Saturday, April 15, 2006

Ivory Tower Stonewall

Well, I've said little on this subject and I should have. 9/11 was a turning point for me. I have now learned more than I ever want to know about Islam and the Middle East. I know more about the cultural disparities as well as any likeness of common humanity than I ever knew before. I have learned who the Taliban were, how they came to power, cultural and religious beliefs that mirror bin Laden and just how terrible their rule was in Afghanistan.

In this situation, with the Taliban spokesman being provided a Visa to the US (a primary issue here that I would like an explanation from the State Department exactly how that happened and why this fellow is still in the US; did he give us information in exchange for coming here for protection? I'd like to know since that may change my perception of the situation, on the otherhand, knowing may compromise intelligence and security issues so we are in a connundrum) and Yale gives him a free education, without good information on how this came to be, I must submit that I feel rather appalled if not down right angry at both the State and Yale.

Yale's limp response is meant to defray the situation and pray that the questions die down and don't effect alumni donations. But, reading about Kathy Bailey and Margaret Pothier trying to get a response as both a family member of a 9/11 victim and the mother of a student who paid over $150,000 for their daughter to attend, one would think that Yale would go a little further in reaching out and clarifying the situation.

But, that's not what's happening. They are pretty much playing the waiting game, hoping that other issues will come up and give them cover. I think they owe a serious explanation for this apparent lapse in moral clarity, sympathy and understanding.

Read this article and you'll understand why, after all this time, though I've said little, it stays on my mind.

A 9/11 survivor asks Yale to explain why it admitted the Taliban Man.

From my perspective, this is tantamount to Yale admitting Goebbels or Yoshimoto in 1942 and telling us that we should have them here so we can "learn" something from them and they can learn about global conflicts. I found that statement interesting because the first thought that came to my mind is how many of these people come to our universities, get educated in chemistry, engineering, computer systems and geo-politics, only to turn around and go back to the Jihadists as well educated bomb makers, propagandists or researchers hoping to figure out how to make, store and use enough chemical weapons to kill thousands of people.

Yes, I still remember the video from Afghanistan that showed AQ testing ricin or sarin on a bunch of dogs in cages; watching them die slow, painful and ghastly deaths; I also remember that the Islamist like Hashemi see us as dogs to be killed. Frankly, I'm sure that I don't want to "understand" anyone like that or the "anger, bereavement" or whatever else some of the Yale speakers on 9/16/2001 talked about as excuses for the attack (and that is what they are: excuses).

In all honesty, I'm not sure Yale can say anything that would make me "understand" their decision accept that they were actually doing it as a payoff for any intelligence this guy gave our country. Of course, Hashemi's life would be in danger, but I'm not feeling very compassionate about that, all things considered. If he was part of that, he would have gotten a new name and identity. So, as much as I would hope for that sort of situation, knowing then that Yale was actually assisting with our efforts by providing part of a deal, I doubt it with all seriousness.

So, we're back to square one. What the hell was Yale thinking? All of these universities must think they are a world unto their own and can operate within this country as their own country, disregarding the people wherein they reside and trying to turn out good little indoctrinated folks who they call "educated".

What the hell was the State Department thinking? It seems like these folks should be saying something as well and maybe some heads should roll.

I'm a tax payer. I watched the towers fall and the Pentagon burn and smoke roll from the field in Pennsylvania. I am a US citizen. I remember that the Taliban refused to give up Osama and that they are now killing our people and helpless Afghani who only want to live and prosper. Does Yale or Hashemi have any comment about the Taliban who are killing teachers and blowing up schools (which they did way back before we were there as well) right now so that boys and girls cannot get educated like Mr. Hashemi and learn to help their country?

I'm disgusted. I hope Yale Alumni and other donors make it plain to Yale that they are equally disgusted.

As for the State Department, I think I will write a letter because I find this breach of public trust and safety more than disgusting, I find it criminal.

A Suicide Bomber Was Closing In...

Reading Michael Yon on Friday, I noted in his article he was on his way to Lashkargar, Afghanistan. He talked about the poppy fields and the base they were building for the British who are taking over the area. He discussed the security issues there. At the end of his post, he talked about feeling that he wasn't very safe and that he was right, a suicide bomber was closing in. That was Friday, April 14th.

As a note on how slow some of the news travels from this place, the AP reports today (Saturday) that:

Elsewhere in Helmand, a Taliban suicide car bomber rammed a British military convoy in the provincial capital of Lashkar Gar on Friday, wounding three British soldiers and one Afghan national, coalition officials said.


But, the thing that he didn't discuss was also telling since its probable he knew what was up before hand:

SARTAK, Afghanistan - Security forces backed by U.S.-led coalition helicopters attacked a suspected Taliban hideout in southeastern Afghanistan, sparking an intense battle that killed 41 rebels and six police, a senior official said Saturday. [snip]

Ullah said Afghan police surrounded Sartak, about 25 miles southwest of Kandahar, on Friday morning and asked villagers to evacuate, but some were still inside their homes when the fighting broke out.[snip]

The violence also is a growing concern to other nations contributing troops under the mandate of NATO, which is doubling its current force of 10,000 troops to about 21,000 by November, as it gradually assumes command of all the international forces in the country. Some 6,000 mainly British, Canadian and Dutch troops have started moving into the rebellious southern provinces.


I'd stay tuned to Michael's site if you want to get a good picture of the Afghanistan situation, or, as we who watch call it, "the forgotten war". The battle for Iraq dies down and Afghanistan starts heating up. It appears the mujihadeen feel its safer to go to Afghanistan now to fight the much smaller forces arrayed there than to go head to head with our boys in Iraq. This is a multi-front war and we should not forget that.

Friday, April 14, 2006

Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency

I was perusing Michael Yon's revamped site when I came across this great little gem: Fundamentals of Company Level Counterinsurgency. I'm not sure if anyone on the mil-blog ring has discussed it at any length (I can't remember anyway), but I thought I would point to it and indicate some items I found very interesting considering other posts here and around concerning our current counterinsurgent activities in Iraq and Afghanistan.

According to the bio on the writer:

Dr. David Kilcullen served 21 years in the Australian Army, commanded an infantry company on counterinsurgency operations in East Timor, taught tactics on the Platoon Commanders Battle Course at the British School of Infantry, served on peace operations in Cyprus and Bougainville, was a military advisor to Indonesian Special Forces, and trained and led Timorese irregulars. He has worked in several Middle East countries with irregular and paramilitary police and military units, and was special adviser for Irregular Warfare to the 2005 U.S. Quadrennial Defense Review. He is currently seconded to the U.S. State Department as Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, and remains a Reserve Lieutenant Colonel in the Australian Army. His doctoral dissertation is a study of Indonesian insurgent and terrorist groups and counterinsurgency methods.


I thought the opening was great considering that several deployed mil-blog officers have indicated that TE Lawrence has become a big read for the officers, recommended by their own commanders.

Your company has just been warned for deployment on counterinsurgency operations in Iraq or Afghanistan. You have read David Galula, T.E. Lawrence and Robert Thompson. You have studied FM 3-24 and now understand the history, philosophy and theory of counterinsurgency. You watched Black Hawk Down and The Battle of Algiers, and you know this will be the most difficult challenge of your life.


I made that recommendation last year as a staple and noted that certain actions of the military had obviously changed and seemed to reflect TE Lawrence's 28 point Bulletin on the subject of interacting with the locals (interesting that Kilcullen makes his Fundamentals 28 points as well). Not the least of which is to stop doing things for the locals and let them do it themselves or at least make it appear like they are doing it themselves so that the local leaders can maintain face or "wasta". If you impede on that, you will get little cooperation. It works that way in Afghanistan, too (h/t Mudville).

Point 10 he says:

This demands a residential approach, living in your sector, in close proximity to the population, rather than raiding into the area from remote, secure bases. Movement on foot, sleeping in local villages, night patrolling: all these seem more dangerous than they are. They establish links with the locals, who see you as real people they can trust and do business with, not as aliens who descend from an armored box. Driving around in an armored convoy day-tripping like a tourist in hell degrades situational awareness, makes you a target and is ultimately more dangerous.


