. Both Examiners said that they could only say that it was not less than 5ft. There was no evidence or any known way to extrapolate the distance based on the available information and Tillman's condition. At no time do either ME posit a theory on the type of weapon, only the caliber. The AP extrapolates the "M16" based on the purported caliber and their limited knowledge of army weapons.

That report is completely inaccurate and has added to the conspiracy theories already abounding.

The ME does question the grouping and distance provided by eye witnesses because he has never seen three such wounds in such a tight grouping from such as the distance indicated by the shooters and physical report of their location (200 meters). However, he does not present any factual information on which to base this opinion beyond the close grouping. This also seems to work on the theory that there was only one shooter putting rounds into Tillman's position.

The images indicating the number of rounds placed in Tillman's position (between 25 and 40), Tillman's body being held upright and stationary as he was struck, the expertise and ability of the shooter coupled with the M240B's "point range" indicates that it is possible. Update: Not to mention the the squad leader's M4 or the other gunners M249.

The Multitude of Conspiracies

There are a multitude of conspiracies, supposition and misleading stories out there. all of which contribute to the general feeling of the public that somebody is not telling the truth. In today's culture, no proof need to be attached to that "feeling" to make it a lasting damage to people and our society.

I will continue to address known conspiracy theories and inaccurate reports as I find them. The next issue: How facts and bizarre coincidence collides to make a conspiracy.


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Barrage of Fire (one of the few media reports that gets it right - printed in 2004 after initial investigation)

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Going Off the Reservation: Beauchamp and Tillman

One thing that I've learned about blogging, even in a community of like minded bloggers, you are likely to find something that you disagree about. Sometimes rather vehemently.

Recently, both the Mudville Gazette and Blackfive indicated that they were backing off the Beauchamp story, virtually suggesting that their readers do so as well. Though, the end of Blackfive indicated that the TNR part of this story might still be of interest. While I understand their concerns, I disagree that it should just disappear. Not because we need to investigate and find out every truth or fiction involved in his stories, but because The New Republic represents what is wrong with the media today. Not simply the question of ideology or political narrative guiding editorial decisions, but the extremely poor editorial decisions that are leading to the loss of readers and revenue. In short: the media in decline.

Where I really leave the reservation is Blackfive's Uncle Jimbo and Kev speculating about how and who possibly killed Pat Tillman. I think that this was completely wrong and really below the caliber of Blackfive's milblog.

When you understand the hierarchy of blogging you understand the true damage that can result from such speculations. Particularly based on the very limited information available. Blackfive is one of the top Milblogs because it has a past reputation of being straight forward, providing definitive information on things military and continually bringing the story that is the US military at war to the public. They get linked by hundreds, if not thousands of blogs, including other high traffic sites like Instapundit and Michelle Malkin, amongst others.

It is by this linkage, by word of mouth or, more likely, email, that Blackfive's authority and legitimacy is established. Thus, when Blackfive speaks about things military, people listen. And that is why this unfortunate attempt to discover who the shooter was in this tragic event is a terrible mistake by Uncle Jimbo and for Blackfive. When he indicates that he believes he knows who the shooter is and why, people are bound to believe him and spread this information to others. Worse than the speculation is naming the alleged person. Even if this is retracted, the damage is already done. It may put undue attention on this man who was part of the tragedy, but may actually have no culpability beyond being there. It may influence ideas, the investigation and even worse add to the conspiracy that is already attached to this terrible event.

Finally, Uncle Jimbo and Blackfive have just done what they routinely accuse the media of: printing speculation as fact. Even if they retract it, it is already too late. The damage has already been done.

I think that is a lesson they've forgotten.

PS...I took down my piece on Beauchamp and the Blaze of Glory speculation. I have decided that I should live by what I preach. That piece was pure speculation. I did leave up the discussion regarding TNR and how they determined to use his writing. That part of the story is not over yet.

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Thunder Run Correspondent in the Sand Box

David from Thunder Run has got an inside into the Sandbox. He just arrived in Kuwait.

