Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part II - Trajectory

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Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Looking around the internet, one of the main questions continues to circle around the three wounds that Pat Tillman received to his "forehead" as indicated by the ME. His report and interview also indicates that the three wounds were within a 2" to 3" grouping.

Most of the internet questions seem to be generated from the idea that there was one shooter. Also, from the perceived wisdom that a fully automatic weapon could not place three rounds in a limited area. Finally, that the movement of a body, either from already being in motion (ie, walking, running, standing up or sitting down) or put in motion from a GSW is looked at as effectively canceling the ability of a shooter from placing rounds into the same location. One commenter said that, if he could know the number of shots fired in a general location, the probability of more than one round striking the same target could increase.

The first question cannot be full answered as the rounds that actually killed Tillman are not available for ballistic testing nor can be evaluated to see if they are even different calibers. Keeping in mind that this was a battle scene in hostile territory, that forensic scientists for such battle field analysis are not immediately available to secure a location and search (as one would expect in a civilian setting) and that the wounds were such that the bullets nor fragments were contained within the cranial cavity, it should not be surprising that the question remains unanswered except for the inconclusive testimony of those involved. Although, the CID did review the death site and was able to evaluate the trajectory of the incoming rounds based on the impact to the surrounding area.

The remaining questions are also best answered by the examination of the "kill zone" that was conducted by several groups including the final CID in March 2006. The following images are low grade black and white images from the PDF files provided by the FOIA. These are found here, pages 193 and 194. I have enhanced one of the photographs by simply adding color indicators where the black and white indicators were on the originals (which can be viewed at the above link; click images to enlarge).



In this photo, the "D" marks where "Thanos", the AMF attached to Tillman's fire team, was located at his death, head pointing down hill. The red pin points indicate small arms impact points on the rock just to the right and in front of Tillman's final position indicated by the "A". Note the tight grouping of rounds that impacted the rock. This would indicate that the shooter or shooters had the position "dialed in" and had excellent weapons control. There are twenty two (22) impact points on the rock, not including the wounds on both "Thanos" and Tillman. Tillman received between four and 10 rounds directly. The final number is unknown due to the unavailability of his body armor and MOLLE for examination. This number is based on the fragment wounds he received in his upper extremities from the damaged flash bang and the eyewitness that had examined Tillman's MOLLE and body armor at the base before it was destroyed as well as the three known wounds to his head. Besides at least one round in the flash bang and three in the forehead, the eyewitness believes he saw up to seven (7) rounds in Tillman's body armor. The front plate was "shattered" (pages 147-152).

Of particular interest should be the ground around this rock and the rock to left (right in the photo) with the black cross. This ground is raised behind the rock indicating that it gave minimal cover. O'Neal was lying prone behind the rock. Tillman was found in a "sitting" position, his legs straight out in front of him, torso leaning against the rock with the "X" and head slumped forward.

Based on the limited cover and Tillman's position, it is unlikely he was kneeling or standing at the time he was killed. He was most likely lying prone between the two rocks and then sat up to throw the smoke grenade when he was shot. Again, review of injuries and known equipment indicates that he received multiple rounds, possibly "walked" into his final position. Other rounds impacted a flash bang he was carrying on his MOLLE, the MOLLE itself (worn on the upper body over the "vest" or body armor) and his "forehead". The rock behind him most likely maintained his upright position as he was struck. [update: according to O'Neal's interview(page 428), they received fire for under a minute in sparse cover; Tillman decided to "puff smoke"; firing ceased for a few moments; both determined the danger was over and stood up; they waved their hands trying to indicate they were "friendlies"; firing resumed; both dropped prone on the ground, O'Neal behind the rock and Tillman beside him (possibly laying on his back on the incline beside the rock making more sense of the diagram)[update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; O'Neal and Tillman exchanged a few words, O'Neal said he was praying, O'Neal believes Tillman was injured at that time; then Tillman allegedly yelled, "What are firing at?! I am Pat *expletive* Tillman!" and then O'Neal heard nothing; he thought he heard running water and asked Tillman if he had "urinated" on himself; he received no response; the firing had ceased; he looked over and saw blood running from under Tillman's head; he grabbed Tillman by his armor and pulled him up (probably why the sergeant found him in a half sitting position with his head slumped over)] Eyewitness indicate that there was circular blood splatter on that rock behind Tillman's head which would support the proposition that he was sitting in an upright position in front of the rock when he was killed. [update: this is probably still true; very likely Tillman raised his torso up off the ground in a slight reclining position while he was yelling [update to the update: O'Neal later says that the last time he saw Tillman alive, he was on one knee]; possibility that he was only struck with one round in the head in that position and additional rounds as he lay dead accounting for close grouping of wounds; the proposition that he was a "stationary" target still holds; looking at the diagram and trajectory lines, this makes even more sense].