That has taken us a long time to re-establish. As with the current critiques about the conduct of the war at the beginning where many an ex-General has insisted that they knew the insurgency would occur and that the best way to keep it from happening was to have overwhelming force, the insistance on force protection and overwhelming fire power is often a hold over from post Vietnam malaise against state building. No one wanted to have to engage in state building. Everyone wants to pretend at the military level that they can fight a totally military war and would be better without the politicians and other political considerations. Which is true in a sense if you are ready just to let your military roll over an area and obliterate everything. These folks forgot the basic Clausewitz principle that war was an extension of politics and vis-a-versa, subject to political demands, expectation and will:

23 [snip]The war of a community—of whole nations and particularly of civilised nations—always starts from a political condition, and is called forth by a political motive. It is therefore a political act. Now if it was a perfect, unrestrained and absolute expression of force, as we had to deduce it from its mere conception, then the moment it is called forth by policy it would step into the place of policy, and as something quite independent of it would set it aside, and only follow its own laws, just as a mine at the moment of explosion cannot be guided into any other direction than that which has been given to it by preparatory arrangements. This is how the thing has really been viewed hitherto, whenever a want of harmony between policy and the conduct of a war has led to theoretical distinctions of the kind (ed...Shinseki, Zinni, Eaton and Newbold should re-read Clausewitz). But it is not so, and the idea is radically false. War in the real world, as we have already seen, is not an extreme thing which expends itself at one single discharge; it is the operation of powers which do not develop themselves completely in the same manner and in the same measure.[snip]

24.—War is a mere continuation of policy by other means.

We see, therefore, that war is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means. [snip]

for the political view is the object, war is the means, and the means must always include the object in our conception.


This was billed, not just as an attack to disarm Saddam and his regime, but a war of liberation and a war for democratic rule. You do not obliterate the entire country and cause hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths. Certainly, adding 300k troops on the invasion would have created 300 times more incidents of people firing their guns in defense and 300 times more possibility of destroying all political aims inside the country and out.

Everyone has heard expressed by political leaders and serving generals alike that the war (read: insurgency) requires a political solution. Most people have accepted this on the peripheral level and thus view the formation of the government of Iraq and Afghanistan as the pivotal moment at which the insurgency will, in the words of Shakespeare, "to be or not to be". Thus, our frustration at their continued lagging in this matter. Even I have expressed some views that mirror this idea. At the same time, a large part of our population focuses on the "winning" (ie, fighting off insurgent attacks; killing or capturing leaders) and "losing" (ie, attack by IED or VBIED, kills soldiers, no enemy captured or killed) of battles, including deaths of our forces or the insurgents, as an indication of "winning" or "losing" the war.

Kilcullen explains through this educational piece for officers on counterinsurgency what are the real indicators of success. They are not through decisive battles with cadres, large or small, of the opposing force nor at the high level national political level. The real indicators are at the company level, in areas of operation and are determined by the action or inaction of the company level operators.

13. Build trusted networks. Once you have settled into your sector, your next task is to build trusted networks. This is the true meaning of the phrase "hearts and minds", which comprises two separate components. "Hearts" means persuading people their best interests are served by your success; "Minds" means convincing them that you can protect them, and that resisting you is pointless. Note that neither concept has to do with whether people like you. Calculated self-interest, not emotion, is what counts. Over time, if you successfully build networks of trust, these will grow like roots into the population, displacing the enemy's networks,


He goes on to detail exactly what is required to do this and then states:

[snip] build common interests and mobilize popular support. This is your true main effort: everything else is secondary. Actions that help build trusted networks serve your cause. Actions even killing high-profile targets that undermine trust or disrupt your networks help the enemy.


This is why those forces who do build schools, clinics, local government and community structures and action groups have a legitimate reason to complain about the lack of coverage in the media. IEDs or other bloody attacks along with body counts do not represent the true nature or status of this war. The insurgency will not be resolved by national politics of Iraq. It will be resolved one block, hamlet, village, town, city at a time and it will largely be resolved through non-violent means.

He also comments on those officers who have not learned the lesson and believe that they will go to an area of operation, patrol in such a manner that in provokes confrontation and kill or capture insurgents, thus "winning" the war. While he is polite as he is hoping to convince officers to take his advice, his point is that these officers and companies will fail in pacifying their areas. In short, if any soldier (officer, NCO or enlisted) currently serving does not understand that his primary mission is to make friendly with the locals, but insists that they should be finding, fixing and killing the enemy, his command has failed to prepare him for this war.

It is also why such ingenuous commentary Eaton, Newbold, Shinseki or Zinni on the size and make up of deployed forces is non-sensical. It is not the war we are fighting. It is the previous wars: state on state; or, at least, the wars they want to fight because their experiences in Vietnam have convinced them that low level insurgencies, applying economy of force, cannot be won. This includes commentary on the use of such forces as artillery or MP as civil affairs units (and the like); commentary that insists that a larger infantry force, with rifle companies and such, would negate the necessity of using these forces outside of their MOS. It simply is not effective, neither at the brigade, division or "army" level nor at the company level as Kilcullen explains here:

3. Organize for intelligence. In counterinsurgency, killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is often nearly impossible. Intelligence and operations are complementary. Your operations will be intelligence driven, but intelligence will come mostly from your own operations, not as a “product” prepared and served up by higher headquarters. So you must organize for intelligence. You will need a company S2 and intelligence section –including analysts. You may need platoon S2s and S3s, and you will need a reconnaissance and surveillance element. You will not have enough linguists – you never do – but consider carefully where best to employ them. Linguists are a battle-winning asset: but like any other scarce resource you must have a prioritized “bump plan” in case you lose them. Often during pre-deployment the best use of linguists is to train your command in basic language. You will probably not get augmentation for all this: but you must still do it. Put the smartest soldiers in the S2 section and the R&S squad. You will have one less rifle squad: but the intelligence section will pay for itself in lives and effort saved.[snip]

4. Organize for inter-agency operations. Almost everything in counterinsurgency is interagency. And everything important – from policing to intelligence to civil-military operations to trash collection – will involve your company working with civilian actors and local indigenous partners you cannot control, but whose success is essential for yours. Train the company in inter-agency operations – get a briefing from the State Department, aid agencies and the local Police or Fire Brigade. Train point-men in each squad to deal with the inter-agency.

23. Practise armed civil affairs. Counterinsurgency is armed social work; an attempt to redress basic social and political problems while being shot at. This makes civil affairs a central counterinsurgency activity, not an afterthought.


In otherwords, whether you are a rifle company, infantry, a mortar platoon, artillery, mechanic, mess or adminstration, in an insurgency, you are Civil Affairs first. It just so happens that your company is well armed and can shoot back IF necessary. Complaints or insistence otherwise means that you have not accepted that you are fighting an insurgency and your commanders have not conveyed that to you effectively or not accepted it themselves. This is a fact that the American civilian populace, politicians and apparently many military officers, serving and retired, have refused to accept or cannot comprehend.

While it would be nice to have many more civil affairs units that specialize in this activity and an interesting theory that such a make up would allow other forces to maintain their specialty (MOS), there is no way that any army can create and maintain the number of Civil Affairs units and the number of combat only forces needed to provide security to conduct a counterinsurgency in this manner.

Kilcullen has many other specifics about how to build and use a localized network against an insurgency, how to build or train forces and use available resources. He also gives pointers to those officers whose commanders have not yet accepted that fact either and demand other action (such as body counts and arrests):

What if higher headquarters doesn’t “get” counterinsurgency? Higher headquarters is telling you the mission is to “kill terrorist”, or pushing for high-speed armored patrols and a base-camp mentality. They just do not seem to understand counterinsurgency. This is not uncommon, since company-grade officers today often have more combat experience than senior officers. In this case, just do what you can. Try not to create expectations that higher headquarters will not let you meet. Apply the adage “first do no harm”. Over time, you will find ways to do what you have to do. But never lie to higher headquarters about your locations or activities: they own the indirect fires.


This war will not be won at the point of a gun. Adding American forces will not win this war. Adding Iraqi security forces is only a tool, not the solution. The war will not be won at the national ballot box nor in the Iraqi assembly. This war will not be won by generals with brilliant strategies for deploying tanks, artillery and large combat formations. This war will be won by Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants and men (or women) named Specialist Smith who will have learned to do effective counterinsurgency long before we stop debating how many troops or types of weapons we should've, could've, would've deployed.

This war will be won over a cup of chai in a mud hut in a village with a name no one can pronounce.