What am I doing in Kuwait? I have travelled here to provide support to an Expeditionary Medical Facility as they switch into sustainment mode. Most of my 20 years in the DoD have been in the support role. I think I have one of the best jobs in the world. My customers are also my heroes.[snip]

Dave, you oughta see it. This place is covered with highly motivated Americans (military, civilian, and contractor). These people have this place running as smooth as glass. They support what is going on up north, and I have never seen more talented and "switched on" people. They are the NEXT GEN. The up and coming generation. These people have their game faces on and they exercise their free will and initiative... to America's advantage. I met with Chief N from Maryland. He was very protective of his people. During a "dog and pony" walk through, I saw him slow down three times and fix three problems on the spot. He was unashamed that he gave non-standard, out-of-the-box solutions right in front of us "representatives from BIG NAVY." I believe he would have bit someone's ass if they had let the system fail. There is no playing games here. I saw no Mickey Mouse crap.

Read the rest and then stay tuned for updates.

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Colby Buzzel Wins Prize

LONDON - A former U.S. machine gunner's irreverent memoir about his year fighting in
Iraq has won the second annual prize for the best book based on a blog.

"My War: Killing Time in Iraq," by Colby Buzzell was to receive the $10,000 Blooker prize on Monday, beating out 110 entries from 15 countries.

U.S. blogging queen Arianna Huffington, a Blooker judge, called Buzzell's book "an unfiltered, often ferocious expression of his boots-on-the-ground view of the Iraq war."

Buzzell, 31, said he would have never written the book had it not been for the encouragement from readers of the anonymous online journal he started in his free time in a war zone.

Read the rest.

I read Buzzell's blog when it was still active. It was some of the most breath taking writing I had read in a long time. Not because it had poetic prose and unbelievably advanced vocabulary, but because it was direct, strident and, despite spelling and grammatical errors, the kind of writing every person wishes they could do: put the reader right there.

Kudos to Buzzell. He was the first victim of stringent blogging OPSEC that I knew of, probably not the last.

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Information War: Strategic Corporal

I found this over at Small Wars Journal: The Strategic Corporal.

I have been thinking very hard on another post that had been up several days ago: religion in counterinsurgency. I have some ideas on how this can be treated. I deliberately did not read any of the forum comments in order to insure my thoughts are exactly that: my thoughts. I'll have something on that soon.

From this post on Strategic Corporals, I did want to point out a few very interesting points:

The military has traditionally divided perception management into two areas and skillsets: public affairs and psychological operations. In brief, public affairs is usually handled like the old-fashioned PR machines of large companies, featuring photo-ops, interviews, press releases and the like. The target audience is generally the US public and public affairs is usually imbued with the notion of telling things as they are, or getting stories out. Psychological operations are targeted toward an enemy, or a given neutral populace, and are meant to make them think a certain way. These two communities have traditionally been taught to never associate with one another due to the differing needs governing their roles. The problem lies at the intersection of the warfighter's need for deception and the public's need for transparency.

Today though, the globalization of all forms of media means that it is more and more difficult to segregate media products for a given audience. With regard to Iraq, this means that any given story, video, interview, or announcement that is accessible via the internet can potentially have four audiences, all of whom will have a tendency to view it differently:

a) Iraqis
b) Muslims elsewhere
c) Americans
d) the rest of the world.

There is much further segmentation within these groups as well. The point is that electronic media can no longer be carefully segregated as to who will view, read, or listen to it.[snip]

I think this is an important part of the entire problem with information warfare. It is actually eons old, we just never addressed it properly. We tried to pretend, largely, that this segregation could exist and we operated (still do) under those premises. Laws were enacted to protect US citizens from the actions of their own government. No one wanted to turn into the Soviet Union or China, two of the largest states where media was (and is) owned, operated and controlled by the government that routinely, and as a matter of policy, propagandize their own populations in order to control them. It is a basic tenent of population control: he who controls the information, controls the people. Or, in layman's terms: knowledge is power.

Of course, it becomes more and more difficult to control when the points of entry for and the promulgation of information becomes so diffuse and simple that a man in Timbuktu can set up a server, connect to a cable, hook up a computer and be sending messages around the world. If he needs to be mobile, he could use a satellite phone and connection to send text, video, or audio around the world (just ask the enemy how easy it is).