These images are not to scale. In other words, you cannot tell how far away the shooter was, nor how high or low in comparison to the position. This image shows Tillman, "Thanos" and O'Neals position looking out to the shooters' position(s). "A" indicates Tillman's final position. "D" indicates "Thanos" position. "C" indicates O'Neal's position. "B" indicates the approximate location of the "small arms fire". The blue lines are the approximate trajectory and the orange outlines are the approximate outlines of the two rocks bracketing Tillman's team's position.

According to the SAW operator, he was scanning the 9 O'clock position when one of his team members yelled, "contact" at 3' O'clock. One or more of his team members performing dismounted security, began firing towards a position on the hill where he believes he saw an Afghani male "Paralleling" the GMV. The SAW operator said that he spun his weapon around and shot two "ten round" bursts into the area to provide "suppressive fire". He believes he was between 200 and 300 meters from his target. CID and previous investigations indicate the position was approximately 200 meters from Tillman's position.

Specifications of the M240B (Squad Automatic Weapon)



According to Field Mannual 3-22-68, the M240B can provide "suppressive" fire up to 1,800 meters; has an effective range of 1,100 meters while mounted on a tripod, 800 meters on a bipod; and "point" (aim/directly on target) 800 meters Tripod, 600 meters bipod. It can fire "sustained" 100 rounds per minute with 6-9 round bursts, 4 to 5 seconds between bursts.

Update: The squad leader in the first HMMVW to exit the wadi or canyon said he fired six (6) rounds (two 3 round bursts) definitely striking and killing the AMF (Afghan Military Forces) that was just in front of and to the right of Tillman's position. He knows this because he was looking through his scope when he did it and positively identified the uniform the AMF was wearing when he was killed. (see trajectory)

A gunner on that same HMMVW was firing an M240b (SAW) using a 7.62mm round. He said he oriented off of his squad leader and the muzzle flashes from Tillman's position, thinking it was the enemy, and fired two (2) bursts of ten(10) rounds into that position. A second gunner on that same vehicle was firing a M249 using a 5.56mm round. He said he also oriented to where the others were firing and placed at least three (3) bursts of five (5) rounds into that position.

In other words, there were so many shooters and rounds going into that position, it would be impossible to know which of the three shooters or weapons actually made the wounds. However, the number of rounds certainly indicates

Conspiracy From Supposition

According to the ME who examined Tillman's remains, he could not verify the distance from which Tillman was shot based on the wounds. He did state that there was no stippling or gun powder residue that would indicate that Tillman was shot from less than 5ft.

It was this statement that was inaccurately reported by most news organizations, including FOX news, working from an AP report.

In the same testimony, medical examiners said the bullet holes in Tillman's head were so close together that it appeared the Army Ranger was cut down by an M-16 fired from a mere 10 yards or so away.

Not only did they extrapolate the number of yards, but the type of weapon possibly used. Two medical examiners interviewed indicated that they could not tell the weapon used, only approximate the round because there were no fragments or other materials to examine to determine the actual size of the round or the weapon.

Page 118, Questions to Medical Examiner 2:

Q: Do you believe all entrance wounds were from the front of Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes
Q: In your opinion, could small caliber rounds such as the .223/5.56 or 7.62 have caused the defect in Cpl Tillman's head?
A: Yes. The size, characteristics, beveling of the skull, the impact points are more rounded instead of slit like as is on the rear of his head, all of the characteristics were consistent with what I saw during the autopsy of Cpl Tillman.