Also posted at the Castle

Victor Hanson: Dead End Debates

Mil-blogs and Posts that support this document and post are below the fold in the "Read More" section:

Major K
Haifa Street
Honest Broker
The TV Guy
The First Report Is Always Wrong (disregarding Hurricane Katrina commentary)
I was the Intelligence Officer for an Infantry Battalion in one of the most violent sections of Baghdad as many of you know. One of the things that my section tried to promote throughout the Battalion was what we called "tactical patience." Tactical patience is giving a situation enough time to develop and unfold before trying to determine its meaning, significance and how to react to it. Tactical patience can sometimes require only a few seconds and sometimes require many hours. [SNIP]

As the intelligence adviser, the commander would come to me and ask me for my analysis of the situation and if it indicated a pattern or a new development. Many times, my first answer was that we didn't know enough yet. "We just got the initial report in, Sir, and the first report is always wrong." On several occasions, what was thought to be a rocket impact based upon hearing a nearby explosion and seeing the resulting plume of smoke, turned out to be merely a controlled detonation of captured explosives by the EOD team. This is why tactical patience is so important - so that we don't overreact to what we think something is.


Fighting God's Will
Lost in Translation
On Misbehavior (The public eye is on you in your AO and abroad. You need to minimize these incidents because they can set you back, in your AO as well as the entire war effort if it's big enough, Abu Graihb comes to mind, amongst others.)
Also Bad Apples
Dry Holes (Have your own intelligence section; do not wait for prepared info from headquarters to plan operations; they are always behind and do not know your area like you do)
Victory Disregarded (Do many small patrols at the same time, not one or two big patrols; your enemy cannot attack all patrols or know where they are; you can quickly bring around another patrol to support patrols under fire; small patrols are small targets)
Chasing Abu (Cultural Issues and building intelligence; also note comment regarding mentality about performing intelligence duties in a unit that believes it is a combat unit that should be kicking in doors)
Getting the Hang of the Democracy Thing (More "war will be won over a cup of chai" and, according to this post a lot of sweat and cigarette smoke)
Infighting (Local politics determine how you function in your area; you must be aware and step carefully, use tactical patience. Some reports of "terrorists" are people settling scores or tribal disputes.)
Quiet (putting a local face on operations)
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back (self explanatory if you read the PDF)
We Got'em (If you think you are infantry and should be kicking down doors instead of Civil Affairs or Intel, think again)
CSI Baghdad
Arhabi (Mirror the enemy, fight the enemy's strategy, whatever he does wrong you must do right)
March 18, 2005 (Be There; foot patrols, know the locals and the area)
Assisted Suicide (Fight the enemy's strategy; you want people to believe you will be there for them and protect them so they should help you; the enemy will do acts that tell the people that you will not be there, they will kill at will so the people should support them to avoid this death)
Signs Are Everywhere (Know the locals, build networks, replace the insurgents in the hearts and minds)
Sick of Being Sick
Day Tripping Tourists In Hell (as well as non-violent tactics)
The Three Ps (You are Civil Affairs that can shoot)

From Mudville Dawn Patrols
Tea with the Turks
Everything Has Been Busy (If the enemy comes out in force to attack you, it is not a set back; it means that you have been doing your job and he is very anxious about your ability to replace his network and influence)
Taliban PR Disaster
Solatia (Know the local customs; do foot patrols; interact with the people; winning hearts and minds)
Public Scrutiny

Iraq Pictures
Foot Patrols 1
Foot Patrols 2
Foot Patrols 3
You are Civil Affairs
You are Civil Affairs
You are Civil Affairs

Thursday, April 13, 2006

ABC News: Exclusive: Jill Carroll Middle Man Says Kidnappers Demanded $8 Million

Frankly, I think this guy is full of crap. Not because I don't believe they asked for a ransom, but that he is trying to leverage a little good will in order to keep his situation in the political arena on the upswing with the US contingent considering the downswing of the Shia/US relationship.

Everybody knows Carroll was kidnapped within yards of al-Dulaiymi's office and she was released within yards of the Iraq Islamic Party, a Sunni Islamic political group that has ties to the insurgency.

The only thing this fellow said that I believe is the truth is that the kidnapping was a mistake. The amount of publicity it got and the very real, strong implication it was a group known by these political entities put them in a bad situation right in the middle of delicate negotiations. Not just with the US for support, but within the Assembly where they were trying to engineer a coalition with Kurds, Sunni and dissafected Shia from the UIA.

Whether the political entity was complicit in or had knowledge before hand of the kidnapping didn't matter in the scheme of things. Just the implication was enough to make this group have a teetering moment on the precipe where they would be simply military targets instead of a political entity that could eventually negotiate security and economic concerns for their group.

The final problem with his explanation was that the money was given to "widows and orphans". Only an idiot believes that one. If you distributed 8 million dollars among a small group (which it would have been) their economic situation would have been improved beyond belief. Most likely scenario, if there was any money, went to a "charity" and then to "middle men" (maybe women and children) who delivered it on pain of death to the insurgents for their use. But, I highly doubt it. Either there was a ransom and it went directly to the insurgents or there wasn't and this guy is talking crap to maintain his position as both an insurgent spokesman and a politically acceptable face to the Iraqi government.

Honestly, I think he's full of garbage.

ABC News: Exclusive: Jill Carroll Middle Man Says Kidnappers Demanded $8 Million

U.S., Iraq Commanders Dislike Leave Rules - Yahoo! News

ABU GHRAIB, Iraq - U.S. and Iraqi commanders are increasingly critical of a policy that lets Iraqi soldiers leave their units virtually at will — essentially deserting with no punishment. They blame the lax rule for draining the Iraqi ranks to confront the insurgency — in some cases by 30 percent or even half. [snip]

The commander said a shortage of troops is the unit's biggest problem — and pinned the blame on both the policy and unmotivated soldiers.

"Under the military agreement, they can leave anytime," said Col. Alaa Kata al-Kafage, while his troops waited for a roadside bomb to be detonated. "After (soldiers) get paid and save a little bit of money, they leave."[snip]

Some Iraqi officers believe the casual attitude toward unauthorized absences is a good thing because it helps morale among young soldiers who have never been away from home and joined mostly because they need money.[snip]

Added Maj. Gen. Jaafar Mustafa, an Iraqi army officer in Sulaimaniyah: "We do not want any soldier to stay against his will, because this will affect the performance and the morale of the Iraqi army. By giving the choice for the Iraqi members to stay or leave, more people will volunteer in the army."


Let me stop there for a second and say what a bunch of crud that is. Every person needs limits, goals and expectations to focus their efforts and determine if they are meant for the job of being a soldier which is not part time unless it is a reserve or National Guard component. Which seems to me is what is missing here. Maybe more people would be interested in being citizen soldiers in Iraq on that basis. It would be less money, as is ours, and training would be slower, but it would certainly decrease cost and allow for a closer community supported troop. It might even be able to replace the political militias as the local security forces made up of all local citizens with relations to the local and to the central government.

The issue here, of course, is the other political and security problems which forced our commanders to drop the multiple force construct of the Iraq security forces and roll them up into the one: Iraq Army. An army which seems to operate more like a poor National Guard then an army.

I come to this conclusion based on this part of the article:

U.S. trainers also frequently criticize the Iraqi army's leave policy, which grants soldiers 10 days off a month and further trims the ranks of available troops.


Ten days. We've known all along that was a problem. Its been complained about by officers and enlisted in the US army for the last two years.

The other problem, of course, is that this Iraq army is in the middle of a war and it has an impact:

Large-scale insurgent attacks have intimidated many Iraqi soldiers into abandoning their posts.

In the town of Adhaim north of Baghdad, Iraqi soldiers said two insurgent ambushes in December — one that killed 19 troops, and another that killed eight soldiers and wounded about two dozen more — cut their battalion of about 600 soldiers in half.

"We lost altogether about half of our battalion," said Akid, a 20-year-old soldier from Diwanayah treated for a gunshot wound at a U.S. military hospital in Balad at the time. "They gave up." [snip]

In the Qaim area near the Syrian border, dozens of soldiers complained last month that they had not been paid in months. The Iraqi Ministry of Defense has struggled to build an infrastructure to both supply and regularly pay its troops. Iraqi soldiers also often live in dilapidated barracks that are slowly being refurbished.


Honestly, its nothing more or less than the Continental Army pre-Von Stuben at Valley Forge. It shouldn't be shocking in the least.

U.S., Iraq Commanders Dislike Leave Rules - Yahoo! News

Briton Punished for Refusing 3rd Iraq Tour - Yahoo! News

In a follow up to an earlier post, Lt Kendall-Smith gets eight months for refusing to obey orders. Interesting is the fact that, beyond refusing deployment, he also refused to take part in training and other activities prior to deployment which would have been regular military activities, even without deployment which I believe is where this fellow went wrong.