By the same token, this makes information easier to return from whence it was sent. The storm over the use of a public relations firm, Lincoln Group, to disseminate information into Iraqi papers, aimed at Iraqi citizens (and possibly the larger region), reached all the way back to the United States and was painted as propaganda. Not even 20 years ago, this would have been a non-issue since the potential for an American citizen to read or hear it would have been nearly nil. In 2005, however, it sparked a congressional investigation.

While the issue was painted as a problem of manipulating "free press" in a country where we are trying to promote democracy and freedom (one of those freedoms being freedom of speech), the underlying problem was that this "pro-American" propaganda made it back to the states and was seen as influencing readers.

Aside from the issues of operational security (OPSEC), the problem with crossing the lines drawn by the law makes the Pentagon and branches of the military averse to risk in this theater which has made it extremely slow in responding to the changing media environment. The fact that the military is now engaging miliblogs and has set up its own YouTube channel, bypassing the middle man of main stream media, shows that someone finally woke up, smelled the coffee, strapped his boots on tighter and took some major risk.

Listen to Jack Holt, chief of new media operations at the Pentagon, at Pundit Radio discuss media relations, YouTube and milblogging. (scroll down for the correct podcast). Read Milblogger Dadmanly on the new AR and the struggle to control and set free information at the same time.

However, the fact is, military and government use of each new information device is not new. The printing press was the original "mass dessiminator" of information. Our own forefathers used the printing press to print "pamphlets" without the official approval (pamphlateers such as Thomas Paine). During the Civil war, the creation of posters and leaflets became a huge business. These printed materials were used both on the homefront to promote the government's ideas, gain support and recruits and pass information about its successes as well as was used throughout the South to convey propaganda for the Union such as copies of the Proclomation of Emancipation, in hopes of changing the face of the war. This continues even today, both on the homefront and in theaters of war around the globe.

Next, the military coupled the new transportation of airplanes with the power of the printing press and dropped leaflets on the enemy during World War I. This also continues to this day. Film became another new media that the military and government used to promote its ideas, often with the cooperation and direct participation of the industry itself producing short films about the war or bringing home images from the front. But, it wasn't until World War II that the new media of film making became extensive enough to be seen to have a direct impact on the support of the war, the conduct of the war and the subjugation of the enemy.

Transistor radios also became a tool of warfare during WWII. Not just in communication within the military ranks, but by dropping them behind enemy lines, to the resistance fighters in France. These were used as both a method of conveying information as well as passing messages. This, also, continues to this day. The military dropped hand cranked radios into Afghanistan along with food, medical supplies and weapons for the population and our allies from the Northern Alliance.

During WWII, radio broadcasts were made by both the enemy and the allies aimed at the opposing nations and their soldiers on the frontline. Also, something that still occurs today.

This propaganda became so pervasive, the government felt compelled to write a law to protect the citizens from any future use or abuse of these tools against the citizens, usurping, as it were, basic tenets of democracy such as transparency in government and freedom of speech.

The cat, as they say, was already out of the bag. New techonologies, including those in aviation transportation, intercontinental phone lines and many more were already beginning to shape the future of information in warfare. The United States could no longer rely on oceans to defend itself from an aggressor, neither could it rely on these oceans and spaces to protect itself from propaganda: either the enemy's or its own. By Vietnam, this phenomena became even clearer with the evening news conveying images of warfare within in three days of an event or incident's actual occurance. The Viet Cong used this new media much more effectively than the US or its armed forces, leaving the VC in control of the story.

Enter satellites, internet and updated phone lines. The paradigm because the imperative.

The second trend is a growing distrust in traditionally manufactured "information." Corporate press releases, press conferences, advertising, and the like are more and more seen as possessing suspect and murky agendas. Sometimes, though not always, new media -- such as blogs, podcasts, and YouTube videos -- overcome these suspicions, possessing as they do a less-polished feel to them. Ultimately many consumers of information mitigate their suspicions by developing something like a personal relationship and trust with the source, whether it is an institution or an individual.
These trends make for a bewildering environment in which to operate. Consider two recent phenomena:

In March, Multi-National Forces-Iraq created its own YouTube channel [see more here.] [snip]

In other words, the MNF-Iraq has decentralized its public affairs to some extent, allowing videos submitted by troops to reach a very wide audience.