At no time does the ME indicate what type of weapon used. He only indicates that a small range of calibers could have made the wounds. The M240B fires a 7.62mm round.

The questioning continues regarding distance (Page 119):

Q: During the conduct of this investigation, there are some questions as to the distance in which Cpl Tillman was struck. Can you determine the approximate distance the shooter had to be from Cpl Tillman for him to sustain such injuries?
A: No. But it was not within a few feet. It was not a contact wound or associated with close range discharge of a weapon. When I say "close range" I am referring to withing four to five feet.
Q: Based on your observations, can you eliminate the injuries sustained by Cpl Tillman as close range?
A: Yes.
Q: What about an intermediate wound...5 - 10ft?
A: We don't use such terms in this office. If there was stippling or soot, it may have been within 5ft, but I cannot be sure of distance in this case. These are indeterminate distance gun shot wounds, however, they are not close or contact wounds.

Similarly, on page 27, the investigator asks the same questions, the physician replies that there is no way to tell the exact distance. He believes it was from more than 5ft away because there is no stippling or residue. He does make this statement:

"I cannot give you an exact distance, but I have heard several theories such as .50 weapon was used, or Cpl Tillman was shot from a moving vehicle, or he was shot from 85 meters or further. In my opinion, none of these theories were the case. In my opinion, Cpl Tillman was have been shot from much closer range than 85 meters"

It is the investigator that suggests the range to be 5-10ft away, not the medical examiner. Both Examiners said that they could only say that it was not less than 5ft. There was no evidence or any known way to extrapolate the distance based on the available information and Tillman's condition. At no time do either ME posit a theory on the type of weapon, only the caliber. The AP extrapolates the "M16" based on the purported caliber and their limited knowledge of army weapons.

That report is completely inaccurate and has added to the conspiracy theories already abounding.

The ME does question the grouping and distance provided by eye witnesses because he has never seen three such wounds in such a tight grouping from such as the distance indicated by the shooters and physical report of their location (200 meters). However, he does not present any factual information on which to base this opinion beyond the close grouping. This also seems to work on the theory that there was only one shooter putting rounds into Tillman's position.

The images indicating the number of rounds placed in Tillman's position (between 25 and 40), Tillman's body being held upright and stationary as he was struck, the expertise and ability of the shooter coupled with the M240B's "point range" indicates that it is possible. Update: Not to mention the the squad leader's M4 or the other gunners M249.

The Multitude of Conspiracies

There are a multitude of conspiracies, supposition and misleading stories out there. all of which contribute to the general feeling of the public that somebody is not telling the truth. In today's culture, no proof need to be attached to that "feeling" to make it a lasting damage to people and our society.

I will continue to address known conspiracy theories and inaccurate reports as I find them. The next issue: How facts and bizarre coincidence collides to make a conspiracy.


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part I - How it Begins

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy - The Press at it's Best


Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part III - Cycle of Disinformation

Pat Tillman: Death and Conspiracy Part IV - Withholding Information

Barrage of Fire (one of the few media reports that gets it right - printed in 2004 after initial investigation)

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Officer Found "Not Guilty" in Shooting of Air Man in 2006

"Anonymous" left a link in my original post regarding Air Man Carrion who was shot in February 2006 by a San Bernadino Deputy Sheriff.

Apparently, a jury decided that the officer was "not guilty" for attempted manslaughter and assault with a firearm.

I cannot tell you why the jury decided this. I saw a good portion of the video. as I noted above. I heard the officer. The report on the ruling from the jury says that Carrion can be heard swearing at the officer before he's ordered to "get up" and subsequently shot. I don't know when this "swearing" took place. It was some moments before the shooting. Was that supposed to justify a "not guilty" verdict?

The officer is not out of the clear yet. The FBI may still prosecute this as a Civil Rights Violation.

I hope.

In the meantime, I have nothing against the officer or police in general, but this is a miscarriage of justice. Drinking, car chase, cursing, etc neither excuses nor validates this officers actions.