Kendall-Smith's lawyer read a statement from him in which he equated the training with the actual actions and insisted that was why he refused those orders as well. The prosecution said little accept to remind people that the British armed forces were operating under a UN mandate and at the invitation of the current Iraqi government which probably put paid to Kendall-smith's argument that the war was illegal and so was the deployment he refused under international law.

An interesting aside in the last two paragraphs of the peace, the usual little dig about US armed forces comes out (why it is in relation to this situation, I don't know) without any corresponding facts:

The Pentagon says more than 5,500 U.S. servicemen have deserted since the war started in Iraq. It is unclear how many have challenged the legality of the war.


It's unclear who has challenged the legallity or how many because they leave out salient information such as the fact that these "desertions" numbers are nearly on par with desertions from previous years that did not inlclude deployment to conflicts such as Iraq and Afghanistan. It's that little piece of the puzzle these reports like to leave out in order to shape their article to the opinion they wish to generate. In this case, that the LT is not the first to desert and has some commonality in his objections with these other 5,500 deserters.

Its bad reporting as usual and some poor slob surfing the net at their desk job at Widget's Inc got the implication in spades.
Briton Punished for Refusing 3rd Iraq Tour - Yahoo! News

You've Been Propagandized Part II

Or maybe it's part 2000 or 100,000. Who knows? Not even the media knows because it is part and parcel of the problem.

Attempts to be "objective" usually result in the media simply giving you two people's view of whatever (if you're lucky to actually get two unfiltered views) without critical analysis or real attempts to get accurate information. Even a blogger can get the same information from thousands of miles away and make better or at least equally factual analysis of the situation.

In it's modern version, the American press is no longer the American press serving the American people. They believe they have a wider audience they are responsible for so they believe they need to give the other side equal time and it is almost always uncritical simply quoting from them or showing their videos. It is almost as if Goebbels sent Leni Reifenstahl's pictures and movies to the media and they simply showed them without comment or acted as if they were completely accurate, reprinting or repeating there words and images as facts.

It's no doubt difficult to decide if someone is giving you accurate information and images from 9000 miles away. It's probably more difficult when the images and words seem to reflect your own ideological perspective. But, one of the most egregious acts a media organization can do is to be confronted repeatedly with the fact that an employee is indeed presenting you with inaccurate and often completely staged images and stories and still try to protect him, even present him as an award winning journalist, all the while talking about journalistic integrity.

And that is what happened. We aren't talking Dan Rather and Mary Mapes. That was pretty egregious. We are talking about a current and ongoing employee that is pretty obvious has participated with the insurgents in their attacks as a propagandist. Note that I do not equate a journalist who simply ends up with some insurgents or at the site of an attack and presents information from their side (though that is a very thin line), but one that is consistantly able to move within these groups without danger and, worse yet, actually presents obviously staged photos as fact and provides information about the acts in the photos as fact while the incidents either did not happen, were not actually happening at the time of the events or were being represented as greater or different than actual events.

And they are going to keep protecting this guy and acting like he is a real journalist?

Shame. Shame. Shame.

Tuesday, April 11, 2006

BBC NEWS | Scotland | Piper jailed for killing bandmate

A piper who killed a fellow band member in an attack after criticising his playing during a competition has been jailed for three years and nine months.


BBC NEWS | Scotland | Piper jailed for killing bandmate

Who knew that being a piper was so dangerous?

Sgt B?

BBC NEWS | Europe | Madrid bombing suspects charged

My thoughts on that? Finally. Although, it's interesting that I just watched a short video commemorating the Madrid bombings and several people were expressing displeasure that the government had these people in custody for two years and no one had been charged.

Then again, most of the people still see this as a domestic law issue and not an act of war so they don't comprehend intelligence gathering and exploitation. They see this as a simple criminal act that should be prosecuted.

I will be interested in how the government's case is presented considering the early mis-steps regarding ETA involvement and questions of evidence custody on one or more of the bombs.

What I find most interesting is the number of people that are being charged. It's quite extensive:

A Spanish judge has charged 29 people over the Madrid train bombings of March 2004 which claimed 191 lives and left nearly 2,000 injured.

Most of those charged are Moroccan nationals, and the indictments run to almost 1,500 pages.

The trial is expected to go ahead early next year and to last 12 months.

So far, more than 100 people have been arrested in the course of the investigations into the attacks, which have been blamed on Islamic radicals.


1/3 of those arrested during the coarse of the investigation are being charged with complicity in murder and attempted murder:

Judge Juan del Olmo has accused five Moroccan men - Jamal Zougam, Abdelmajid Bouchar, Youssef Belhadj, Rabei Ousman Sayed Ahmed and Hassan el Haski - of 191 murders and 1,755 attempted murders.

Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras, a Spaniard suspected of providing the bombers with explosives, was charged with 192 murders - including the death of a policeman killed during a raid on suspected bombers after the attacks.

The others have been charged as accomplices over the 10 co-ordinated explosions on four trains during the busy morning rush hour.


I would be interested in knowing if the state purports Trashorras knew what they were using the explosives for or if he was simply a criminal conduit without knowledge of the attacks.

One interesting point, which seems to be getting echoed in England regarding the July 7 bombings is that Al Qaida did not "order" the attacks, but that the Madrid bombings were simply carried out by a small cell with sympathies and no direct connection.

This comes out of the contention that Al Qaida is not a command and control organization, but more of a clearing house for Jihadists. However, I think this approach by the state in insisting there was no connection maybe an attempt to limit exposure of the state's security apparatuses. From past activities of Al Qaida, the question of their involvement is not a matter of "yes" or "no", but the depth of it. AQAMs have used the connection with AQ parent organization to get monetary, logistical and training support if not simply pass on messages or pass interested people on to the cells for use and execution of plans.

I think some people have gone from over-estimating their ability to underestimating it completely.

BBC NEWS | Europe | Madrid bombing suspects charged

British LT Refuses Deployment Siting "Unlawful Orders"

An RAF doctor facing charges over his refusal to serve in Iraq has told a court martial that he disobeyed orders "as a duty under international law".

Flt Lt Malcolm Kendall-Smith, 37, who was based at RAF Kinloss in Scotland, has already served twice in Iraq but last year defied an order to return.

He claimed his actions were justified as the UK involvement was illegal.


But the prosecution says:

"The presence of British forces was not unlawful and as a regular serviceman he could not pick and choose those orders he did or did not wish to obey and no question of any unlawful order being given to him arises in this case," he told the Aldershot hearing.


There is another question hanging over this proceeding, but I believe that this question is interesting to discuss among military men and afficianados. For instance, does the fact that he did not find a problem with his two prior deployments affect his ability to claim that it is now an illegal operation?

Does being called to be part of invading force or even an occupation force against another nation infer an "unlawful order" or are "unlawful orders" strictly related to direct orders given to a soldier to perform or act in ways that are not acceptable under the law of land warfare and the Geneva Conventions? Such as the rounding up of civilians into concentratrion camps or mass murder or other depravations? Or, extra judicial execution of surrendered opposing forces?

Can the over all act of committing war between two nations or people with subsequent deployment of forces (whoever fires the first shot or is the "invader") be considered an "unlawful order"?

This lieutenant stated in a letter of resignation after his refusal to be deployed:

"I refused the order out of duty to international law, the Nuremberg principles and the law of armed conflict," he told the hearing.


Which I believe points to several problems. The first is the attempt to push "international law" as superceding the sovereignty and laws of a nation or even superceding that nations national security interests. The second is that he points to the "Nuremburg principles" which hark back to charges against Goering and others of having committed "aggressive war" against Poland and its neighbors. This I believe is what the Lieutenant is charging against his own government.

From my perspective, it has little similarity to the acts of Nazi Germany.

The Lieutenants case has other problems as well:

He said the officer applied for early release from the RAF in May 2005 but was informed he would normally be expected to serve about another 12 months.

"The background to this case appears to be a sense of grievance felt by the defendant, firstly that he could not immediately resign from the RAF, and secondly that he remained eligible for deployment overseas," Mr Perry said.


The Lieutenant is going to try to argue this point by arguing the dateline for his resignation and refusal to deploy v. notification of deployment.

BBC NEWS | UK | Iraq service refusal 'justified'

Monday, April 10, 2006

Zarqawi Was Propaganda?

I believe we are supposed to be shocked by this: U.S. military plays up role of Zarqawi; Jordanian painted as foreign threat to Iraq’s stability.