At the same time, a controversy recently erupted about the Army's new guidance for posting on message boards, blogging, emailing, sending letters home, or creating a resume. The controversy was due to the fact that the going perception of the new policy was that it was intended to shut down personal blogs by Army members. Apparently this was not the case. Nevertheless, the fact is that within two months of each other, one military agency -- MNF-Iraq -- sought to decentralize its informational goals, while another -- the Army -- sought to put added restrictions or layers of oversight on the informational capabilities of its soldiers.

What is to be done?

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Men of the Pen and Sword

Interview with Milblogger, Doc in the Box about military blogging.

Hat tip Milblogs

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Talking With Heroes: I Was There and Got an Exclusive

Hey! Missed everyone last night at the "talking with heroes" event down in Olathe, Kansas. It was wonderful to meet all of the great heroes, families and supporters. Bob Calvert was a little under the weather, but he pulled through like the trooper he is and made it a fantastic experience.

I will post more about the event and, of course, I have video which will be available in the next day or two.

One big "exclusive" that I was able to pull off was an interview with David Chavaria who is the "behind the scenes" man at JD Johannes' Outside the Wire. David is the co-producer of Johannes' documentary "Outside the Wire" where he followed the expoits of the Marines of Silver Platoon in OIF-III. JD is over in Iraq right now doing video.

David was scheduled to do an interview on Hannity and Colmes at 8:40pm CST Friday night, but I scooped them by two hours. And, they don't have their video up yet for the internet so, while they may beaten me "on air" by six hours, I am going to get out there ahead of the internet curve.

Even before the interview, David and I spent some time talking about blogging, JD Johansens' committment to the Marines and telling their story, and quite a bit about the disparity of reporting in the media (we both agreed it "sucked"; my words, he was much more diplamatic).

I hope you enjoy this video, check out their site and start understanding why military blogging (milblogging) and independent films like Outside the Wire are an important part of the story, filling in the gaps left by professional journalism.



Watch JD's blog for updates directly from Iraq and hit his home page to see an excerpt of the original documentary, "Outside the Wire". I've seen the full version and I highly recommend it.

Check out these stories about the marines in Bad Karmah.

Troops on Patrol
Iraq town returns to normal after raid

These men are a big part of the reason that the Al Anbar province is beginning to turn. It took persistance. It took patience. It took extreme prejudice when it was called on and plenty of improvising, adapting and overcoming. The Marines are some of the best, when it comes to those necessities.

Karmah, where the marines in outside the wire were serving, is a town between Ramadi and Fallujah, two of the hottest (in terms of war) cities in Iraq for the last three years. It is only recently that Ramadi began to turn. Karmah continued to be a tough town full of insurgents and generally unenthused about the marines presence. JD showed what it took to make al Anbar a success story, long before anyone ever thought it would be.

Outside the Wire was fortunate enough to be there to record part of that history.

- May no soldier go unloved

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Military Blogging: Good to Go?

Many sites are talking about the new OPSEC that continues to impose stricter regulations on military blogging (milblogs) that will have an impact. Blackfive (and again) and Milblog from Mudville Gazette indicate that this will be damaging to the genre and, just as important, to the ability to communicate or go outside of the mainstream media for a "balanced" picture.

1) The last point of the communication regarding AR 530-1: "Commands have the authority to enact local regulations in addition to what AR 530-1 stipulates on this topic". I do not think that Blackfive is without experience or knowledge about the culture of the command structure in the military. By its very nature, commands are necessarily cautious in dealing with any type of media, whether it is of a "professional" mode or amatuer bloggers. Controlling information has always been a keypoint of appropriate battle planning, whether it is the withholding of information or the timely release.