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Swastikas: Something Guaranteed to Tick You Off

Some jacklegs took flags off of veterans' graves and replaced them with swastikas. Not once but twice.

In Orcas Island, Washington. Now, tell me someone in this little tin hole doesn't know who that probably was. That does not happen here because someone would get their butts handed to them in a tupperware bowl.

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Sympathy for the Devil

Sympathy for the Devil
-K E Henry

You look at me with amazement in your eyes
You don't understand why I can't sympathize
You ask, cajole and, finally, demand
That I forgive, if not forget, at least understand

That men can sometimes be driven to the brink
Beyond the confines of order or ability to think
My idealism you condemn, you call it a sin
There is no virtue, only absolution

You prosletyze and preach that all men of reason
Should make room at the table for every kind of human
While you watch them gnaw on the bones of their victims
With death in their eyes and blood on their hands

The irony of your logic you completely miss
You embrace the murderer, but his victims dismiss
The murderer's grievances become their crimes
They are the sinners, you become deaf to their cries

Because I will not accept your logic as wisdom
You fear me more than you ever feared him
You call me the mirror to the evil we see
I am the same, his twin, you decree

I AM his reflection,
His direct opposition
His dark to my light
His black to my white

The more you try to decipher the abyss
The more I feel compelled to resist
Your demand that I give the devil my sympathy
Just chalk it up to the devil in me.

****************

End the War Right Message, Sent to Wrong address

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Broken Windows Theory: Crime, Small Wars and Trash

I discussed Crime and Small Wars previously. It is important to understand how this works in guerilla warfare (small wars).

Crime fuels the insurgency. It provides it cover. It provides it money. It gives the illusion, along with the over all bombs and firefights (that do not represent the whole of Iraq) of insecurity. In reality, common crimes are as egregious as any acts of terrorism for these same reasons.

If we do not combat the crime, then we cannot combat the insurgency. Insurgents and terrorists are self-sustaining through these acts.

Watch this video on the Battle for Baghdad

Jeff Burris, Times Baghdad Bureau Chief, discusses how the Ba'athists left Baghdad with over $2 billion in stolen money from the Iraq Central bank. Since then, it subsidizes its activities through kidnapping, smuggling, theft, counterfeiting, stealing directly from oil pipelines and gasoline refinery to resale at profit and corruption.

The insurgency cannot be stopped simply by combatting insurgents or even the political process. It must become a losing proposition financially. That means that every crime in Iraq, no matter how small, must be addressed through "policing". This entails picking up people for petty theft, going after kidnappers aggressively (regardless of who they kidnap), painting over graffiti, cracking down on corruption and breaking the blackmarket (largely by providing legitimate means of income for non-terrorist related groups).

Second, real broken windows theory requires more from neighborhoods than turning on the insurgents. In order for people to feel invested in their neighborhood, responsible for its security and hopeful for its prosperity, more than "security" must take place. More than "political reconciliation" must take place. The residents must feel like they are responsible and have ownership.

MNF-Iraq - Muqdadiya: A neighborhood watch program has begun to show signs of success since its formation March 5. The program, which includes 15 villages
throughout the Muqdadiya district, hires local villagers to protect their village and
encourages the population to contact their security forces on criminal or terrorist
activity. “The idea is - to protect the village and to clear it from the armed people and insurgents,” said Dr. Abdulla al Jubouri, the former governor of Diyala and founder of the program.

Since the program began, Jubouri said there have been several signs of success
to include roads free from improvised explosive devices, fighting stopped between
what used to be rival villages, schools are re-opened, electric and water services have been repaired.

In broken windows theory, appearances are actually a very large part of the battle. Visual perception, like first impressions, can change the psychology and, thus, the behavior of a person, even whole communities and those they interact with, including would be criminals and terrorists.