The U.S. military is conducting a propaganda campaign to magnify the role of the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, according to internal military documents and officers familiar with the program. The effort has raised his profile in a way that some military intelligence officials believe may have overstated his importance and helped the Bush administration tie the war to the organization responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

The documents state that the U.S. campaign aims to turn Iraqis against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, by playing on their perceived dislike of foreigners. U.S. authorities claim some success with that effort, noting that some tribal Iraqi insurgents have attacked Zarqawi loyalists.


So, which part are you shocked by? Anything? First thing this fellow does is continue the meme that the administration has been lying to the American public in order to get support for the war. However, the actual reason for the "propaganda" campaign is in paragraph two, "The documents state that the U.S. campaign aims to turn Iraqis against Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian, by playing on their perceived dislike of foreigners."

Note that neither the author of this piece nor the US military says that Zarqawi isn't there. The point is, we focused on him in order to bring internal strife into the insurgency and hopefully convince the others that their best bet is not to align with this character and commit the kinds of attrocities that he is known for, but to join the Iraq government. The military and the administration has repeatedly said (since the end of 2004 I believe, but I will search to find the links) that the Islamist are a "small but vicious" part of the insurgency. They have also regularly informed reporters through press conferences and we have separate reporting from Iraq which indicates that the ex-regime and other malcontents make up the largest part.

But now, supposedly, we are dupes of a propaganda campaign (or the Iraqis are or we all are):

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.


But, speaking of propaganda campaigns, this fellow participates in his own version. While his first paragraph talks about the US trying to link Iraq to the War on Terror making it out as a purposeful disinformation campaign, he commits a serious error and deliberately re-enforces his own conclusion by leaving out an important date in this next paragraph:

There has been a running argument among specialists in Iraq about how much significance to assign to Zarqawi, who spent seven years in prison in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government there. After his release he spent time in Pakistan and Afghanistan before moving his base of operations to Iraq.


In what year did Zarqawi move his "base of operations" to Iraq? This fellow leaves it out, but the year is 2002, October of. At least five months prior to the US invasion. From other intelligence, it's possible he had other visits or contacts there well before his official arrival.

And, with bloggers and freepers going all out on the translation of documents captured from Saddam's Iraq, it's clear that we do not need Zarqawi any longer to put Saddam and Iraq right in the middle of the terror war:

Origins Of War: The latest in a stream of eye-opening Iraqi documents shows Saddam Hussein's regime was planning suicide attacks on U.S. interests six months before 9-11. Why won't Washington get the word out?

Last month the Pentagon began releasing records captured during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Among the documents is a letter dated March 11, 2001, written by Abdel Magid Hammod Ali, one of Saddam's air force generals.

According to an unofficial translation, Page 6 of the letter asks for "the names of those who desire to volunteer for suicide mission to liberate Palestine and to strike American interests."


Where can you find this information? On Captain's Quarters.

The top secret letter 2205 of the Military Branch of Al Qadisya on 4/3/2001 announced by the top secret letter 246 from the Command of the military sector of Zi Kar on 8/3/2001 announced to us by the top secret letter 154 from the Command of Ali Military Division on 10/3/2001 we ask to provide that Division with the names of those who desire to volunteer for Suicide Mission to liberate Palestine and to strike American Interests and according what is shown below to please review and inform us.


(Europe and Middle East countries write the date dd/mm/yyyy for clarification)

The Captain paid two translaters on different sides of the planet who did not know that the other was also paid to translate the document and they came up with the same translation. Free Republic has had a Lebanese member translating the same and came up with the same translation. Yet, we do not hear a peep from the MSM and certainly, it did not make any appearance in the original article about Zarqawi and propaganda meant to convince the American public of Iraq's terror connections.

Unlike that fellow though, I wouldn't want to conflate the two to mean the same though other documents translated have indicated that Saddam and Al Qaida had many more contacts than previously noted even by Steven Hayes. Still, Zarqawi being in Iraq does not have to be the same as Saddam searching for volunteers to commit suicide activities. It could be the convergence of coincidence. In either case, it totally blows Mr. Ricks supposition that the administration needed to or needs to link Zarqawi to Iraq to make it part of the war.

Zarqawi does exist. He did plan and execute many suicide attacks on civilians and US bases. He did take over several cities, including Fallujah and Mosul with his confederation of Mujihadeen, ex-ba'athists and disaffected Sunni (he was even referred to as the Emir -Prince- of Fallujah by captured letters and statements from captured insurgents). He directed attrocious acts on the people of these cities. His own propaganda wing put out statements by him regarding attacks.

This is not a non-existent boogey man made up by the military. This man even misrepresents Colonel Harvey's comments:

Although Zarqawi and other foreign insurgents in Iraq have conducted deadly bombing attacks, they remain "a very small part of the actual numbers," Col. Derek Harvey, who served as a military intelligence officer in Iraq and then was one of the top officers handling Iraq intelligence issues on the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told an Army meeting at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., last summer.

In a transcript of the meeting, Harvey said, "Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will -- made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

"The long-term threat is not Zarqawi or religious extremists, but these former regime types and their friends," said Harvey, who did not return phone calls seeking comment on his remarks.


In this kind of war that is played out largely through information war (which is how insurgencies are fought when the insurgents do not have the ability to defeat opposing forces militarily) there is always the possibility that, as you paint the foe as a terrible deviant committing all sorts of acts, it will actually lend him the aura of invincible leadership that will actually draw followers to him at the same time that you are hoping to divide him from the general population.

The other thing that you hope to do is to divide the opposition. Whether that is completely in half or peeling off a small part that can be chewed up depends on other factors like political considerations. Obviously, we've been working on a political solution with the Sunni and ex-Ba'athists.

So, those who want to believe that the administration has lied to them and is lying to them, will believe this article confirms, once again, their suspicions. The general public will be confused and those who have been following the war closely will remember that even Rumsfeld has been saying that Zarqawi is only one part of the problem, a small and vicious part responsible for many suicide attacks (spring 2005 epidemic of suicide car bombs for instance), but only one part. And the even smaller group of people who have been studying insurgent warfare will shrug their shoulders because they knew why the focus was on Zarqawi even in the midst of a larger insurgency.

The question may be who you are, what you know and what you want to believe.

He continues to raise an important question throughout the article which he dismisses through sly conjectures that the military, denying that American's were targets of the campaign, is lying although he couches it in less libelous terms. Yet, one military person explains the situation succinctly:

U.S. military policy is not to aim psychological operations at Americans, said Army Col. James A. Treadwell, who commanded the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq in 2003. "It is ingrained in U.S.: You don't psyop Americans. We just don't do it," said Treadwell. He said he left Iraq before the Zarqawi program began but was later told about it.

"When we provided stuff, it was all in Arabic," and aimed at the Iraqi and Arab media, said another military officer familiar with the program, who spoke on background because he is not supposed to speak to reporters.

But this officer said that the Zarqawi campaign "probably raised his profile in the American press's view."

With satellite television, e-mail and the Internet, it is impossible to prevent some carryover from propaganda campaigns overseas into the U.S. media, said Treadwell, who is now director of a new project at the U.S. Special Operations Command that focuses on "trans-regional" media issues. Such carryover is "not blowback, it's bleed-over," he said. "There's always going to be a certain amount of bleed-over with the global information environment."


You think? Particularly with the media's insistence on "it bleeds it leads" and Zarqawi definitely was linked to a lot of bleeding in Iraq. But, even a barely tentative watcher of the news would be able to tell you that Zarqawi's name has not been so prominent in the lastt 6 months or so. The media has been casting the violence as "Sunni/Shia sectarian strife". The probability that Zarqawi's name has been less famous lately because the military no longer uses it as often in press releases is pretty clear. Thus, its also clear, as I pointed out in yesterday's post, that the media lacks serious ability to report and analyze the situation. They are just as confused as anyone about who is doing what to whom and why.

You may have been propagandized, but the question is, by whom?

I find it funny that the media wants to blame its inherently incomplete reporting on the military as if it was an all powerful, monolithic force that controls the media through mere suggestion.

Must be the same power the Zionists have to control the government of the US.

Update: Speaking of propaganda, I suggest this article on photographs.

Sunday, April 09, 2006

Iraq Liberation Day and Civil War

Today is Iraq Liberation Day. In Iraq they are calling it "Freedom Day". While I still hold hopes for Iraq and still maintain, without caveat, that Arabs, Kurds, Turks, Persians and/or any person that follows Islam can and will practice Democracy as is understood in Western ideology and politics, it would appear to me that Civil War, open and without reserve, may be the outcome of Iraq.