I don't think it is inappropriate to deduce that those who are unfamiliar with or even distrusting of information flow that is not controlled by their command structure will feel constrained to put the most stringent interpretation on these instructions restraining bloggers and eventually or with great probability will cause bloggers to be shut down or ordered shut down.

Further, by simply re-issuing this regulation, it will be imparted and implied that blogging is a problem that needs to be addressed. In the minds of both commanders and those who blog or potentially blog, this definitely sends a negative affirmation. [yes, I meant to say "negative affirmation" as that is how this AR is couched - "okay, it happens, but watch your six" is definitely a "negative affirmation"]

I think that we are being obtuse if we do not recognize that probability. A great example about how this works would be to look at any number of inconsistent orders from one base to another, to one unit or another. Take the hat: who can wear a boony hat? Who can't? I distinctly recall early in the war that regulations came out directing the soldiers not to bend or fold their hats in any manner. How many commanders issued orders or implied that boony hats would not be appropriate at all?

Which brings me to #2:

2) I see no where in discussions, in the communication or the regulation itself where commanders will be given appropriate "guidance" about the appropriate monitoring of this media nor it's inherent value, beyond perceived ills of operational insecurity. It is more than a communication device. It is a very important tool in this war and any other war where 24 hour news cycles have a story in and out so fast you cannot digest the reality of it nor place it in its appropriate context.

But, beyond that, it is an organizing tool that has been instrumental in providing support directly to soldiers AND the war.

Whether it is one soldier asking for clothes, shoes and school supplies to help him in the "hearts and minds" campaign in his AO or a company of medics who get special supplies that help save lives or, again spreads good will to the local populace. There is a real and tangible impact. Blog readers have supplied equipment for sniper units or for nascent Iraqi and Afghani forces.

Many of us are aware that it was bloggers that helped provide significant money with soldiers angels for Kevlar blankets and an even greater amount of money (over 100k) for Project Valour IT providing over 1000 voice activated laptops for the wounded. A device that has proven its importance in the recovery of wounded soldiers. Some who have gone on to continue their careers in the military.

This is where this AR and the military continues to fail in recognizing the value of this media and imparting it to the commanders or their forces in general.

As the field of milbloggers are narrowed by these commanders and this AR, so is the ability of the private sector to respond, as it has so often and so efficiently in the past, to the needs of the military in the field, at home and in the hospitals.

This is hardly an intangible side effect, but an organizing principle of milblogging and notable by the few examples I have provided. As a "military support blog", our soldiers' angels blog and, thus, the organization, has benefited greatly from the relationship with these blogs. These benefits have directly translated to benefits for deployed military and their families. Surely a valuable assett, if not partner, with the military in maintaining readiness and even directly impacting the outcome of this war or those of the future.

In closing, if there was one thing I would wish to have conveyed to commanders who will have responsibility for these decisions and oversight, it is the concept that milblogs are more of an assett than a danger. This should be weighed considerably when making decisions about approving or disapproving blogs.

John the Armorer also has some important comments.

I've made this point before in discussions of the subject - the key here is the commander and how he or she defines their Essential Elements of Friendly Information, which define those topics that relate to OPSEC. The fact remains, however, that the reg allows a commander the default position of any item posted to a public forum. [snip]

Most commanders understand a key rule of leadership: Don't give orders you *know* won't be obeyed. Commanders who go medieval on their soldiers regarding this will simply shut down the supportive and thoughtful voices, and leave the battlefield to the angry and disenchanted. Exactly the opposite of what 1st Information Operations Command wants, if they are thinking strategically.

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My Regular Morning Reads

I just thought I would share some of my regular morning reads. Several are blogs that do "round ups" from other military and political blogs that keep me well informed.

In no particular order:

The Thunder Run
Mudville Gazette
Milblog
Castle Arrggh
Jules Crittendon
Pajamas Media
Instapundit
Powerline

It's a lot of reading, but fortunately, I'm speedy. I hope you enjoy.