Here is the Broken Windows Theory in Action in Ramadi

RAMADI, Iraq – Improving conditions in Ramadi’s Malaab, or “stadium district,” means shops are opening, schools are teaching and the garbage is piling up on the roadsides. Coalition forces have been largely successful in breaking the stranglehold terrorists held on the neck of this formerly affluent community, but the question has remained: Who’s going to take out the trash?[snip]

Even before the vehicle ban, regular trash pickups were intermittent, threatened with the ever present risk of improvised explosive devices. This, coupled with the travel restrictions, has led to heaps of rubble, garbage and other debris littering the streets. Cosmetic concerns aside, the litter posed a more serious concern for occupying forces and residents alike, improvised explosive devices. [snip]

The formula seemed logical. Cleaning the trash would cut down on hiding places for IEDs, making the area for service members and locals alike. Only now, with a diminished insurgent presence, is this cleanup possible.

“We just finished a large clearance operation, so a lot of people are able to come out now,” Lively said. “There’s a little more security now from the enemy activity, and now today, the civilians have asked us to come out and help them.”

The major catalyst for the cleanup has turned out to be the neighborhood residents themselves. Under the protection of Coalition troops, citizens came out in force eager to clean up their community. Wielding shovels, brooms and rakes, adults and children alike tackled the mounds of refuse with a will. Backhoes and garbage trucks operated by Iraqi police and soldiers cruised the streets, bringing towering heaps of trash to an impromptu landfill.

Appearance makes a huge difference, not only to the residents, but to those who would act criminally or be a terrorist in the area. Prosperous appearances not only give hope to the residents, but take it away from the crimnals and terrorists. Prosperity means that the community cares, is active and is watching. Watched communities are less susceptible to crime, thus, terrorism. Visible police and other security apparatus adds to the over all perception along with not letting any crime be considered "acceptable".

Third and finally, is economics. Jobs must be available. It does not have to be a large manufacturer. Micro-economics can move a communities economic status into that next level, one that is, if not making the people wealthy or even "middle class", providing a sustainable, stable and steady income.

One example of micro-economics can be seen in this book about Beauty Salons in Kabul, Afghanistan.

In Iraqs current climate, this must be a cash business, portable and/or appropriate for Iraq. Should be small businesses that require little cash to start up. This is where NGOs and other charitable organizations would be usefull.

It could include such things as basic services, including trash clean up, for the community. The important aspects is to make crime expensive and honest work lucrative. It has to take the young men off the streets and out of the potential hands of the insurgents.

This is on a micro level. The problem that we continue to have has been the "big" projects, like electric grids, that never could and will not in the near future, provide effective supply to Iraq for years due to its size and condition (however slowly it may be improving, it can't keep up with the demand, even in relatively peaceful and prosperous Kurdistan). It may need to be done, but what people needed was a way to survive immediately and that survivability is not only security, but money. The way they get the money is the question.

Plant an IED? Or, make shoes? Smuggle blackmarket items or manufacture bottled water? (a must in Iraq considering its sewage and water treatment problems).

Run a local five and dime? Or, kidnapping?

That is Broken Windows Theory in a nutshell.

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Crime, Small Wars and Broken Windows Theory

Reading an article Tuesday, I noted some comments that reminded me of a post I wrote in 2005 (right before Kilcullen wrote 28 Articles) that was, if not dead on, at least intuitive to the plan that was developed and is being implemented by Gen. Petraeus starting in January.

Marine General says: Anbar Getting Better

Still, on his visit Conway was told by numerous American commanders throughout Anbar that the tide had shifted against the extremist group al-Qaida in Iraq when Sunni tribal sheiks who previously opposed U.S. forces decided to start cooperating instead.

Some commanders said the extremists' key misstep was to interfere with the locals' black market trading, which al-Qaida co-opted in order to finance itself. Anbar stretches west from Baghdad to the borders with Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

The new cooperation has enabled U.S. forces in recent months to clear extremist elements from even the most violent areas, including Ramadi, and to put more Iraqi forces on the streets, Conway was told. Cooperation by the sheiks also has quickly created a Sunni police force in areas where none existed before.

I wrote in June 2005, Converging War and Tactics

Criminal Rings: These are either an amalgem of many groups or tribal activity with entire tribes participating in one manner or the other. These supply materials, smuggle people, money, information, etc over known smuggle routes. These largely participate based on the money factor and make money from all three of the above noted groups with the largest monetary gain from the Jihadists and Ba'athists. Have no real loyalty or ideological support of any of the first two, though may have more loyalty to tribal groups considering their interactive capabilities.