As I stated on another blog, it's not that I don't believe civil war is occuring now, it is just that there is a difference between open civil war and the tit for tat killings that we see now in what must be best termed a power struggle. In my supposition, the current situation reminded me of the 1850's in the United States where groups of people moved from one state to the other to stuff the ballot boxes and determine entry as free or slave state; where armed militias would ride into different towns or even across state borders to raid and punish towns that they thought were "stacked" or in order to punish those citizens for possible beliefs. John Brown and Harper's Ferry, the Lawrence Raid, there were many other incidents that took place before the official opening of the American Civil War. The election of Lincoln was the straw that broke the camel's back. In Iraq, it may be the selection of the Prime Minister which does the same.

Interestingly, Caleb Carr wrote today a piece that advocates allowing the Iraqis to have their civil war.

As the violence in Iraq has expanded, analysts have been asking: Are we witnessing the beginning of a formal Iraqi civil war? But far more important when we consider what role our troops might play in the extended fighting is the question: Does the United States have any right to forcibly stop such a war, when and if it begins?[snip]

And although civil wars, like revolutions, can be influenced by outside forces as well as ideological considerations, sometimes they are merely struggles for power. Still others -- like the American Civil War -- are contests over not just politics or power, but some high motivating moral principle as well.

No such principle would seem to be at play in Iraq, for one of the insurgency's glaring deficiencies has always been its lack of a coherent ideological rallying point for all Iraqis. Its aim, by contrast, has been simple: the return to power of the Sunni Muslim minority that held sway under Saddam Hussein, or, failing that, the kind of endless anarchy that will make any other government's rule impossible.


The last is the truth, except where I would say the power struggle within the Shia sect is equally violent. Many of the deaths of Shia political and religious leaders have been blamed on the Sunni ex regime or al Qaida Islamist affiliates, but some of them have certainly been murdered by other Shia groups as the Shia jockey for power, not just of the national government, but for cities, mosques and financial power brought by reconstruction money. So, when we speak of the possibility of civil war in Iraq, we are not talking about civil war that we are familiar with, two opposing sides. Caleb Carr gives a hint to that, but doesn't really fill out how many potential "sides" would be involved, who they are or why. It's difficult to tell since no one knows what might drive one group to ally with another. It's not even a given that the Shia would be one monolithic "side" in this fight. In some ways, Carr presents a three sided theory with Kurds, Shia and Sunni making the main groups, but that, like the current situation, would be far too simplified.

Aside from the MSM coverage which is all death and little economic or living situation reporting, the MSM has failed to really provide informative analysis of the different groups and what is really going on politically or even in the deaths. The usual fare consists of "Sunni/Shia sectarian strife", where as I am indicating that the strife is far more complex and involves strife between sub groups under each of these sects. The Islamists kill the ex ba'athists or Sunni shiekhs who cooperate with the coalition. The Sunni shiekhs kill the Islamists for revenge or in order to clear them from their territory because of their treatment of their people. Some Sunni clans fight each other for control of land or water rights or because of some offense to honor. There may even be the possibility that Sunnis who practice Ashouri Islam attack their Wahhabist co-religionist for religious reasons, though this is less reported than the Shia incidents. Of course, in the Sunni areas, there is much less money from tourism of pilgrimages to their mosques and less money for reconstruction (since it has little tourism involved and most Sunni religious sites for pilgrimages are in different lands like Saudi Arabia).

The Shia, for their part, have several very high profile and important mosques in Iraq that attract many pilgrims, such as Najaf and the Ali Mosque. There's a lot of money in controlling, not only the mosques, but tax revenues from tourism, money from bribery and extortion (such as security details, clearances, permits for opening businesses or operating street side carts, construction permits and contracts, etc); then there is the money for reconstruction from the Iraq and US government. The money from the mosque comes from donations of wealthy patrons or the zakhat (tax for charity; like Christian tithing) that can buy a lot of good will, particularly when it comes time for elections.

Of course, the political power of being able to preach and reach a secure audience in a highly populated area can guarantee votes.

Finally, the ideological struggle of Islam is not just liberal v. conservative or Shia v. Sunni, but the Shia have an internal ideological struggle as well, underneath all the power struggles that are purely secular in nature. The question is whether Iran's Qom or Najaf, Iraq is the center of learning, the director of sharia law, the decision as to whether Islam is political, controlling the state and the law or strictly religious, which guides the people's lives and only influences the state, leaving politics to the secular.

It's a long standing issue that has been going on long before Western powers ever thought about crusades to Jerusalem, much less discovered oil. The question may be whether a civil war within Iraq will actually resolve these issues to the point where sectarian internal and external killings actually stop or whether it will just drive it underground once a "winner" has been determined; for now anyway. It will not resolve the entirity of the struggle in the Middle East, but it may reconfigure Iraq into a "state" instead of the anarchist territories that exist today.

Caleb goes on to write:

If Americans ever had the power to stave off such a conflict, the past three years of misguided military policy have exhausted it. But military ability to stop a civil war is not the key issue. Nor should excessive concern for our own national security cloud our policy decisions: The first casualties of any expanded fighting will almost certainly be both Saddam Hussein (who has been kept alive thanks to U.S. insistence on his trial -- and thanks to U.S. guards) as well as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who is now despised more than Hussein by many Iraqis. No, the real issue of importance for Americans with regard to any impending Iraqi civil war is: Are we morally justified in trying to prevent it?


Here, I believe, Carr makes one mistake in his analysis. US involvement in staving off the conflict has little to do with morality. That is a question for the philosophers. This is real politics. If Iraq starts into open civil war and we do not try to intervene on behalf of one or the other side, we will leave the field open for influence from Syria, Saudi Arabia and Iran who will certainly provide weapons and money for the groups they wish to win and who would then be beholden to those governments. Neither state is a friend of the US and would certainly make Iraq not the ally of the US in the region, which was one of the agenda items for this entire escapade. Ignoring that expectation and real geo-political situation for the "moral" is a bit of sheer blindness on Carr's part.

However, he makes an argument that sounds nearly sane in comparing Britain's consideration of interference in the US Civil War with the final decision not to after careful warning from Lincoln. The difference, of course, was that England did not have any significant forces in the Unites States already, had not invaded us and turned over the governmet. If it had, it would have been in the same position as we are: deciding to support one side against the other and throwing their forces behind it in order to insure a friendly government or withdrawing totally until the issue was decided.

Carr makes another valid point:

Indeed, if polls in Iraq are reliable (and they seem to have been, thus far) then the American presence there is only increasing the likelihood that if civil war comes, it will be more vicious. The presence of U.S. troops, noble as their efforts at control may be, only fuels more rage, since they keep Kurdish and Shiite forces at bay while failing to stop the Sunnis from committing daily murder.


Two sides may hate each other, but they will never love the peacemaker in the middle and that is our situation. In short order, if there is no resolution to the government and the assembly does not decide on an immediate date for a new vote, open civil war can be guaranteed.

It is this and only this that I would agree to pulling back and letting them go at it. In fact, I almost agree with Carr that we just sit back and support no one, particularly since it's obvious the Shia are just as likely to commit murder on civilians, executing prisoners and doing other things that are not kopascetic with our own rules of war or the Geneva Convention which our participating would require. The Vietnam issue was greatly complicated by the South Vietnamese actions (and our own) that greatly depressed world opinion of the war. We should remember that and insure that we do not become embroiled in the situation.

There is still time for political resolution, but, even as a supporter of the war, I think it is important to be ready to recognize when the political resolution no longer exists and its time to let the Iraqis sort it out between themselves.

John at Castle Arrggh has another post that echoes a conversation we had several months ago in the midst of the terror in Iraq regarding the benefits of total war. Or, at least following Powell's Doctrine (Clausewitz said it first) of overwhelming force.

What Clausewitz said:

3. Utmost use of force.
[snip]
Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst. As the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the co-operation of the intelligence, it follows that he who uses force unsparingly, without reference to the quantity of bloodshed, must obtain a superiority if his adversary does not act likewise. By such means the former dictates the law to the latter, and both proceed to extremities, to which the only limitations are those imposed by the amount of counteracting force on each side.

This is the way in which the matter must be viewed; and it is to no purpose, and even acting against one's own interest, to turn away from the consideration of the real nature of the affair, because the coarseness of its elements excites repugnance.