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Our Allies in Afghanistan: British Royal Marine Commando

Found this at Milblogging.com:

Royal Blue J company on a Mission

Day 10

Rip, roar and havoc. Not a fight. A battle. Fire from the front. Fire from the flanks. Rockets and bullets scything through the air. Up to 30 Taleban in 12 different positions have opened up from close range before we are out of the vehicles. The rear door swings open and we pitch out from the warm womb of the Viking into sudden light, chattering machineguns, explosions and whipping lead: nought-to-ninety in a second on an adrenalin high. Hit the ground. Run. See an empty trench.

Dive into it. To our left one of the open-deck Land Rovers, a mobile machinegun platform is firing withering bursts at Talebs shooting from dunes beyond. Tug is to assault the position with his six Marines. They peel out of cover and take a long run leftwards.

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Gollum in the Green Zone and Other Iraq Stories

Gollum in the Green Zone (February 15th, 2007 - Scroll Down)

So we’re all starting to look like one another… And then there’s the comment that any outsider (that is, person who doesn’t work in our office) makes, pointing out that when they open the door to the office, we all look up from being hunched over our keyboards, Gollum-like (”my precioussssss”), glaring evilly at the hapless intruder, who cringes, if he/she is at all sensitive, and backs out of the room with profuse apologies. Sadly, I believe that I, too, have been guilty of the Gollum hunch and glare…

Badger Six: Badger Down - Prelude

As they rolled in, I found myself instantly irritated with 3-6. I wanted them to refuel. Yes, I know that they had not been out for very long, but you never know what is going to happen out there. I believed we needed to use this chance to reset our logistics situation and I was led to believe they had been given different instructions. Even though I know I was right to ultimately demand they come in and refuel, I regret ever feeling irritated with 3-6.

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Great Day in Afghanistan and Other Nuggets

From Afghanistan Without a Clue:

Great day? Funny story there. Hamid came to Phoenix with us to get lunch, and as I walked back to my hut, I said, “Another Great Day.” Hamid looked puzzled, and I explained my little ritual. Every day I walk back alive makes it a great day.

“You should not worry about suicide bombers or the Taliban,” he informed me. “If God wants you dead, you will die. If not, no worries.”

Read the rest of why it is a Great Day in Afghanistan

The Bigger War

People have laughed at the term “War on Terror.” I don’t. It is simply too hard to define the enemy. They move from country to country, and originate from many different nations. This war is far from over. Even if by some miracle Iraq settled down and became a peaceful, united nation, we are not in the clear. Even if we succeed in Afghanistan, and a thriving democracy emerges, the war isn’t over. These are merely battles in a much bigger war. The troops aren’t coming home for good. It is a virtual certainty we’ll be going somewhere else soon. In my humble opinion.

Lifetime of Experiences

As we were driving home, dodging an unusually thick crowd of both people and vehicles, we cut across the media to avoid a traffic jam and head down the main road into on-coming traffic. Normally this might cause the pulse to race a bit, but we had a nice taxi clearing the path for us. I laughed and said, “Only in Afghanistan” as we tored through muddy, rutted roads trying to get back home. I have to admit, the sheer nuttiness of this place has a certain endearing charm of its own. Of course, after spending almost eight months in the Twilight Zone, nothing seems terribly strange or unusual, just different. Yesterday we drove around the end of the runway, and if you remember yesterdays photo, we found a huge set of landing gear lying in the field. You wouldn’t see that in the States. We tried to imagine the poor pilot who was taking off and suddenly realized some of his landing gear had fallen off. That can’t be a good feeling. If nothing else, this year will have provided a lifetime’s worth of unique experiences.

Afghanistan Without A Clue

I would direct you also to Make A Desert and Call It Peace and a round up of blogs called From the Front

High Protector

Meet Alex, our “high protector”, this dog does more for the War on Terror than many of your fellow Americans. Being our third line of defense, her bark will immediately alert us to any Tango presence. She works in tandem with another “high protector”, Daisy.

Hook, Line and Sinker

Instead of honoring the memory of these fine officers, I will divulge the details of their stupidity so that others may learn from their mistakes. Do not EVER walk up to a suspected IED and inspect it with your barehands….which is exactly what three of the ANP did, one of which was their Intel officer.

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