I wrote the ways to combat these situations:

If I was in the border areas near Iran, Saudi Arabia, Jordan or Syria, I would look at ways of infiltrating the smuggling gangs. These gangs work on money, just like drug, car thief and other gangs in the US. The same are in Iraq, but difficulties may arise because many of these gangs are tribal efforts and infiltrating a tribe would be difficult. Thus, to fight this aspect of the war, money, large quantities of money would have to be available to buy them off. Also, the possibility of making money "legitimately" by helping these smuggling groups develop business opportunities that would net them comparative or near to comparative profits.

An Iraqi blogger (blog gone) made the same complaint about crime and the insurgency at the same time- Iraq Criminals and the Insurgency:

Not just terrorist attacks that has been reduced but even regular crimes, as it seems that part of the operation is focusing on capturing regular criminals who are in addition to their usual criminal activities do form, in my mind, the right hand for the Ba'athists.[snip]

Back to operation lightning, a few days ago I witnessed one of these raids by the IP against some thugs in our neighborhood who were apparently part of a big gang specialized in kidnappings and selling arms.

I wrote a similar concern over at the Small Wars Journal in response to several of Kilcullen's posts on the Surge and the actual strategy that was being implemented (largely, a guerilla war version of "Broken Windows"):

One of the most frustrating parts of the iraq strategy and tactics has been watching the "crime" go unaddressed as if crimes such as theft, hijacking, black market, smuggling, car theft, etc. have little to do with terrorists, insurgents or militia. As in the US, these crimes are usually linked to much bigger crimes and criminal rings. It cannot go unknown that smugglers are likely bringing in money, weapons and even fighters to all three spheres that Kilcullen indicated.

It's also likely that these criminal rings selling blackmarket goods are using the money to fund all three of the spheres (insurgent, terrorist, sectarian violence) or being "shook down" for "protection money" that also goes towards larger acts.

Men and boys loitering on the streets, painting graffiti, etc are most likely to either a) be part of the local criminal/terrorist activity or b) susceptible to blandishments or money to participate in some small way including acting as look outs, transporting money, weapons and people, etc, etc.

All of this talk of crime and its effects might seem petty in regards to the "real shooting war" with the guerillas, but I assure you, it is a very important part of the "perception of security" as well as "battling insurgents".

Insurgents have to fund their activities like everyone else. There are only three ways to fund an army: a) pillaging resources and supplies from the local community (sometimes referred to as "foraging", but in this instance, more like "pillaging" as thought of during medeival warfare and movement of armies) or b) commerce (legitimate or otherwise) or c) underwriting by outside nations or actors. Or, in this case, a little of all three. Some more than others.

Illegitimate commerce is the most practical way for an insurgency to fund it's local activities through co-oping blackmarket activities. There are no taxes, they set the prices and their market is boundless in a depressed, war time economy. In the case that was noted above in the "Marine" article, these tribal gangs may be totally in the pocket of the insurgents (such as the six tribes that have not yet pledged to the Awakening Council) or, as noted, being pushed out once they had acquiesced to demands or agreements with the insurgents. In short, the insurgents have pushed out the "middle man".

In another Small Wars Journal article - Iraq's Real Civil War, Bing West wrote:

In Anbar, AQI became the occupier, shaking down truck drivers and extorting shop owners. In the young sheik's zone, AQI controlled the fuel market. Each month, 10 trucks with 80,000 gallons of heavily subsidized gasoline and five trucks with kerosene were due to arrive. Instead, AQI diverted most shipments to Jordan or Syria where prices were higher, netting $10,000 per shipment and antagonizing 30,000 shivering townspeople. No local cop dared to make an arrest. The tribal power structure, built over centuries, was shoved aside. Sheiks who objected were shot or blown up, while others fled.[snip]

Led by Sheik Abu Sittar, who has called this an "awakening," the tribes believed they were joining the winners.