If the wars of civilised people are less cruel and destructive than those of savages, the difference arises from the social condition both of states in themselves and in their relations to each other. Out of this social condition and its relations war arises, and by it war is subjected to conditions, is controlled and modified. But these things do not belong to war itself; they are only given conditions; and to introduce into the philosophy of war itself a principle of moderation would be an absurdity. [snip]

4.—The aim is to disarm the enemy.[snip]

Here then is another case of reciprocal action. As long as the enemy is not defeated, I have to apprehend that he may defeat me, then I shall be no longer my own master, but he will dictate the law to me as I did to him. This is the second reciprocal action and leads to a second extreme (second reciprocal action).


When I was talking to John about as we sat in our comfortable chairs at the bar in the Outback eating steak and chatting with SWWBO was historical war. Not simply modern wars that we remember and hark back to like WWII and Vietnam when we talk about the Iraq War, but medieval war. When medieval knights took a town they didn't simply do battle with the defending army. They sacked and pillaged. They would burn down the peasants homes and take most of their grain and other stores. It wasn't just for the pleasure of it or to provision their own forces. Without huts for shelter or grain or salted meats that had been stored away for the winter, the peasants spent most of their time building their homes and replenishing their stores so they wouldn't starve. Thus they had little time for rebellion. In modern times that translated to the total war of WWII.

As Clausewitz noted, the further we become civilized, the less we remember why war was so terrible and the less terrible we try to make war which usually results in:

Now, philanthropists may easily imagine there is a skilful method of disarming and overcoming an enemy without causing great bloodshed, and that this is the proper tendency of the art of War. However plausible this may appear, still it is an error which must be extirpated; for in such dangerous things as war, the errors which proceed from a spirit of benevolence are just the worst.


And the worst is what we are seeing in Iraq. Zarqawi may yet get his wish to begin a civil war between Sunni and Shia. It will certainly cause the US to rethink its situation in Iraq, but I believe that Zarqawi has placed his bet with the losing side because the Sunni simply cannot muster the amount of forces and weapons that the Shia will and it will be all undone for the Sunni. Or maybe we should feel pity for the Sunni who obviously did not realize that they were not the majority and no longer controlled the military. The slaughter they will have engendered by their insistance on joining forces with Zarqawi and ex-Ba'athists is just too terrible to contemplate.

Still, on Iraq Liberation Day, Carr has a valid point:

We went to Iraq, according to our president, to make Iraqis free. If that is so, and if their first decision as a free people is to declare war upon one another, just as Americans once did, where do we derive the right to tell them they may not?


As another famous blogger once said, "Indeed."

Thursday, April 06, 2006

Islam, Freedom and Democracy

In this post from yesterday, I argued the point made by the writer that democracy is not fit only for Western man with his base of Judeo-Christianity. The writer stated:

The problem with Iraq, Mr. Will said in a Manhattan Institute lecture, is that it "lacks a Washington, a Madison, a [John] Marshall--and it lacks the astonishingly rich social and cultural soil from which such people sprout." There is no "existing democratic culture" that will allow liberty to succeed, he argues. And he scoffs at the assertion by President Bush that it is "cultural condescension" to claim that some peoples, cultures or religions are destined to despotism and unsuited for self-government. The most obvious rebuttal to Mr. Will's first point is that only one nation in history had at its creation a Washington, Madison and Marshall--yet there are 122 democracies in the world right now. So clearly founders of the quality of Washington and Madison are not the necessary condition for freedom to succeed.


He is right. No culture nor religion guarantees or precludes sane democracy with elemental human rights. In fact, most religions and cultures do have some tenets which mirror our own. It is not these things that engender or block democracy.

Interesting, I looked up the definition of "democracy" in the heritage online dictionary. I thought it was interesting how many definitions exist:

de·moc·ra·cies
1) Government by the people, exercised either directly or through elected representatives.
2) A political or social unit that has such a government.
3) The common people, considered as the primary source of political power.
4) Majority rule.
5) The principles of social equality and respect for the individual within a community.


In truth, democracy, as described by a sixth grade social studies class, is the direct rule of the people where all people have a vote. There is no leader, per se, all decisions are communal. It is one reason that the United States and other modern democracies have "representative democracy". Because rule by majority is often the tyranny of the majority. In the tyranny of the majority, unlike the fifth description above, individual rights are not protected, but subject to the ideas of the majority. Individual freedom to practice religion, to be speak freely, to do business or study topics as an individual sees fit, these are rarely present in a "true democracy" or in democracies that lack that one essential item: the social contract between individuals that insures individual space and rights.

That's why democracy as we know it is not simply "democracy" as in the original Greek template that was hard pressed to survive, nor even simply a "representative" democracy which allows a representation of a cross section of the governed. Western Democracy, the democracy that we understand to mean "democracy" is based on individual rights that include the primary, unalienable rights to "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" wherein we understand that individuals have the right to live. This is the "primary directive" of all democracies based on humanist enlightenment.

From the western perspective, this includes the right to protect "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" whenever another member of our society threatens the individual's right to life. Even should one member take the life of another, we go further and insist on knowing the reasons and circumstances. Was their life or the life of another threatened by the member of our society that was killed. In short, the right to self defense to protect that holiest and most vital unalienable right to "life".

However, we place limits on ourselves to insure that people do not perceive every instance as a threat to "life" and thus limit the justifications for taking life of another member of our society. In otherwords, we hold even the lowest among us to have that right to "life" and that it is precious above all other things.

Still, we must consider that the threat to life, to end it, is not the only threat. Liberty and happiness, even "life", may be bound up in the concept that the health of the body, being damaged in anyway or threatened, provides the right to self defense or the right to be defended by another. This goes towards establishing the limits by which a Western democracy, understanding the basics of enlightened humanism and reasoning, can and will impose punishment, up to and including death. It also establishes basic concepts that insure the law and reason is supreme above the majority who may otherwise commit vigilante justice without the procedures of law that protect every citizen and insist that acts against another are within the procedures of law applied with reason.

So, how does this delicate balance maintain itself within society when any number of people may feel that their life or health is threatened and all out anarchy could exist?

It is the concept that every citizen must learn, the "social contract" which is beyond even the procedures of law, but insists on reason and reasonable understanding of the concept of equal rights for all and the balance of individual rights. It also insists that the individuals trust that the law, more often than not, will be just and fair in its actions.

The secondary directive of Western Democracy believes in individual freedoms and rights above the rights or beliefs of the group. This insists that, while the group as a whole must be secure against the loss of life, that security is limited to the physical danger. There is no loss of security or "life" expected in Western Free Democracy whould an individual believe in a different god than the majority. As long as the individual still believes in and adheres to the social contract protecting the primary right to "life" of the others as well as a few basic laws that maintain the thread of society, such as not stealing or cheating, their ideas, their religion, cannot harm the group.

It is this idea alone which is "missing" according to such great thinkers as Buckley or Fukyama. But, these go a step further in insisting that the development of this social contract can never exist or be grown because culture, or religion, has engrained such contrary concepts that this humanist enlightenment cannot be gained.

According to the writer of the WSJ article, and to which I agree, this is absurd based on all democracies that have come in existance today straight from despotic rule; and there are many.

I pointed to France as an example of similarity with Iraq and its struggle for democracy with sectarian infighting and "death squads". There is another similarity. In fact, France was ruled by a despotic king who, through ignorance or purpose, oppressed and starved the people. And, he had help. There were limited few at the top, nobles, who took as their privilege often what little those below them had through either corruption, extortion or outright theft. They routinely murdered or arbitrarily punished those without power without true procedure of law or equal justice.

This was society based on post fuedal Europe which could never in it's wildest dreams be refered to as a group of countries or peoples with any proclivities towards democracy or humanist enlightenment. Fuedal connections through marriage (like modern Arab tribal relations) and allegiance, maintained the ruling elite with their military and economic power, but also provided the fabric through which the local populace was protected. Individuals who went outside of that fabric or did not conform were considered to be dangerous to the security of the whole and were punished with everything from public stocks to horrific execution. The church was not, at that time, a leader in humanist enlightenment or champion of the individual. The success of the church depended on conformity and perpetuated the rule of nobles by re-enforcing the necessity of conformity, not just in religion, but in every aspect of life. The nobles in turn provided protection for the church in a quid pro quo.

How and why did this change? Simply put, the idea that conformity protected the security of all began to disappear. It could be linked to a number of indicators. Economic development that created a wealthy burgeois that provided tax revenues to cities and fuedal lords alike and sustained the nations. It could be the advancement of weapons where the lowly serf once could only afford and was only allowed simply tools for farming that he used as defense, now could afford swords, axes, bows and arrows and other weapons. Or, they were supplied in order to fill out the ranks of ever greater and larger armies, providing the means for equality. In fact, this can be seen in the complaints of knights about bowman being "unchivalrous" and "cowardly", but was really about the knight becoming the victim of the "low".