Politics in Baghdad have swirled around reinstating former Baathists to their prior jobs, thereby supposedly diminishing the insurgency. The central government, though, has given Anbar such paltry funds that jobs are scant, Baathist or not. In Anbar, reconciliation theories count far less than that eternal adage: Show me the money.

When the sheiks delivered thousands of police recruits, they consolidated their patrimonial power by providing jobs, plus pocketing a fee rumored at $400 paid by each recruit. The tribal police then provided security that permitted American civic action projects profitable to contractors connected, of course, to the sheiks.

You can read the rest of what I wrote in 2005 Converging War and Tactics, including thoughts on what is now called PiTTs (Police Transition Teams) and MiTTs (Military Transition Teams). I also suggest reading Tipping Points and this original post on Broken Windows Theory to understand parts of the strategy that must be implemented in order to "win".

A big part of this is going to be putting together the "connections" for the criminal and tribal rings, both inside and outside of Iraq. Another aspect would be to implement an organized crime team and system (computer or other) that tracked these connections and was accessible. I believe we have obviously done something of this nature in order to determine those tribes that would be most willing to work with us. It was a similar method that was used to capture Saddam. Basically, by identifying the people around Saddam and then making a simple organization chart. In fact, they had originally tried to find Saddam through using a complicated computer tracking system that took in thousands of pieces of information, but turned out to be unusable due to the amount and inability to correlate so many points.

It turned out that the simplest connections (tribe and family - like Occam's razor) were the correct answers.

In this case, I believe it would be appropriate to take the next step in undercutting the insurgents financial support by looking over the organized crime connections of the tribes and working to undermine or shut it down. That will require both "policing" and "economics".

Another important aspect that Bing mentions and has to be worked over is the committment and follow through of the Central government in Baghdad to the Sunni al Anbar tribes for reconstruction and money. The money and committment must come from Baghdad. If Baghdad does not make the committment, then there is no reason for the Sunni's to committ to the government. They need protection, both from Al Qaeda and from the Shia extremists who are "cleansing" the Sunni, blame the AQI attacks on the Sunni and who want to realize the total government control of Baghdad and Iraq. The Shia extremists, as portrayed by al Sadr, want to insure the Sunni are weak so that they do not ever have to fear their return to government and power over the Shia.

In "Broken Windows", when New York cleaned up its crime and criminals, it took six years. It took numerous forays into the same neighborhoods, over and over. It took committment. It rolled from neighborhood to neighborhood in slow motion. And many times, people despaired it would ever work. It required doing all of the "little things" and making them as important as the "big" if not more so.

In Iraq, it is not the things that you see on TV everyday. It is not the shootings or bombings, it is not the street to street, house to house battles or helicopters being shot down or shooting into buildings full of insurgents. though, as each neighborhood is taken or its control by insurgents challenged, battles will take place in Baghdad; the battles that we expected on April 10, 2003 are taking place April 10, 2007.

Read also some general comments by Malcolm Gladwell on "Tipping Points". Pay close attention to his comments on "memes as a virus". It paricularly reflects another posting at Small Wars regarding IEDs: Viral Targeting of IED Social Networks. Also, a brief discussion by Gladwell on "Yawns" and contagious diseases.

Really, if you haven't read Malcolm Gladwell's Tipping Points you are way behind the learning curve for this strategy.

Quick review of the Tipping Points reading guide.

18. The Power of context infers that epidemics are sensitive to the conditions and circumstances of the times and places in which they occur. Are certain individuals more sensitive to their environment than others? Think of examples of behavior as a function of social context. How often or to what extent does the environment dictate your behavior i.e. your conduct when at the opera versus being at a baseball game?
19. The Broken Windows Theory argues that crime is the inevitable result of disorder. It suggests that crime is contagious. Do you agree or do you think this risks excusing a criminal’s culpability?
20. Most conservative theories say that the criminal is a personality type whereas the Broken Windows theory and Power of Context suggest the opposite – the criminal is actually someone acutely sensitive to his environment and who is prompted to
commit crimes based on his perceptions of the world around him. Which theory do you believe?

Cross referenced at the Castle and Thunder Run

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