In the Islamic Arab world, the concept of the group security overriding the rights of the individual still exists. This group security, for centuries, is based on conformity. This conformity came from tribal blood relations and religion; the concept of the Umma. This served the Islamic nation from its birth to growth into an empire, providing the ties and wealth to pursue empire, even into it's decline when the empire nations broke into smaller mandates with borders that did not recognize the suzereignity of tribal locations. Groups became the aliens within these states and their security depended on the tribal and the Umma of Islam.

The difference here may be the speed in which ideas and material development, including improved living conditions, economics, industrialization, technology and even weapons can be assumed into a culture. In a global world, this increases exponentially over every development. It would be inappropriate to assume that these developments need to be simultaneous or equal. It would be helpful if economics, industrialization and improved living conditions developed faster than the acquisition of weapons. But, as the Umma or tribe or other unit leaves security from conformity, the sense of or physical requirement for security through other means, including weapons and military increases. It may not be necessary to use them, but it does provide even the sense.

In Iraq, this security was not only provided through tribal and sectarian relations, but through the auspices of the totalitarian government that suppressed all but a few equally. There was uniformity and conformity on the pain of death. The instant release of this conformity through the state of Iraq into anarchy. There were no controls, no slow release from the pressures and there were instant need to redefine the parameters of security. Where the ideology of the social contract did not exist or was held in place through brutality, not society, the inability of the government or invading military forces to exert security across the broad spectrum required groups to fall back on known security patterns: tribe, sect, umma.

It does not stand to reason that the government or invading forces were automatically going to need to provide additional force to provide security. In this case, outside forces that threatened security and well developed demands for revenge due to past grievances internally, promoted the feeling of insecurity. Further, political grievances that did not provide for political resolution (which continues today) increased the insecurity. While it was likely that some killing would take place during the transition and while society determined their security needs along with their personal demands, it was not necessary that sectarian strife begin. Even with external factors. Yet, it was a matter of power shift with the existence of massive amounts of weapons that provided two of the developments for "equalized" society.

Does this mean that there is no chance for ideology and economy, among other things, to develop into democracy? The answer is no because these things do not preclude that development. One thing that might provide the idea of security for the group without conformity would be a large outside threat that was a threat to all groups. This would have existed in Iraq with Al Qaeda, but the Sunni minority made a mistake in allying themselves with these terrorists in the hopes of recreating their power base. This was an obvious mistake considering their minority numbers. However, it is not a death knell for the development of democracy in Iraq.

Eventually, the growth of economics and improved living conditions can outstrip the sectarianism as long as government and ideology develops apace (though, again, not necessarily equally or simultaneous; jumps in either one can provide the stabilization or attrition against the violence.

The question is how to promote ideology? Education. The printing press of the Renaissance was a great equalizer. Economic growth provided the ability for the middle class to educate their children. It's a matter of all of these things. Truly, history, culture and religion do not preclude or engender attributes for the development of democracy.

History has proven this effectively. History has proven that sectarian strife or even civil war will not preclude democracy or the advent of freedom. And, it is not simply democracy as a process that will instill stability or free democracy as we perceive it.

Individual rights and the sanctity of human life as the primary unalienable right included in the social contract must come to exist.

This is why some place like Iran is not a free democracy however they may style themselves a republic. They do not respect individual rights, they demand conformity, it is the tyranny of the majority that are conservative Muslims.

And this is why, despite what must be common sense, they feel that they can punish a woman with death for killing her husband who tried to rape her 15 year old daughter from a previous marriage. While I would not condone cold murder without the procedure of law, in this society, there is no protection for women. There is none because this society, this security depends on a male dominated, sectarian, tribal association. To maintain the power structure, they must insure that women have no value. Thus, it would have been acceptable for this woman's daughter to have been raped and she would have been killed for adultery. It's a no win situation.

So, what is left for a woman to do in those situations?

Support this woman please.

Wednesday, April 05, 2006

The Wrong Time to Lose Our Nerve

I can't believe I missed this while looking at the Islamic Imperial Dreams, but this is good:

A small group of current and former conservatives--including George Will, William F. Buckley Jr. and Francis Fukuyama--have become harsh critics of the Iraq war. They have declared, or clearly implied, that it is a failure and the president's effort to promote liberty in the Middle East is dead--and dead for a perfectly predictable reason: Iraq, like the Arab Middle East more broadly, lacks the democratic culture that is necessary for freedom to take root. And so for cultural reasons, this effort was flawed from the outset. Or so the argument goes.


My favorite lines:

Does Mr. Fukuyama believe Iraqis prefer subjugation to freedom? Does he think they, unlike he, relish life in a gulag, or the lash of the whip, or the midnight knock of the secret police? Who among us wants a jackboot forever stomping on his face? It is a mistake of a large order to argue that democracy is unwanted in Iraq simply because (a) violence exists three years after the country's liberation--and after more than three decades of almost unimaginable cruelty and terror; and (b) Iraq is not Switzerland.


And this one about "cultural differences":

The problem with Iraq, Mr. Will said in a Manhattan Institute lecture, is that it "lacks a Washington, a Madison, a [John] Marshall--and it lacks the astonishingly rich social and cultural soil from which such people sprout." There is no "existing democratic culture" that will allow liberty to succeed, he argues. And he scoffs at the assertion by President Bush that it is "cultural condescension" to claim that some peoples, cultures or religions are destined to despotism and unsuited for self-government. The most obvious rebuttal to Mr. Will's first point is that only one nation in history had at its creation a Washington, Madison and Marshall--yet there are 122 democracies in the world right now. So clearly founders of the quality of Washington and Madison are not the necessary condition for freedom to succeed.


I will add here one country he does not mention in their democratic struggles: France. Only an unserious student of history would forget that one of the more celebrated democracies of history that claims itself an ally of the US began with a period of time called "the Reign of Terror". It started out with some noble intentions and ended with the "terrorists" beheading (yes, beheading) thousands of fellow French. First they started with the "oppressors" and then they moved on with denouncing each other as "traitors". Even the grand "terror master" Robespierre ended with his neck under the blade. I believe this revolution continued from 1789 until 1794 with the most horrific year being 1793 to 1794 where, according to wikipedia:

Although the regime under which the Terror took place began to assemble itself as early as 2 June 1793, the Terror as such started on 5 September 1793 and lasted until the executions following the coup of 9 Thermidor Year II (27 July 1794), in which several key leaders of the Reign of Terror were executed, ushering in the Thermidorian reaction. The Terror took the lives of between 18,000 to 40,000 people (estimates vary widely, due to the difference between historical records and statistical estimations). In the single month before it ended, 1,300 executions took place.


1,300 executions in a single month. Imagine that. And this was in a "civilized" nation. Today, we would be seeing headlines that assured us France was a lost cause and would never see democracy. Of course, unlike Iraq, they had little external support to stabilize or ward off the inevitable return to despotic rule under Napolean and the return of the monarchy for several decades.

Another interesting similarity:

In the summer of 1793, the French Revolution was threatened both by internal enemies and conspirators, and by foreign European monarchies fearing that the Revolution would spread. Almost all European governments in that era were based on royal sovereignty, whether absolute or constitutional, rather than the popular sovereignty asserted by the revolutionary French. Foreign powers wanted to stifle the democratic and republican ideas, which they feared to pose a threat to their own respective countries’ stability. Their armies were pressing on the border of France (see French Revolutionary Wars).


We often see bloggers discuss the similarities in developing democracies in nations such as Japan and Germany where democratic ideas had little if any history. We talk about how long it took to build government and infrastructure, create a democracy. But, in all the struggles for Democracy, I've always found the French/Iraq comparison to be the most viable save that the French had try to destroy their clergy as oppose to use it as a base for governance as we see in Iraq.

It took the French four years before they finally executed King Louis XVI. They even argued over whether it was right, necessary or beneficial. He even received a trial, though I'm certain it was a lot less judicial than Saddam's circus. The political wranglings of post Revolutionary France were no less torturous. Maybe even worse, all things considered.

Yet, here they are, 200 years later, believing themselves to be the arbiters of real democracy and foreign policy. The most tolerant society.

So, the policy of democracy and freedom are dead?

Or, is it that the "realists" are still trying to cling to the throne of their "righteousness"?

A response to Messrs. Buckley, Will and Fukuyama

I also recommend this video for self education. (h/t Blackfive)